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History repeatedly demonstrates the difficulties faced by large conventional powers confronting decentralized resistance movements. From the American Revolution to Vietnam and Afghanistan, weaker forces have often offset military inferiority through mobility, dispersion, decentralization, local support, and the avoidance of decisive engagements.

While George Washington and the American Patriots are often credited with defeating the British Empire through asymmetric warfare, Washington arrived at that strategy belatedly and embraced it only partially. His instinct was to fight as a state—with a professional army, centralized administration, and conventional military institutions.

Charles Lee, on the other hand, recognized much earlier that America’s greatest strengths lay in decentralized resistance, militia warfare, and making British occupation prohibitively expensive. The distinction mattered not only militarily but politically, as conventional warfare demanded many of the fiscal and administrative measures that accompanied the Revolution. In reality, Washington gradually moved toward a strategy of exhaustion, avoidance, and attrition, while Charles Lee had recognized from the beginning that America’s greatest military advantage lay in avoiding the sort of conventional contest Britain wanted to fight.

The Continental Congress had the option between both men—George Washington and Charles Lee. In Conceived in Liberty, Rothbard wrote regarding the choice between Washington and Lee, “What Congress decided to do about that army would determine what it would do about the entire Revolution.” These men had entirely different strategies as to how to fight the British and maintain independence. Obviously, Washington was chosen over Lee, however, this article seeks to explore the little-known alternative: What if Charles Lee and his strategy had been chosen instead?

At the outset, a word of caution is necessary. We always have to be careful with speculation from counterfactual history and not overstate unverifiable conclusions. There are limits on the conclusive power of available evidence and there were negatives of Lee’s strategy. Human decisions, unforeseen circumstances, and countless variables make definitive conclusions impossible. Moreover, Lee’s proposed approach was not without risks or drawbacks of its own.

We can, however, examine what did happen, the available evidence, appreciate Lee and the logic behind his proposed strategy, and recognize some of the drawbacks of Washington’s strategy. Such an exercise helps guard against historical determinism—the assumption that the course of events was inevitable—or that Washington’s state-centered approach to warfare was the only realistic option. The American Revolution could have been fought differently. Charles Lee believed it should have been, and his arguments deserve closer examination.

This key decision of the Continental Congress matters because the way a war is fought affects the outcomes. It is the contention of this article that the choice to fight like a state means either losing or winning like a state.

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