ID Verification Breach Exposes Millions of Sensitive Identity Documents

If you ever needed more proof that governments pressuring companies to collect ID data from customers or users is a bad idea, you only have to look at what happened this week. A dark-web service advertised on August 31 has been offering over 153 million scans of driver’s licenses, more than 10 million other identity cards, over 3 million travel documents and/or international IDs, and at least 579,000 medical cards.

The data apparently stems from a company hired to verify people’s identities. The service, called Nexus, was advertised on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit.

Security researcher Brian Krebs found that a blank search on Nexus returned about 11.5 million result pages with roughly 15 results per page. This would support the claim that there were over 153 million license scans in the database, and the number increased by nearly 400,000 in 24 hours.

Nexus itself claimed to have “continuously exfiltrated new data for over a year into our private database” – but this is not verified and could be an advertising claim.

What Krebs was able to verify is that his own Virginia license was among those available on the site. He searched with permission for the licenses of more than a dozen friends and relatives; nine people whose records appeared said that the attached timestamps matched or closely tracked their travels.

In the case of Krebs and his mother, the timestamps corresponded to a June 2025 car rental from Hertz. Their records were created seconds apart, matching their account that they handed both licenses to the rental representative at the same time.

Krebs’s record contained three pairs of images showing the front and back of the license in visible light, infrared, and ultraviolet.

Privacy researcher Zach Edwards also found his license on Nexus. Its timestamp matched a trip to Las Vegas, where he had presented the document to TSA, the Aria hotel and the Planet13 dispensary. Edwards said the dispensary was the only one of the three places where he knew the license had been scanned.

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Microsoft knows your entire browser history — and it can send it to the FBI

Virtual Private Networks are meant to shield your browsing history from all manner of prying eyes, including your internet service provider, your workplace or school, and even potential hackers. If you use a VPN with your Windows PC, though, I have some bad news: Microsoft has a full record of your browsing habits, and it can even report your activity to the FBI.

According to court documents released on July 1, a 19-year-old young man working with the cyber criminal group known as Scattered Spider was caught hacking into a computer system belonging to a luxury jewelry store. While inside, the hacker stole company data and demanded $8 million in cryptocurrency for ransom. Ultimately, the jewelry store kicked the hacker out of its system without paying the ransom, and the perpetrator was later arrested and charged.

It’s a simple case of conspiracy, digital intrusion, and fraud … but there’s a catch.

The hacker’s identity should have been hidden from the feds.

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Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology: The Largest US Biometric Database You’ve Never Heard Of

After being troubled by delays and budget concerns for nearly a decade, the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) program will become the US government’s largest biometric database when it launches in September. The program has also been plagued by privacy concerns raised by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which has warned that HART has “gaps” in its privacy policies.

HART will be managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and will store and process biometric data such as digital fingerprints, iris scans, and faceprints that have been gathered by DHS and its various sub-agencies. According to DHS, government agencies may seek to access this data for national security reasons, law enforcement, immigration and border management, intelligence gathering, background investigations for national security positions, and certain positions of public trust.

While HART is set to complete “initial operating capability” in September 2026, the system is not scheduled to be fully completed until 2027. The system was originally announced in 2015 as a replacement for the legacy Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), which was originally developed in 1994 as a law enforcement system for collecting and processing biometric data from individuals apprehended by border security or immigration officials. In 2013, the DHS’ Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) began plans to replace IDENT with HART. HART was set to become operational in December 2018 but was delayed numerous times due to budget concerns.

Since the initial announcement regarding the transition from IDENT to HART, the GAO and digital rights groups have raised concerns about the government upgrading and centralizing its repository of sensitive personal information of millions of Americas.

In February 2020, DHS published its original HART Privacy Impact Assessment to “assess and mitigate any potential privacy risks.” While the system wasn’t yet active, DHS said they “anticipated potential privacy risks associated with the privacy sensitive system” and “sought to proactively develop appropriate privacy safeguards to be implemented” throughout HART’s development.

In September 2023, the GAO released their own report detailing what it saw as “gaps” in privacy policies required by the Office of Management and Budget. The GAO said DHS implemented only five of twelve privacy requirements. GAO noted that the 2020 privacy impact assessment was “missing key information,” including on whose data will be stored in the system and the partners with whom the system will share the data.

The GAO report also said the HART program did not have “assurances that partners that provide information to the system will appropriately retain and dispose of personally identifiable information.” GAO concluded by stating that until DHS addressed these “privacy weaknesses,” there is no assurance that the personal data gathered on hundreds of millions of individuals will be “appropriately protected.”

In August 2024, DHS released an updated Privacy Impact Assessment for HART in an attempt to “clarify and address points raised by external oversight bodies.” The assessment provided answers to some of the questions posed by the 2023 GAO report, namely whose information will be stored and with whom it will be shared.

“HART will contain personally identifiable information, including biometric data and associated biographic information, on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and foreign nationals,” the assessment stated.

The report says biometric data held in HART may be shared with every agency of the DHS, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), as well as other federal agencies such as the State Department, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Defense (DOD). It also states that biometric data may be shared with “elements of the Intelligence Community (IC).”

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DOJ: TikTok to pay $400M in settlement over suit alleging violation of children’s privacy law

The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a $400 million settlement with TikTok over a lawsuit alleging the company violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA).

As part of the agreement with TikTok, its developer ByteDance and related entities, the DOJ said in a Friday press release that the social media giant will pay $300 million immediately and the additional $100 million when certain conditions are met regarding a previous legal dispute with Musical.ly, TikTok’s predecessor.

“This settlement is a major victory for American children and parents,” said Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward Jr.

“The Department’s priority is ensuring that children are protected online and that companies entrusted with their personal information meet their legal obligations,” Woodward continued.

COPPA dictates that online services aimed at children must obtain parental consent before collecting personal information from users under 13 years old.

The suit alleging that TikTok violated this law was filed by the DOJ in 2024, though the Justice Department asserted that the social media company had experienced immense internal changes since that time.

“Since the Justice Department filed its complaint in 2024, TikTok has undergone significant changes to its ownership, management, compliance functions, and privacy practices,” the release stated.

“The company has implemented extensive measures designed to strengthen safeguards for younger users, improve age-related controls, and enhance parental oversight,” it continued.

In January of this year, TikTok announced that a majority American-owned joint venture was established to comply with President Donald Trump’s 2025 executive order requiring the company’s divestiture in order to keep operating in the U.S.

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US prosecutors charge Atlanta man after GrapheneOS phone wipes itself during airport search

 A federal case in Atlanta is raising questions about a privacy-focused mobile operating system, with prosecutors arguing that its features were used to erase evidence. The US Department of Justice is attempting to prosecute Atlanta resident Sam Tunick under a federal statute that makes it a crime to destroy property in an effort to prevent it from being seized.

The case centers on Tunick’s use of GrapheneOS, an open-source operating system that works on Google Pixel phones and lets users enter a passcode to wipe a device clean.

Experts said the legal approach is unusual and may be the first time the law has been aimed at an operating system. “It’s concerning – and sends the message that [GrapheneOS] is criminal by default,” said Christophe Boutry, a cybersecurity and surveillance expert. Boutry and Bill Buddington, senior staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, both said they had not seen a similar case.

The incident began at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport on January 24 of last year. Tunick had just returned from a trip to the Dominican Republic when he was stopped for questioning. According to court testimony, federal agents had already circulated his name and photo internally, saying he was under investigation for “suspected terrorism activities” because of his alleged association with the movement against Cop City.

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The Fourth Circuit Says Border Agents Can Search Your Phone By Hand, No Suspicion Required

The Fourth Circuit issued a disappointing opinion in U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo, a case in which EFF filed an amicus brief, alongside the national ACLU, its Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia affiliates, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).

We argued that electronic device searches at the border should require a warrant based on probable cause, but at minimum, regardless of whether an officer searches by hand or with forensic software that plugs into a device and downloads its entire contents for search, the same Fourth Amendment standard should apply to all device searches at the border.

Unfortunately, the court rejected that argument and ruled that a lower standard applies to manual searches, allowing the government to conduct extraordinarily invasive electronic device searches without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply because the border officer chooses to search by hand rather than with a forensic tool.

The Border Search Exception Meets Your Phone

The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches of persons or property be reasonable, which usually means obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a judge.

But a warrantless search can still be reasonable if it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, including the exception that allows officers to search your belongings at the border. The border search exception allows warrantless searches of persons or property crossing the U.S. border, including the functional equivalent of the border such as international airports, given the government’s interests in controlling who and what may enter the country.

Historically, courts have categorized border searches of luggage, vehicles, and personal effects as “routine” and thus reasonable even if conducted without any suspicion that the traveler has engaged in wrongdoing; courts have also held that more invasive “nonroutine” searches, such as certain body searches and searches that damage property, require reasonable suspicion.

But a person’s privacy interests in the personal data on a phone or laptop are extraordinarily different than their limited privacy interests in the contents of their suitcase.

The Supreme Court addressed cell phone privacy in Riley v. California (2014), holding that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to cell phones, thereby generally requiring a warrant for phone searches, at least at the interior of the country. The court recognized the unprecedented privacy interests people have in their cell phones and how even brief manual searches can reveal the “sum of an individual’s private life,” including our political affiliations, religious beliefs, sexuality, and more. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that because electronic device searches bear “little resemblance” to searches of bags or physical containers, they should be evaluated differently.

Following Riley, the Fourth Circuit considered two border device search cases involving forensic searches, in which border officers used external software to extract and analyze a device’s data.

In U.S. v. Kolsuz (2018), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic search of a cell phone at the border “must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion” of a transnational offense, but the court declined to decide whether the standard is only reasonable suspicion or instead a probable cause warrant.

Then in U.S. v. Aigbekaen (2019), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic device search at the border in support of a purely domestic law enforcement investigation requires a warrant. The court also reiterated the general Kolsuz rule for a forensic border-related device search: the “Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception’s purposes of protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import contraband.”

In Belmonte Cardozo, manual searches were finally before the court.

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Comcast Turns Millions Of Routers Into Motion Sensors – The Same WiFi Signals Can ID You With 99.5% Accuracy

Dear Comcast customers: The internet gateway in your living room is now a motion sensor. It’s free of charge, and the data can go to law enforcement without further notice. What’s more, researchers have already shown that these same signals can identify exactly who is in the room.

On Tuesday, Comcast unveiled Xfinity Shield, a home security platform built entirely around the WiFi network. Its centerpiece, WiFi Motion, turns the leased gateway into a motion detector at no extra charge. According to Comcast, a typical customer has roughly 36 devices connected to their WiFi.

WiFi Motion works because a human body moving through a room disturbs the signal field between the gateway and stationary connected devices, like a printer or a game console. While the feature is opt-in and – according to Comcast’s rollout materials – does not track phones or reach through WiFi extenders, those limitations are choices Comcast made in software, not limitations of the technology itself.

Comcast says WiFi Motion works “without recording video, capturing images or identifying individuals.”

The company is not shy about identification as a product. The $15-a-month tier, Xfinity Shield Select, adds AI-powered cameras that identify people, pets, packages and vehicles. The free tier’s restraint is a line drawn one product SKU away.

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X Wins Australian Case Over Private Message Scanning Rule

Australia’s eSafety Commissioner wrote a rule requiring online services to scan what their users send each other. Not to act on reports, but to run detection systems across private messages before anyone has complained, hunting child sexual abuse and pro-terror material. Top censor, Julie Inman Grant, wrote it herself, under powers the Online Safety Act hands her, and breaching it carries penalties of up to $49.5 million.

Then she took the view that it covered social media platforms as well, because they let users send each other messages.

On August 12, the Federal Court told her it does not. The Relevant Electronic Services Standard “does not apply” to X, Justice Elizabeth Raper held, ruling for the platform in a case it brought in May 2025. It “would be rather perverse for a social media service…not to enable messaging or chat between end users,” X’s barrister had argued — on eSafety’s reading, having a DM function was enough to pull a platform into a rulebook written for something else.

The distinction is important because of who writes what. Social media services in Australia are covered by a code developed with the industry, X included. The RES Standard is not a negotiated code. It is an instrument the Commissioner drafts and enforces herself. The standard says it applies “to the exclusion of any industry code” — so reading it to cover social media would have let the instrument she controls displace the one she negotiated.

Raper said so directly. “I accept X Corp’s characterisation of the facts that the RES Standard has been made by the commissioner…as a standard applicable to participants in a different section of the online industry, that are specified…as ‘providers of relevant electronic services’,” she wrote.

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The Right To Be Left Alone

“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness… They conferred against the Government the right to be let alone — most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” ~ Justice Louis D. Brandeis (1856-1941)

The rapid spread of public surveillance cameras represents something far more consequential than a new piece of police technology. It represents a fundamental change in the relationship between the individual and the state.

These cameras allow government agents to record, identify, catalog and retroactively track the movements of people who have committed no crime, are suspected of no wrongdoing and have done nothing to invite government scrutiny. That’s not public safety. It’s an assault upon individual privacy.

Privacy is not a privilege granted by government. It is an aspect of personal liberty that government exists to protect. It is a natural human right protected from the government in the Bill of Rights. The fact that a person leaves his home and travels upon a public road does not mean that he has surrendered that right.

There is an enormous moral and constitutional difference between a police officer who happens to observe a person in public and government surveillance that automatically and systematically records that person’s vehicle, location and movements; and stores that information for future use.

A free society doesn’t just protect people from crime; it protects them from arbitrary government. The presumption is liberty. Government is the negation of liberty. A person should not have to establish his innocence before the government leaves him alone. The burden always belongs to the government to justify all intrusions into personal liberty. Police cameras reverse that principle. They collect information about everyone the camera views and leave it to individuals to challenge the collections afterward.

The Constitution requires articulable suspicion connecting the person being surveilled to a legitimate law-enforcement objective to justify public surveillance. A vague assertion that the technology might someday help solve a crime or enhance public safety does not meet that standard.

The view that personal privacy and public safety are in equipoise — that they are merely two competing interests of equal moral and legal weight from which government officials are entitled to choose subjectively their preferred balance — is the core of authoritarianism.

Safety is one of the legitimate purposes for which government exists. Privacy is among the personal liberties that government exists to protect. It cannot be taken away without judicial approval. Government cannot justify violating a natural right merely by asserting that doing so might make people safer. If that were so, there would be no meaningful boundary on any governmental power.

There is a profound difference between investigating a specific crime through constitutionally authorized surveillance and constructing a permanent infrastructure of suspicionless surveillance. The former begins with evidence and seeks information relevant to a particular governmental purpose. The latter begins with everyone and waits for the evidence.

When 7,000 American police departments have these systems with no legislative approvals, we have the police making policy judgments. They are deciding that the government should possess a new capacity to observe innocent people, what information should be collected, how long it should be retained, who should have access to it and what purposes may justify searches; all this irrespective of the Constitution.

Those are not merely administrative questions. They are questions about personal liberty.

If elected legislators believe that such surveillance is necessary, they should publicly debate it, enact specific legislation mandating warrants, establish meaningful limitations and accept responsibility before the voters. The decision should not be buried in a police procurement process or treated as an ordinary equipment purchase.

Liberty cannot depend upon the benevolence, restraint or good intentions of government employees. The premise of the Constitution is that government power must be limited, checked and divided because government officials are human beings who possess power and will inevitably have incentives to abuse it.

The answer is not better government surveillance. The answer is what the Fourth Amendment requires: No government surveillance without search warrants.

The constitutional question cannot be reduced to whether someone was physically standing in a public place. A police officer seeing a car pass by is one thing. A government database capable of reconstructing months of a person’s movements is something fundamentally different.

The difference is the difference between observation and surveillance.

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Meta Faces Criminal Complaint in Germany for Its AI-Glasses, Accused of Violating Privacy Laws

Who wants to be filmed all the time?

The struggle between new, useful tech gadgets and the objections that these new capabilities raise is a field expected to grow in the next few years, and make many lawyers very wealthy.

One such example is the Meta AI-Glasses.

In principle, it seems a great idea to pack so much computing power in a pair of glasses for our benefit.

But once you start to compute the legal and ethical objections that this gadget raises, it becomes a much less clear question.

Today (12), a German advocacy group took matters into their own hands, and filed a criminal complaint against Meta and other companies, ‘arguing the devices violate privacy laws’.

Reuters reported:

“Digital rights group HateAid said in a statement on Wednesday that the launch of the devices, the Ray-Ban Meta Wayfarer in particular, broke German digital privacy laws, in the latest sign of legal scrutiny in a nation where the right to privacy is highly valued.

‘There’s no place to escape from smart glasses. You have to expect at any moment to be filmed and then exposed on the internet’, said HateAid managing director Josephine Ballon.

The organization reported the management of Meta, units of spectacles maker EssilorLuxottica including Ray-Ban, as well as retailers Fielmann, Apollo-Optik, Mister Spex and MediaMarkt to the Frankfurt-based digital crime prosecution unit ZIT.”

The complaint is based on Germany’s federal digital data protection law, which prohibits the sale of communication devices designed to film people without them noticing.

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