Analysis: Connecticut’s AR-15 Ban Defense Relies on Misreading Medieval English History

The Supreme Court is about to decide the fate of so-called assault weapons bans, but the state backing them misrepresents the key history that will determine the outcome.

Connecticut just filed its response brief in Grant v. Higgins, defending its ban on possessing unregistered AR-15s and similar firearms. It has been consolidated with Viramontes v. Cook County. Oral arguments will be heard December 2, 2026. In the brief, Connecticut justifies its ban by citing historical English laws from as far back as the 14th Century that it argues prohibited possession of several kinds of weapons. Given what it held in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Supreme Court is unlikely to rely on English laws many decades or even centuries removed from the Founding when deciding the case.

However, even taken at face value, these older laws are not what Connecticut claims.

Connecticut first points to regulations on the lancegay. That weapon was “a type of spear or lance, but that it was probably considerably lighter than a full-length war lance,” according to the University of Bristol Centre for Medieval Studies’ David Scott-Macnab. Connecticut relies on two laws, one from 1383 and another from 1396, which it claims prohibited owning lancegays.

But the 1383 law only banned possessing a lancegay while riding. It prohibited carrying lancegays unless one had a special license from the King. Richard II later “affirmed the validity of his 1383 legislation” in 1396 with the second law Connecticut relies on and “ordained and assented that no man shall ride armed within the realm, against the form of the Statute of Northampton thereupon made, nor with launcegays.”

Again, this second law merely prohibited the carrying of lancegays while riding. English law did not ban possession of a lancegay in one’s home. Connecticut is misinterpreting these laws as a ban on possession to justify their ban on AR-15-style rifles.

Historical evidence demonstrates that lancegays weren’t just lawful to own; they were actually quite popular.

“Among the myriad items recorded in an inventory of the possessions of the English gentleman-soldier and landowner Sir John Fastolf Caister Castle, Norfolk, we find that his magna aula, or great hall, contained an assortment of weapons…a ‘Launce gay,’” Scott-Macnab wrote of the arms in 2009.

“[W]e find that Sir John Fastolfe was far from alone in owning such a weapon. Brother Hugh Middleton, commander of the English contingent of the Knights Hospitaler at Rhodes, owned one too,” he wrote.

Court records from the Borough of Nottingham show “[e]ven common folk with no military associations seem to have possessed the weapon, as we learn from a legal action brought by John Melburn of Nottingham, a weaver, for the return of a lancegay-shaft.”

If the lancegay was illegal to possess, Mr. Melburn could not have brought a judicial action to compel its return. Nor could his action have been successful, which it was. And “John Scrope” “bequeathed his ‘launchgay cum uno batillaxe’ to his brother in 1452” via a will which was legally registered. If the lancegay was illegal to possess, then Mr. Scrope would not have been able to legally bequeath his lancegay to his brother.

Further evidence that Englishmen were not prohibited from possessing lancegays comes from a “stern edict issued by Henry VI to the sheriff of Worcester in 1457” that “the king would not tolerate a variety of unlawful acts, including riding about armed with lancegays and other weapons.”

“The King to the Sheriff of Worcester, greeting. . . . We instruct you . . . to proclaim in public that no-one . . . ride on horseback armed with lances, lancegays, swords and other weapons, contrary to the laws and statutes promulgated and published on this issue . . . .’),” the edict said.

If there was a ban on possession of the lancegay, then this edict would not have included the lancegay in a ban on the carrying of weapons which were legal to own. In fact, Englishmen were long required to own many of the weapons in this list. The 1181 Assize of Arms required all British men to own arms commensurate with their financial ability to purchase them.

Connecticut has misinterpreted these laws as prohibitions on possession. In reality, it was legal to own lancegays in Medieval England.

Connecticut also relied on Medieval English restrictions on crossbows and handguns. The first of these is most readily distinguishable because it had an express exemption for home defense.  “None  shall  shoot  with  a Cross  Bow, unless  for  Defence  of  his  House,  other  than  a Lord,  or  a Person  having  zoo  Marks  Freehold  per  Ann,” it read.

These laws culminated in 1542’s Acte Concerning Crossbows and Handguns. It prohibited some Englishmen from possessing crossbows and handguns. But there are several differences between this law and Connecticut’s modern AR-15 ban.

First, this law only applied to the poor. It did not apply to those who “have lands, tenements, fees, annuities or office to the yearly value of one hundred pounds.” Thus, it was a class-based law that is irrelevant in deciding the scope of the American right to arms. Furthermore, the primary purpose behind England’s ban on crossbows and small handguns was to aid in the national defense. The express rationale of that law was to promote the use of the longbow.

“[S]erving men now of late have laid apart the good and laudable exercise of the long bow, which always heretofore hath been the surest safeguard and continual defense of this Realm of England, and an inestimable dread and terror to the enemies of the same,” it read.

Englishmen were encouraged, and often required, to own longbows in particular. Edward III of England’s declaration of 1363 expressly encouraged their use:

“Whereas the people of our realm, rich and poor alike, were accustomed formerly in their games to practise archery – whence by God’s help, it is well known that high honour and profit came to our realm, and no small advantage to ourselves in our warlike enterprises… that every man in the same country, if he be able-bodied, shall, upon holidays, make use, in his games, of bows and arrows… and so learn and practise archery,” he wrote.

Further, in 1511, Henry VIII ordered that all men under the age of 60 practice shooting regularly, and that fathers be responsible for providing their sons and young male servants with archery equipment and training. England even banned other sports to promote the practice of archery. The Unlawful Games Act of 1541 was an Act of the Parliament of England, designed to prohibit “Several new devised Games” that caused “the Decay of Archery.” All Men under the Age of sixty Years “shall have Bows and Arrows for shooting.” Men and children between seven “Years and Seventeen shall have a Bow and 2 Shafts.” Men above seventeen “shall keep a Bow and 4 Arrows.” That law remained in effect until the Gaming Act of 1845 repealed much of it.

The 16th Century saw the advent of crossbows and early firearms. As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority in Bruen, “Henry VIII worried that handguns threatened Englishmen’s proficiency with the longbow—a weapon many believed was crucial to English military victories in the 1300s and 1400s, including the legendary English victories at Crécy and Agincourt.” That concern over military readiness catalyzed the laws Connecticut cites, whereas Connecticut alleges its ban on AR-15 rifles prevents crime.

Thus, the “how” (a ban on possession just for the poor) and the “why” (national defense) of the 16th-century ban are different from Connecticut’s law. Connecticut’s claim that crossbows and handguns were completely banned because they were highly dangerous weapons is simply not true. To the extent they were restricted, it was because they were not effective enough in a military context.

Additionally, the complete arms bans that Connecticut did identify were very short-lived.

The first is Stuart Royal Proclamation No. 126 from 1613, which banned small handguns. However, this law was amended shortly after, in 1616, to ban only the making, selling, or carrying of them. And, contrary to Connecticut’s assertion that this law prohibited small handguns because they were exceptionally dangerous, the 1613 law makes clear those items were typically used by criminals. The 1616 law expanded on this and explained that these weapons were not suitable for military purposes or self-defense.

A ban on carry is not the same as the ban on unregistered “assault weapon” possession in Connecticut. Furthermore, the rationale for this prohibition was much different. The 1616 Stuart Royal Proclamation Number 160 said the weapons were prohibited because they were “vtterly vnseruiceable for defence, Militarie practise, or other lawfull vse, but odious, and noted Instruments of murther, and mischiefe.” As with the 1542 law discussed above, the concern was these weapons were not effective for self-defense or military purposes. Contrary to Connecticut’s representation, these weapons were not restricted because they were especially dangerous. Their carry was prohibited because their typical use lacked a lawful purpose.

At most, this law confirms what Heller already tells us: that the weapons protected by the right to arms are those in common use for lawful purposes.

Connecticut then relies on the Game Act of 1671 as an example of a law that banned all gun possession. There’s some dispute among historians about the scope of the law, but the text indicates it was merely designed to prevent the peasantry from hunting. It prohibited people who were not wealthy from having  “Guns, Bowes, Grey hounds, Setting-dogs, Ferretts, Cony-doggs, Lurchers, Hayes, Netts, Lowbells, Hare-pipes, Ginns, Snares or other Engines aforesaid” for hunting.

Historically, as the Duke Center for Firearms Law’s Catie Carberry has pointed out, the term gun did not refer to pistols. It makes sense that pistols were excluded because the law’s express purpose was to prevent the poor from hunting, and pistols are less suited for that purpose. While the law did cover guns when first passed, it was quickly replaced by the Game Act of 1692. That act superseded the previous act and removed “guns” from its list of prohibited items.

It is likely not a coincidence that this law was passed around the same time as the 1689 English Bill of Rights, which guaranteed “[t]hat the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.” However, the 1692 Game Act and its subsequent amendments contained a clause which still prohibited any other “engine” which could be used for hunting–engine essentially meaning instrument.

Subsequent litigation demonstrated that these laws did not apply to firearms when not used for hunting. In 1739’s Rex v. Gardner, an individual was charged with violating the Game Act of 1705 for owning a gun. The court concluded that “a gun differs from nets and dogs, which can only be kept for an ill purpose, and therefore this conviction must be quashed.”

“[I]f the statute is to be construed so largely, as to extend to the bare having of any instrument, that may possibly be used in destroying game, it will be attended with very great inconvenience; there being scarce any, tho’ ever so useful, but what may be applied to that purpose,” the justices reasoned “And tho’ a gun may be used in destroying game, and when it is so, doth then fall within the words of the act; yet as it is an instrument proper, and frequently necessary to be kept and used for other purposes, as the killing of noxious vermin, and the like, it is not the having a gun, without applying it in the destruction of game, that is prohibited by the act.”

Similarly, in 1752’s Wingfield v. Stratford & Osman, a man challenged his conviction under the Game Act and the confiscation of his gun and dog. The prosecution’s plea was held faulty, but the court pointed out that it would have held for appellant in any case as the prosecution had not alleged that the gun had been used for killing game:

“It is not to be imagined, that it was the Intention of the Legislature, in making the 5 Ann.c.14 to disarm all the People of England,” the court wrote. “[A]s Guns are not expressly mentioned in that Statute, and as a Gun may be kept for the Defence of a Man’s House, and for divers other lawful Purposes, it was necessary to alledge, in order to its being comprehended within the Meaning of the Words ‘any other Engines to kill the Game’, that the Gun had been used for killing the Game.”

As these two cases make clear, the inclusion of guns in the Game Act was short-lived, and the Act was quickly amended to remove guns. Connecticut’s reliance on the Game Act of 1671 is misplaced.

The vast majority of the laws Connecticut relies on either did not ban the possession of arms or exempted the wealthy, and the ones that did ban possession did not last. Ultimately, the historical gun regulations the state relies on to defend its modern AR-15 ban did not operate in a similar manner.

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Ohio GOP Commissioner Under Fire After Son Convicted on 27 Counts of Child Sex Abuse, Family Says She Knew

Ohio Republican Commissioner Drenda Keesee faces a resignation demand from her own county GOP after her son’s conviction on 27 child sex abuse counts. Chairman Fred Dailey said sworn testimony, including her daughter’s, indicated Keesee knew about the abuse and failed to report it.

Knox County Common Pleas Judge Richard Wetzel found Gary “Tom” Keesee Jr. guilty on Nov. 6. The convictions include 11 counts of rape. Three women testified that he abused them as children.

“I’m calling upon Commissioner Keesee to resign her elected position immediately,” Dailey said in his Nov. 6 statement.

Dailey also cited 21 missed commissioner meetings this year. Voters elected Keesee in November 2024.

Keesee and her husband, Gary, founded Faith Life Church in New Albany, where their son previously held a leadership role. The victims had church ties, though the abuse did not occur on church property.

The parents told the congregation they would continue leading the church. “That assignment has not changed,” Gary Keesee Sr. said during Sunday’s service.

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Idaho Election Officials Find 2,675 Ballots Left Out of Results

Officials have discovered that thousands of ballots were left out of reported election results in two Idaho counties during post-election reviews.

More than 2,600 ballots were either omitted from reported results or went uncounted on election night in two Idaho counties following last week’s midterm elections, prompting a full recount in one county.

Latah County in North Idaho began a full recount Tuesday after local officials discovered that votes from 2,342 ballots had not been included in publicly reported results.

The ballots, representing a portion of early voting, had been tabulated by election machines but were not included in the county’s publicly reported results. The discrepancy was discovered during the county’s review ahead of its official canvas.

Laura Heinse, a Democratic candidate for county commissioner, separately filed a formal complaint asking the Secretary of State’s Office to require a full recount of her race. She argued that the omission raised questions about election-night reconciliation and whether other reporting discrepancies existed.

“This is a significant discrepancy in results, and we are taking it very seriously,” Secretary of State Phil McGrane said in a statement on Monday. “Every Idahoan needs to have confidence that their vote counted, and we’re working closely with Latah County Clerk Julie Fry and her team to ensure the results are accurately reported, and every vote is properly accounted for.”

Newsweek reached out to McGrane via email for comment.

An early review by the Secretary of State’s Office indicated that the omitted votes would not change the winner of any race. However, the size of the discrepancy drew particular concern because several contests were relatively close, including races for three state legislative seats, two county commission seats, county clerk and county treasurer.

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Surprise! Muslim elected to American state legislature demands intern applicants be MUSLIM!

Social media has labeled the actions of a newly elected Democrat Colorado state legislator as clearly illegal and called for an investigation immediately.

This after Iman Jodeh, newly elected in the midterms and preparing to take her office in January, posted an opening for an internship that requires the applicants to be Muslim.

Or North African.

Colorado, of course, already is an extremist state, having Democrat control of the governor’s office, both houses of the legislature and the state Supreme Court, which exhibited its blatant partisanship by trying to ban President Donald Trump from the 2024 election ballot.

There, too, Phil Weiser, who is to be governor in a few months, is demanding that he has the authority to change ballot issues on which citizens voted, and approved.

They deal with banning “gender” body mutilations on children and requiring boys to be on boys athletic teams, and not in girls locker rooms.

He is insisting they’ll have to be fixed, so he’ll be working on changing what the voters actually approved.

A report on Jodeh’s agenda at the Daily Caller said she “announced a paid internship at the state capitol with qualifications requiring that candidates identify as Muslim or descend from predominantly Muslim regions of the world.”

Jodeh posted, “”Gain first-hand experience at the Colorado Capitol in Sen. Jodeh and Rep. Zokaie’s offices!”

The first requirement is applicants must “Identify as a Muslim and/or as Middle Eastern, North African, or South Asian.”

It is being offered under the “Middle Eastern, North African, South Asian (MENASA) & Muslim Joint Legislative Caucus.”

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits hiring or firing based on national origin and religion, among other immutable characteristics. Colorado state law also prohibits discrimination against employees based on protected classes such as religion and national origin.

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The Non-Obvious Anatomy of a Slow Collapse: How Economic Decline Reshapes Nations, Concentrates Wealth, and Paves the Way for a New Order

Debt is a promise dressed as a number, and the rich world has spent four decades making promises its productive capacity cannot sustain. Global borrowing has passed three hundred trillion dollars, while American federal debt alone exceeds thirty-seven trillion, with interest payments now outstripping the entire defense budget. Yet the real concern lies not in the size of these figures but in what they reveal about the direction of the economy. In 2022 and 2023, the American money supply contracted for the first time since the Great Depression, an unusual reversal that suggests the economic engine is beginning to run backward. Nothing detonated. There was no sudden banking crisis or dramatic collapse to signal that something fundamental had changed. The system simply began to falter, and the significance of that shift is easy to miss precisely because it happened without a defining moment.

Most discussions of economic breakdown revolve around the familiar symptoms: jobs disappear, prices climb, markets tumble, and savings dwindle. These are the immediate consequences, the first act of a crisis that has already received more than enough attention. The deeper changes take longer to emerge and are far less obvious. They surface in places economists rarely examine closely, from the trust between neighbours and the stability of family life to the human body’s capacity to endure chronic stress. They also shape the explanations people reach for when their lives no longer work as they once did. A partial collapse — a prolonged, grinding downturn rather than a sudden economic shock — does not destroy a society in a single blow. Its effects accumulate gradually, changing how people live and relate to one another until the country that emerges on the other side may look familiar in name but is fundamentally different in character.

The implications become darker when we consider who stands to benefit from such a transformation. A society under sustained pressure is not merely vulnerable; it can also be steered, and those who already hold the greatest wealth and influence have reasons to favour a controlled demolition over an unpredictable breakdown. The phrase order out of chaos captures this dynamic. Once associated with secret societies, it has found its way into discussions of central banking and World Economic Forum panels, carrying the idea that periods of disorder can create opportunities to reshape the system that follows. Sometimes chaos is deliberately engineered; in other cases, those with power simply recognise an opportunity and exploit it. Distinguishing between the two is not always straightforward, but the difference matters: one involves a plan, the other a willingness to take advantage of events. The following analysis examines the less visible consequences of a partial collapse, the changes that rarely make headlines, and the question that runs beneath them all: who is already positioned to profit when the smoke finally clears?

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Algeria jails state TV journalist for three years over Facebook posts

A court in Chéraga, west of Algiers, sentenced journalist Abdelali Mezghiche on Sunday to three years in prison and a fine of 200,000 Algerian dinars (about US$1,500), the New York-based press freedom group Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported Monday.

CPJ says the case stems from posts on his Facebook page about public anger over the jailing of local figures in the southern city of Djanet.

Mezghiche was convicted on five misdemeanour counts, including publishing content deemed harmful to the national interest, inciting unarmed gatherings and spreading hate speech. A local journalist told CPJ he was convicted under Articles 96 and 100 of Algeria’s penal code.

Prosecutors had asked for five years at an October 25 hearing. His defence team plans to appeal.

A presenter of cultural programs on Algeria’s state-owned broadcaster since 2005, Mezghiche has also published three poetry collections, CPJ says. In February, CPJ said his Facebook page has more than 130,000 followers and that the posts had since been taken down.

State security officers arrested him in Algiers on February 5, according to CPJ, and an investigating judge ordered him held in pretrial detention four days later. He has been in Kolea Prison in Tipaza province since.

A February alert on the Eu SEE website gave a different account. It said he was arrested on February 9 on charges that included disturbing public order, spreading false information and belonging to a subversive group.

CPJ regional director Sara Qudah called the sentence “a blatant weaponization of the Algerian judiciary to silence critical voices.”

Emails CPJ sent to Algeria’s justice and interior ministries asking for comment went unanswered. At least seven journalists are jailed in Algeria for their work, the group says.

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Accused CCP Spy’s Circle Linked to Sinaloa Cartel Stash House and Cambodian Scam Empire

A California real estate agent accused of spying for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is tied through her romantic partner to a house the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identified as a stash house for a Sinaloa Cartel money-laundering network. Her partner’s business connections also lead to the alleged enforcer of a Cambodian scam empire.

FBI agents arrested Wanying “Heather” Zhang, 34, of Irvine, at Los Angeles International Airport on October 4, 2026, as she prepared to board a flight to Shanghai. A federal grand jury indicted her on October 9 on charges of conspiracy and acting as an unregistered agent of the People’s Republic of China. Her trial is scheduled for November 30 in federal court in Santa Ana.

Investigators believe Zhang received the surveillance assignment during a June 2025 meeting with a Chinese government contact in Changsha, China. On September 1, 2025, she and a companion identified in the complaint as “Individual 1” flew from Las Vegas to Seattle, rented a car, and drove to the home of Ting-Yu Lai, the son of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te.

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Infant Vaccination Increases Death Risk by Up to 112% vs Unvaxxed

A new study by Drs. Karl Jablonowski and Brian Hooker of Children’s Health Defense titled Increased Mortality Associated with 2-Month Old Infant Vaccinations, analyzed linked Louisiana Department of Health immunization and death registry data to evaluate whether routine two-month infant vaccinations (administered at 60–90 days of life) are associated with mortality in the subsequent month (90–120 days)

Using individual-level records from 1,225 infants who later died before age three, investigators compared infants vaccinated in the two-month window with those unvaccinated during the same period, while holding age-at-death constant.

Infants vaccinated at two months showed consistently higher odds of death in the following month, with statistically significant risk increases spanning individual vaccines, cumulative exposure, sex, race, and combination products.

Most alarming, infants who received all six recommended two-month vaccines had a 68 percent higher odds of death overall (OR = 1.68; p = 0.0043), with the risk surging to +68 percent in Black infants and +112 percent in female infants (OR = 2.12; p = 0.0083).

Mortality risk increased with cumulative vaccine exposure (dose–response)

A clear cumulative risk pattern emerged as more vaccines were administered at the 2-month visit:

  • All five 2-month vaccines (DTaP, rotavirus, HIB, polio, and pneumococcal vaccines) compared to unvaccinated infants:
    +60 percent (OR = 1.60; p = 0.0084 — statistically significant)
  • All six recommended vaccines (DTaP, rotavirus, HIB, polio, pneumococcal, and HepB vaccines) compared to unvaccinated infants:
    +68 percent (OR = 1.68; p = 0.0043 — statistically significant)

Subgroup analyses also showed even stronger cumulative effects:

  • Black infants (6 vaccines): +68 percent (OR = 1.68; p = 0.0311 — statistically significant)
  • Female infants (6 vaccines): +112 percent (OR = 2.12; p = 0.0083 — statistically significant)

This cumulative analysis—summarized in the paper’s abstract and Figure 6—represents one of the study’s central findings.

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Was Jeffrey Epstein a Spy?

Was Jeffrey Epstein a spy? The Epstein-is-a-spy parlor game has been going on for years. There are plenty of reasons to believe that he could have been an intelligence asset, but the House Oversight Committee report reaches no such conclusions.

There are legitimate questions about how this guy could move through the world with such impunity without government cover. The Committee plumbed ideas about how Epstein got acceptance and cover from legitimate business and elite society big shots, and did, in fact, ask if his advantages came from intelligence ties.

The Oversight Committee, looking into the government’s treatment of the pervert’s activities, found suspicious, though inconclusive, insights into this question. Spoiler alert: The Oversight Committee Report found massive problems with the government investigations into Epstein, as I reported in Epstein Report: Victim NDAs Blocked Justice, While Dems Just Wanted to Get Trump.

But what of the espionage ties?

Who else could possess passports with aliases for different countries — including Saudi Arabia — in his possession? That sounds like spycraft, doesn’t it?

Who has a girlfriend/accomplice whose dad was a suspected Mossad agent? Was Ghislaine Maxwell an intelligence asset?

Who was besties with the former head of Israeli intelligence and former Israeli PM Ehud Barak? Epstein.

Some of the suspicions about Epstein’s ties to intelligence came directly from reporting about Alexander Acosta, the former head of the Department of Justice’s South Florida U.S. Attorneys’ Office. Acosta allegedly said that Epstein “’belonged to intelligence’ — though Acosta denied ever making this statement during his transcribed interview with the Committee.”

These are tantalizing issues which are not conclusively answered in the House Oversight Committee majority report (there’s no minority report yet) about the government’s handling of the Epstein case. But they do offer some details from recycled media reports found in the footnotes.

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When A Society Has Reached Its Limits, Reforms No Longer Fix What’s Broken

The most difficult part of my framework to grasp is the keystone: our system has reached its limits. The difficulty is that this is impossible to understand if one is embedded in the system’s beliefs of how the world works and wedded to the system’s sclerosis via self-interest.

Once self-interest dominates, it locks the system into its current configuration because attempting to change anything rouses resistance from whatever interests depend on that part of the status quo for their piece of the pie.

The sustainability of the entire system is of no concern because the only thing that matters is keeping our piece of the pie intact as-is. Nothing can change because that threatens somebody’s share of the pie, i.e. how the system distributes income, gains, power and risk.

Everyone from the super-wealthy to low-income households fears any change that might reduce their security. Beneath our everyday awareness, a balance has been struck: if we just keep this exact arrangement as-is, everyone accepts the status quo.

This rigidity leads to sclerosis: the system has lost the flexibility and nimbleness needed to adapt. Any proposal that actually changes the socio-economic system is immediately struck off by those whose interests are threatened.

This leads to the substitution of artifice for authenticity – the other core concept that is impossible to understand if one is wedded to the status quo by self-interest and the fear of losing what we have.

Once a system has reached the point where authentic change becomes impossible because it disrupts the delicate balance of self-interest, it has reached its limits, and is set on run to failure, for a system that has lost its adaptive flexibility is doomed once conditions change.

Rather than face this disruptive reality, everyone wedded to the existing balance becomes dependent on expediencies that keep the system glued together, but at the cost of system stability. As self-interest and sclerosis dominate, the focus narrows to doing whatever it takes to maintain the increasingly unsustainable balance of interests.

This is how we’ve reached the point where the federal government borrows $2 trillion a year – 27% of its entire outlays – to maintain the precarious balance of every interest group. That this is unsustainable is obvious, but since real change is impossible because of the system’s limits, everyone approves of expediencies that only add to the destabilizing momentum of run to failure.

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