Tag: iran

The notion of a short and decisive war has always been a temptation for politicians. This notion holds a promise of quick victories, low costs, and clear triumphs. However, the course of history over the last few decades has indicated that wars do not always follow this pattern. The current conflict between the United States and Iran seems to be a clear manifestation of this reality, as the early indications of a quick victory are not supported by the fundamental realities of the conflict.

The fundamental reason why a quick victory might not be possible in this conflict is not related to military capabilities. The military capabilities of the United States are overwhelming, as they are far ahead of Iran in terms of technology, logistics, and global reach. In the early phases of this conflict, the U.S. forces, along with the Israeli military, struck thousands of targets in Iran, targeting its missile capabilities, naval forces, and military installations. According to experts, the initial objective of this campaign was to destroy the Iranian naval capabilities, missile systems, and nuclear facilities, as well as weakening Iranian influence in the region.

However, military success does not automatically translate into a corresponding level of political achievement. As many a strategic analyst has noted, “destroying capabilities does not necessarily translate into regime collapse, political transformation, or stability.” While military instruments are effective at destroying capabilities, they are not as effective at creating alternatives.

This tension represents the heart of the strategic problem facing the United States.

As a matter of fact, even before the war began, American intelligence assessments reportedly indicated that military intervention was not likely to result in a change of regime in Iran because the Iranian system was so resilient, and there was no opposition to replace it.

Such intelligence assessments are part of a larger trend in modern warfare, wherein systems under military pressure tend to become more, not less, cohesive. Leadership changes occur rapidly without necessarily altering the fundamental structures of power. In this current conflict, the speed with which a new leader was installed into the Iranian leadership structure was a manifestation of this trend.

For the strategist who hopes to achieve a rapid level of regime collapse, this level of resilience represents a formidable obstacle.

Another factor affecting the prospects of a swift victory is the symmetry of the strategic goals and objectives. While the US might hope for a decisive victory in the form of destroying the military capability of the adversary or changing its politics, the same is not necessarily true for Iran. In fact, it is possible that the Iranian strategy is simply to survive.

In an asymmetric war, survival is victory.

The Iranian strategy seems to be one of survival and waiting it out, and analysts are observing how the escalation of the war is less dependent on the ability of the two adversaries to match each other in conventional warfare and more dependent on the ability of one of the adversaries to make the conflict unsustainable for the other. This means the war is now one of endurance rather than one of firepower.

A prime example of this is the energy sector and how it can be considered a part of the strategic environment. The current situation with the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s total oil supply is shipped, has already caused economic concerns for the world as a whole. Analysts predict that if the current situation is not rectified, the price of oil could rise significantly, causing economic consequences for the world as a whole.

Similar concerns are now coming from financial institutions as well, with some predictions indicating that the conflict could have significant effects on the world’s markets and economic growth, thus showing the economic consequences of the escalation of the conflict.

The economic consequences of the conflict create a whole new aspect of the strategic environment of the war. The conflict is no longer limited to military facilities and vessels; it is now affecting global trade routes and economic growth, as well as the politics of nations.

History has shown that conflicts of such nature are rarely brief.

The United States has faced similar strategic conundrums in the past. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan both began with rapid military successes that destroyed pre-existing governments within a matter of weeks. However, the political and security aftermaths took years to resolve. The conclusion should not be drawn that military force is ineffectual in these situations but rather that military victories do not necessarily equate to political success.

The case in Iran is more complex.

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There may be no winner in the war on Iran. But, although it is Iran that is under attack, they will not be the only losers. This war, fought without legal reason or political or security justification, will have myriad losers. Here are five.

The first loser of the war on Iran is the Iranians. Iran has an “inalienable right to a civilian program that uses nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They signed the JCPOA nuclear agreement that closed all roads to a military nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) repeatedly verified that they were in full compliance. They were currently negotiating further voluntary limitations on their civilian nuclear program, which would have assured the world of the impossibility of diverting their civilian nuclear program to a military one. Nothing was illegal or unusual about Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.

But bombs fell on Iranians. The people of Iran live in daily terror. Their cities are being bombed, and their infrastructure and water desalination plants have been devastated. Nearly 20,000 civilian buildings have been damaged, including dozens of hospitals and schools. Their leader has been assassinated. Over 1,300 civilians, hundreds of them children, have been killed.

The second country that will pay a price for the war on Iran is Ukraine. Just as Russia is thought to be massing for a large late spring offensive, its war economy is being pumped full by the rising cost of oil; which was caused by the effective closing of the Strait of Hormuz and the resultant easing of sanctions on Russian oil, while Ukraine’s supply of weapons is being threatened. Russia will have the money to continue launching missiles and drones, and Ukraine will lack the missiles to defend against them.

The U.S. is firing an incredible number of interceptors to defend against Iranian missiles and drones. The war on Iran is using up the defensive weapons that would have been sent to Ukraine. “The biggest and most immediate impact will be on air defense,” Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow & Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities, told me, since “Ukraine depends almost entirely on the United States for air defense, especially Patriot air interceptors and AMRAAMs.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said, “We understand that a long war… and the intensity of the fighting will affect the amount of air defence equipment we receive.”

In this war of choice, the U.S. has made a bad choice, and it too will be a loser in this war. The U.S. will lose the war in Iran in four ways.

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The US Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program has newly issued a $10 million reward for information on the whereabouts of Iranian Supreme leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani.

The alert calls for information on the two “Iranian terrorist leaders” at a moment of ongoing heavy bombardment of Iran by the US and Israel. Interestingly the State Department said that informants could make people eligible for “relocation”. The Pentagon on Friday said it believes the new Ayatollah is likely wounded and disfigured.

“These individuals command and direct various elements of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which plans, organizes and executes terrorism around the world,” the alert stated.

It actually also seeks information on other top security and government officials. Below is the official US statement in part:

Rewards for Justice is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information on the key leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its component branches. These individuals command and direct various elements of the IRGC, which plans, organizes, and executes terrorism around the world.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of Iran’s official military, plays a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism as a key tool of Iranian statecraft.

Already amid the US-Israeli operation, at least 40 high-ranking government and military leaders have been killed. Many were slain in the opening days of the war, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

All of this seems part of a US-Israeli effort to foment spying and defections within Iranian ranks and society. There have been claims this week that Iranian citizens are feeding information to Israel – which of course means they are spying as assets.

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Iran said Saturday that all  countries besides the US and Israel may pass through the Strait of Hormuz, in a desperate attempt at coalition busting less than a day after the US bombed military targets on its oil-critical Kharg Island.

“As a matter of fact, the Strait of Hormuz is open,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said.

“It is only closed to the tankers and ships belong[ing] to our enemies, to those who are attacking us and their allies. Others are free to pass,” Araghchi told MS NOW. 

President Trump has threatened to destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure on  Kharg Island energy hub — through which  90% of its oil exports pass — if it refuses to allow safe passage.

Araghchi noted that many ships “prefer” not to undertake the journey due to “security concerns,” but insisted, “this has nothing to do with us.”

“And I can say that the Strait is not closed, but it is only closed to American, Israeli, you know, ships and tankers, and not to others.”

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One of the more fascinating sidelights of our war of choice in Iran is how it has reinforced the devastating consequences of our hollowed-out industrial base, consolidated commercial sector, and overreliance on long intermediated supply chains.

For example, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz carries implications for not only oil but also fertilizer, right at the height of the spring planting season. About one-third of the world’s fertilizer ships through the strait, and without access, prices have jumped and farmers are anxious. Yet there are enough natural resources in the United States—nitrogen, phosphate, potash—to serve all our fertilizer needs; in fact, in the 1930s and ’40s one of the largest fertilizer producers in the world was the Tennessee Valley Authority. This production was wound down in the 1970s; today the industry is dominated by two to four firms, and that may end up having existential implications for hungry people the world over.

A more comically shortsighted example concerns our depleted stock of munitions, one of the few industrial capacities America has retained but which still is imperiled by concentration and outsourcing. These are of course the basic materials necessary to prosecute a war, and you’d think it would be the one item countries would retain the ability to produce themselves. But our trillion-dollar military operates more like a welfare program to help underprivileged Northern Virginia contractors buy second homes and luxury yachts, not as a force that has what it needs when it needs it. Pacifists should rejoice; stupidity in military supply chains puts a binding limit on how many brown-skinned people we can kill.

In the 1990s, dozens of military contractors were reduced to five prime integrators, something demanded by Clinton Defense Secretary Les Aspin and his deputy (and future defense secretary) William Perry at a meeting known as the “Last Supper.” Nearly all weapons and delivery systems now flow through Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Dynamics. Executives at these companies were called into the White House last Friday—less than a week after the war began—to discuss how to accelerate offensive and especially defensive weapons production amid a shortage that already was weighing on the military. This was after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that the war was saved by shifting to smaller bombs rather than “exquisite” munitions for the campaign. If that was the case, why have the meeting?

Specifically, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile systems are so complex that only 96 get built per year; about one-quarter of the U.S. stockpile was used last year in Israel’s brief war with Iran, with many more flying every day as this war continues. Patriot interceptor systems are cheaper and easier to build, but inventories were a quarter full before the war started. Offensive Tomahawk missiles can be produced with greater frequency as well, but as of October last year the stockpile of that weapon was far short of its target. Something like $5.6 billion in weaponry was burned off in just the first two days of the Iran campaign. Trump’s lying aside, analysts who know something are clear on this point: The nation has a few weeks of bombing left before running out of the precision munitions typically used in modern warfare.

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