Tag: nuclear weapons

Washington Is Underwriting the Proliferation It Went to War To Stop

The Trump administration sent Congress its civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. Asked what the deal permits, the president wrote: There will be no enrichment of material. His own Energy Secretary, Chris Wright, has said the opposite. The agreement gives Riyadh a pathway to enrich uranium on its own soil, and in doing so the potential for a Saudi nuclear Bomb. To placate fears Wright has put enrichment years down the road but not in doubt. Wright is describing the document. Trump is describing a country he is at war with to prevent from doing exactly this.

The war is meanwhile six months old and the reader knows its shape. American and Israeli aircraft killed the Supreme Leader of Iran in February to end all Iranian enrichment and prevent Iran from ever building a weapon. It has not ended. A settlement deadline passed on 17 August with the president in no rush, and his Treasury Secretary now promises an economic D-Day, the toughest sanctions in the country’s history, on the concession that the bombing did not do what was promised. Enrichment is the thing the war is supposedly being waged for. It is also the thing the Saudi contract is for.

The agreement is a 123 agreement, the legal instrument that lets American firms build a foreign country’s nuclear program, and the Energy Department’s announcement calls it peaceful, upholding the highest standards of nonproliferation. Not so fast. Past American deals kept enrichment out of the recipient’s hands, because low-enriched fuel for a reactor and the highly enriched metal of a warhead come off the same cascades; the separative work that makes the first does most of the work of the second. The Saudi deal instead preserves the enrichment option and, on the reporting, opens a route to reprocess spent fuel, the plutonium road to a bomb that runs parallel to the uranium one. In place of international inspection it substitutes a bilateral arrangement whose terms are not public.

There is a standard for this, and it was set relatively recently and right next door. When a US firm built the Emirates’ reactors in 2009, the UAE volunteered the strictest safeguards on offer, renounced enrichment and reprocessing outright, and today draws a quarter of its electricity from nuclear power without owning a single centrifuge. Saudi Arabia has refused that bargain. It has declined to sign the Additional Protocol, the enhanced-inspection regime that 144 states accept and that lets the International Atomic Energy Agency hunt for undeclared sites, and in 2024 it rescinded even the small-quantities protocol it once held. The country being handed the fuel cycle is the one refusing the cameras. The country being bombed to give up enrichment, Iran, was under those cameras, and before the war the IAEA director general said there was no proof of a systematic Iranian move toward a weapon.

The American reassurances offered for the Saudi deal deserve scrutiny. The deal is called conditional: the president announced, the day after his own Secretary signed it, that it would proceed only if Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords and normalized relations with Israel, a term absent from the agreed text. A condition attached by afterthought can be lifted by afterthought. The deal is called subject to congressional review: in practice, lawmakers have ninety days to pass a resolution killing it, the clock can be stopped and has been stopped before, and if the two chambers do nothing it takes effect. Congress must muster a veto-proof majority to halt what it never voted for. Silence is assent. Some of the members are not silent. In November a group of them wrote to the secretary of state warning that the deal could enable Saudi Arabia to produce a nuclear bomb, and reminding him that he had once, as a senator, demanded the gold standard himself.

To see why enrichment is a reason for war in Tehran and a business line in Riyadh, look at what Saudi Arabia has already bought. In September last year, days after Israel bombed Doha and Washington did nothing, the kingdom signed a mutual defense pact with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state that never joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and holds an estimated 170 weapons. Any attack on one, the pact says, is an attack on both. Asked whether it covered the arsenal, a Saudi official called it a comprehensive agreement encompassing all military means. Pakistan’s defense minister said the capabilities his country holds will be made available; once the sentence had done its work he said nuclear weapons were not on the radar. The saying and the unsaying are not a muddle to be resolved. They are the product. Riyadh takes the deterrent value of a Pakistani umbrella and the deniability of an official denial, and the world is left to guess. This is called strategic ambiguity and has been applied by Israel for decades. Three weeks ago the arrangement widened: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, extending the same all-for-one clause across three states, with Pakistani troops and aircraft already deployed on Saudi soil.

This is the government the United States has decided can be trusted with enrichment. Its crown prince has said, on the record and more than once, that if Iran gets a weapon Saudi Arabia will follow suit. Its own officials tie the nuclear question openly to Iran’s. It shelters under a foreign bomb it will not confirm and refuses the inspections Iran accepted. Nonproliferation experts read the deal for what it is, a US-blessed hedging strategy toward a bomb option, and say so.

There is one more fact, and it does not go in a footnote, because the war was sold on the memory of exactly this kind of fact. Fifteen of the nineteen men who flew airliners into American buildings on 11 September 2001 were citizens of Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden was born in the kingdom, a son of one of its richest families. None of the nineteen was Iranian. The state that produced the hijackers and the man who directed them is being handed a path to enrichment. The state that produced none of them is being currently bombed back into the stone age.

What connects the two decisions is money, and it runs through one family. Jared Kushner ran Middle East policy from the Trump White House and cultivated the Saudi crown prince throughout it. Six months after he left office, the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund put $2 billion into his new and untested firm. The fund’s own screening panel had recommended against it, finding the operation unsatisfactory in all aspects and the fees excessive. It was overruled by the fund’s chairman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the man the CIA concluded had ordered the journalist Jamal Khashoggi lured into the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and cut apart, and whom Kushner had defended. The kingdom pays Kushner’s firm about 1.25 percent of $2 billion a year on that money, – do the math. The House committee that examined the arrangement called it the appearance of a quid pro quo for his foreign-policy work. The president’s son-in-law draws a continuous income from the Saudi state while the president tells the public, falsely, the Saudi state is not getting the thing it wants most, enrichment.

No investigation, if there was one, has shown the money bought the policy. What can be set down is narrower and still hard to look away from. A denial as flat as no enrichment, said over a document that permits enrichment, by a man whose Energy Secretary confirms the pathway and whose family is on the Saudi payroll, is not the language of a president who has not considered the future the document contains.

Set the pieces in a row and the shape stops looking like contradiction. The United States is bombing one country to deny it enrichment while writing enrichment into a contract for another. It invokes nonproliferation in the press release for the act that proliferates. It strikes the state that admits inspectors and sells the fuel cycle to the state that turns them away. It bombs the country that produced no hijackers and arms the country that produced fifteen. Each decision has a reason, and the reasons are not the ones on the label.

The label is where the empire now does its work. A power able to enforce nonproliferation would not need to kill a head of state to attempt it, and would not find itself six months later reaching for sanctions because the strikes had failed. Its clients are interpreting the weakness for exactly what it is. They watched Doha burn and Washington stay silent, watched their own refineries burn and the guarantor offer only more war, and concluded that the protector cannot protect. So they bought a Pakistani deterrent and widened it into a three-state pact, and they extracted an American enrichment pathway as the price of a normalization the president wanted more than they did. The order the United States built and policed for eighty years is fraying at the hands of the government that claims to enforce it, and the fraying does not stop at the Gulf. The same erosion of trust in the American umbrella is visible in Seoul and in Warsaw. What a disarmament body called a tradable security service is what the end of an order looks like from inside it. The enforcer has begun to auction the thing it once forbade, because the auction is the leverage it has left.

No enrichment, the president wrote. In a few years, when the feasibility study is filed and the centrifuges the contract allows begin to turn, the sentence will read as the first official confirmation that the enrichment was always coming.

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Trump’s Saudi Nuclear Agreement May Prolong the Iran War

A final deal between the United States and Iran is slipping further out of reach. Since the Memorandum of Understanding collapsed in July, the prospects for reviving it have deteriorated by the day. While Tehran publicly demands a return to the MOU, Trump’s current position is that even if Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz, he would neither return to the agreement nor lift the blockade on Iran. And even in the unlikely event that he did, the MOU could not come back into force as long as Israel continues to bombard Lebanon. Iran is unlikely to accept an MOU minus Lebanon: its demand for a regional ceasefire is non-negotiable.

But even if these obstacles were resolved, profound differences over the nuclear issue would remain. And those differences have now grown dramatically more severe because of Trump’s nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia. The details of the deal were just made public, and Kelsey Davenport at the Arms Control Association has published an excellent FAQ addressing its most important aspects.

The bottom line is: Trump is granting Saudi Arabia access to the same uranium-enrichment technology the United States has sought to deny Iran for more than three decades, while imposing a far weaker inspection regime on Saudi nuclear activities. In effect, Washington is providing Riyadh a pathway to the bomb while insisting that Iran have no enrichment capability whatsoever – the infamous zero-enrichment objective.

As ACA writes,

“the Trump administration rejected key nonproliferation conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation that have long-standing bipartisan support and are internationally recognized best practices.

Most critically, the deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adhere to the more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, known as the Additional Protocol.”

As a point of comparison, Iran began voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol (AP) under Obama’s nuclear deal in 2016 and was expected to ratify it once the United States formally lifted sanctions through Congress. That never happened, however, because Trump withdrew from the agreement in May 2018.

Moreover, Trump’s agreement with Saudi Arabia gives the kingdom a pathway to develop a uranium-enrichment program reaching 20 percent. Again, the comparison with Iran is revealing. When Iran expanded its enrichment to 20 percent in 2010 to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor – which, ironically, the United States had given Iran in the late 1960s as part of the Atoms for Peace program – Washington pointed to the move as further evidence of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons ambitions.

State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley said on February 11, 2010, that Iran’s decision to begin enriching to 20 percent “further solidifies… our impression and that of the international community that Iran’s nuclear intentions are anything but peaceful.” At the UN Security Council, then-Ambassador Susan Rice argued that Iran’s decision moved it “closer to weapons-grade material,” as she made the case for new UN sanctions against Tehran.

Now, Trump wants Congress to approve a deal with Saudi Arabia that gives the kingdom access to precisely that technology – but with far fewer inspections – while bombing Iran to prevent it from having any enrichment at all.

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Was An Obama Energy Secretary A CCP Plant?

Before Steven Chu oversaw America’s national laboratories and nuclear-weapons complex, a group inside what U.S. officials describe as the CCP’s “political warfare” apparatus listed him as an “overseas honorary president.” He later launched landmark research and technology partnerships with Beijing from inside the Department of Energy.

The organization was not simply “China-linked.” Its own records say it was led by the CCP Central Secretariat and administered by the Central United Front Work Department—the sprawling Party organ the U.S. government says works to co-opt elites, neutralize opposition and manipulate foreign institutions in service of Beijing.

Buried inside a non-searchable image on the official website of the Western Returned Scholars Association, or WRSA, is Chu’s Chinese name: 朱棣文.

The page identifies the organization’s Fourth Council as serving from 1999 to 2003. In the official roster image, under the heading 海外名誉会长—“overseas honorary presidents”—WRSA lists ten additional prestige scientists.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences explicitly identifies 朱棣文 as “Steven Chu,” the Stanford physicist and 1997 Nobel laureate. WRSA itself later used the same Chinese name for the “former U.S. Energy Secretary and physicist” Steven Chu. The surrounding names—some of the most famous overseas Chinese scientists of the era—make the match effectively certain.

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International Atomic Energy Agency Digs TONS of Nuclear Material Buried in Clandestine Site in Syria! al-Sharaa Regime Reverses Plan and REFUSES To Hand Over the Findings

A former al-Qaida terrorist is now sitting on a treasure trove of nuclear material that can be weaponized.

A United Nations team has excavated a ‘previously undisclosed site’ in Syria and found several tons of nuclear material from the days of the Bashar al-Assad rule.

The agreed plan was for the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove the material from Syria – but that’s not what’s going to happen, anymore.

Syria is now holding the nuclear material, and refuses the handover, saying ‘it will remain under IAEA safeguards for peaceful civilian use’.

The Telegraph reported:

“Rafael Grossi, the chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said on Tuesday that ‘tons of nuclear materials that could be put to bad use’ had been found at the site, dating from the time of Syria’s authoritarian Assad government.

‘After your courageous decision to inform us that there was another place, another site where nuclear material had been stored, we were able to access this place’, Mr. Grossi said during a press conference with Asaad al-Shaibani, Syria’s foreign minister, in Damascus. ‘We are talking about a few tons of nuclear material that could be put to bad use’.

The IAEA had previously said it was preparing to remove the nuclear material, left over from the era of dictator Bashar al-Assad, who was overthrown by a coalition of rebels in 2024. They now form the Syrian government.

However, Mr. Shaibani said the nuclear material was not dangerous and would remain in Syrian custody, subject to IAEA guarantees, adding that Syria had the right to use it for civil and ⁠peaceful purposes.”

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The Rulers of the Nuclear Powers Are Slow Learners

Although 81 years have passed since the atomic bombing of Japan in August 1945, the rulers of major nations continue their reckless march toward a nuclear holocaust.

The nine nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), possessing some 12,100 nuclear warheads, are all busily upgrading and expanding their nuclear weapons arsenals at an accelerating pace.  Nuclear weapons spending rose to an all-time high of $119 billion in 2025 – a 19 percent increase over the preceding year.  The U.S. government alone, which accounted for more than half of this spending, is embarked on a $1.7 trillion, decades-long nuclear weapons buildup.

As the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has observed, “this overwhelming spending on nuclear weapons shows a willingness to research, develop, finance and build tools to exterminate humanity.”

Moreover, international nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements among the nuclear powers have collapsed.  Russia and the United States own 86 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and, although they signed numerous treaties in the past to limit or reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals, the last of these treaties, New START, expired this February.

The accelerating nuclear arms race is accompanied by repeated threats of nuclear war.  Russian officials are particularly notorious in this connection.  According to the Voice of America, from early 2022 to late 2024 Russian officials publicly issued 135 nuclear threats, with 27 of them coming from Vladimir Putin.  But America’s Donald Trump has also publicly and repeatedly threatened other countries with nuclear destruction, as has North Korea’s Kim Jong Un.

Early this year, the editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, assessing this deteriorating situation, moved the hands of their famous “Doomsday Clock” to 85 seconds to midnight, the most dangerous setting in its history.

Of course, there have been a great many warnings that nuclear weapons portend global disaster, including many beginning right after the shocking annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  “Seldom, if ever,” reported CBS radio commentator Edward R. Murrow, “has war ended leaving the victors… with such a realization that… survival is not assured.”  The Chicago Tribune warned that a future atomic war would leave the world “a barren waste, in which the survivors… will hide in caves.”  In France, the resistance leader Albert Camus declared that the modern world had “reached the last degree of savagery,” in which nations were faced with the prospect of “collective suicide.”

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Trump and Fauci: The Nefarious Tag Team Executing the Genetic Kill Switch on Humanity

The Genetic Kill Switch Introduction

We are living through the final act of a planned global genocide. According to my research findings, Donald Trump and Anthony Fauci are not adversaries — they are tag-team partners in a depopulation agenda that uses a binary weapon to trigger a genetic meltdown of the human race. (I’ll explain more below…)

The first component of this weapon is the spike protein contamination from mRNA injections, which Fauci orchestrated through gain-of-function bioweapons research at the Wuhan lab and laundered into so-called vaccines via Operation Warp Speed (pushed by Trump).

The second component is nuclear war, which Trump is likely to invoke to “finish the job” in Iran. The fallout of radioisotopes causes double-strand DNA breaks in human cells, and the spike protein has already suppressed DNA repair by 85–90%. Together, they form a kill switch that will melt down the genetic integrity of billions of humans and end humanity as we know it.

Here is how this unspeakable plan was set in motion, why the government lies about radiation risks, and what you can do to survive.

The Spike Protein Bio-Weapon: Fauci’s Contribution to Mass Genetic Contamination

Let’s trace the chain of command. Fauci, through the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, funneled millions of taxpayer dollars to the Wuhan Institute of Virology via Peter Daszak’s EcoHealth Alliance. Newly released documents show Fauci actively protected Daszak from federal scrutiny while suppressing evidence that SARS-CoV-2 was a lab leak [1]. The result was a gain-of-function spike protein toxin.

As I have previously reported, the spike protein’s modified cleavage site was engineered into the mRNA, and that same synthetic spike is now being produced inside billions of human bodies via the so-called vaccines [2].

The genetic damage from these mRNA injections is catastrophic. A ground-breaking Swedish-Chinese study showed that the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein impairs DNA damage repair and inhibits the BRCA1 and 53BP1 pathways [3]. In plain English, this means the spike protein suppresses the cell’s ability to fix broken DNA by 85 to 90 percent.

The result is turbo cancers, immune failure, and accelerated aging. On top of that, the mRNA shots are contaminated with bacterial DNA plasmids that can integrate into the human genome and trigger cancer [4][5]. This is not a vaccine, in other words — it’s a genetic bioweapon designed to contaminate the entire population and prepare every injected person for the nuclear “genetic meltdown” kill switch.

Trump’s Complicity: From Operation Warp Speed to Nuclear War

Trump cannot pretend to be innocent. He authorized emergency use of the mRNA injections, bragged about Operation Warp Speed, and repeatedly protected Fauci from prosecution. Emails have now revealed that Fauci and then-NIH director Francis Collins agreed to suppress the lab-leak theory for political reasons, and Trump’s administration did nothing to stop it [6]. In fact, Trump’s own FDA commissioner, Marty Makary, recently stated that Fauci was “100% involved” in a “massive” COVID origins cover-up [7]. Yet Trump never held Fauci accountable. Why?

Because they are co-conspirators. They answer to the same boss.

Now Trump is set to launch nuclear weapons in his desperate escalation of war with Iran or Russia. As of early 2026, Trump has escalated rhetoric against Russia, shortening a “50-day” warning to “10 to 12 days” and threatening strikes deep into Russian territory. This is a deliberate provocation designed to trigger a nuclear response that could kill up to 200 million Americans from the initial strikes alone.

The radiation from those bombs will circulate globally and cause double-strand DNA breaks, but the spike protein has already disabled the body’s repair machinery in billions of people. That means billions of human beings will die from genetic damage that could have otherwise been self-repaired if not for the presence of the spike protein, an engineered toxic and part of a binary weapon system targeting human genetic integrity.

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The US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Makes No Sense

A few points on the shocking U.S.–Saudi nuclear deal announced.

1. This reflects a weaker American bargaining position, not a stronger one.

The broader context is China. The Biden administration pursued a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, as part of a broader expansion of Trump’s Abraham Accords, in part to pull Riyadh closer to Washington and away from Beijing. But Washington’s position has deteriorated since then. The credibility of the U.S. security umbrella has weakened, GCC states have become more strategically autonomous, and Saudi Arabia has gained leverage by diversifying its partnerships.

The result appears to be that Washington had to offer substantially more to try to keep Saudi from drifting further toward China, while getting substantially less in return.

2. By any historical standard, this is an extraordinary Saudi victory.

Compared to previous negotiations, Riyadh has secured remarkable concessions. It no longer appears to have to normalize relations with Israel as part of the package. It is reportedly not required to sign a traditional Section 123 agreement that would deprive KSA of enrichment technology. And there are no comprehensive IAEA safeguards comparable to those Washington has long insisted upon elsewhere.

If these reports hold, Saudi Arabia has achieved what few thought Washington would ever accept.

3. Biden was going down the same path…

The Biden administration reportedly considered similar arrangements, but its efforts were derailed by the repercussions of the October 7 attacks.

Biden officials also understood the risks, although it did not prevent them from pursuing it and signalling willingness to offer Saudi major nuclear concessions. Some of the contingency ideas reportedly discussed bordered on the surreal: having American troops physically guard Saudi enrichment facilities from the Saudis themselves, or designing systems that would allow the United States to disable – or even destroy remotely – the facilities if necessary.

The fact that such safeguards were seriously contemplated should itself have been a warning. If your proposal requires extraordinary mechanisms to prevent your own ally from using the technology you are providing, perhaps the proposal is fundamentally flawed.

4. This may prove a stepping stone toward an even greater disaster: Security Guarantees for Saudi

As Rosemary Kelanic points out, this deal provides Riyadh with leverage it can use in the future to force Washington to provide it with security guarantees. Saudi Arabia can threaten to build nuclear weapons unless the U.S. offers it Article 5-level security guarantees – a disastrous move that would further entangle the US in the region militarily instead of allowing America to come home from the Middle East.

As Kelanic argues, there is ample historical precedent. South Korea and West Germany both advanced nuclear programs that alarmed Washington. Rather than allowing them to acquire nuclear weapons, the United States ultimately strengthened its military commitments and security guarantees in exchange for abandoning those programs.

As a result, this nuclear deal may prove to be a prelude to an even more damaging concession to Saudi down the road.

5. This likely weakens Washington’s negotiating position with Iran.

If there is eventually another U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement, today’s decision establishes an entirely new benchmark.

It becomes impossible to argue that Saudi Arabia may enrich uranium while Iran cannot, although Tehran was never going to accept zero enrichment in the first place. But proposals that earlier had been entertained – such as a 5- to 10-year moratorium on enrichment – may now also be out of reach.

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it becomes harder to insist on intrusive international inspections for Iran while accepting a far lighter non-IAEA inspection regime for Saudi Arabia. And it becomes much more difficult to portray enrichment itself as an unacceptable proliferation risk.

Washington has made the type of deal it wants from Iran more complicated.

6. Israel has every reason to be deeply unhappy.

Much attention will focus on the loss of the Saudi normalization card, which has been one of Israel’s strategic objectives.

But the more consequential issue may be that Saudi Arabia now appears to have a far more credible pathway toward a nuclear weapons capability should it ever choose to pursue one.

That represents a fundamental shift in Israel’s long-term strategic environment.

7. Is this about widening the war with Iran?

Possibly. One interpretation is that Washington made these concessions to secure greater Saudi cooperation in the current (or a future) confrontation with Tehran.

But Tehran itself does not appear particularly alarmed.

Saudi Arabia’s direct military contribution to a war with Iran would likely remain limited, and the Kingdom’s participation does little to alter Iran’s fundamental geographic advantages in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, Saudi leaders have spent years trying to reduce—not increase—the risk of becoming a battlefield in a U.S.-Iran conflict.

If that remains Riyadh’s strategic priority, this agreement is unlikely to fundamentally change the military balance in the war.

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Nuclear Mass Death

Mark Twain was right when he said history may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.

Consider America’s approach to nuclear weapons. Under Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, America’s strategic nuclear triad was modernized at immense cost. One hundred B-1 bombers were built. The stealthy B-2 bomber followed. MX “Peacekeeper” ICBMs were deployed. New Ohio-class nuclear subs armed with Trident missiles were launched. Pershing II and GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) were fielded in Europe. And Reagan presented his idea of a missile defense shield, known as the strategic defense initiative (SDI) or informally as “Star Wars.” All this cost enormous sums of money.

Fortunately, the Pershing IIs and GLCMs were retired under talks that eliminated intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The Peacekeeper missiles are already gone. The B-1s are due to be retired over the next decade and no longer fly nuclear missions. And the Ohio-class submarine force, the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad, remains on station, with just one submarine capable of destroying much of the world.

The U.S. today possesses an enormous nuclear overkill capacity. The arsenal consists of roughly 5000 nuclear bombs and warheads. Again, just one submarine carries up to 20 Trident II D5 missiles with multiple nuclear warheads, each warhead being far more powerful than the bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. To borrow a line from Daniel Ellsberg, each submarine is capable of 100 Holocausts. They are genocidal weapons to a degree that is unimaginable. By the way, the U.S. has fourteen Ohio-class “boomer” submarines.

Here is where history rhymes. Under yet another tough-talking Republican president, the U.S. today is yet again “modernizing” its nuclear triad while imagining a missile defense shield (now known as “Golden Dome”). The Air Force wants a new nuclear bomber (the B-21 Raider) and ICBM (the Sentinel), and the Navy wants a new ballistic-missile-firing submarine, the Columbia-class.

None of this is really necessary. ICBMs are obsolete; they are static targets and destabilizing ones at that. Bombers are superfluous and besides, the Air Force still has B-52s and B-2s for nuclear missions. Missile shields like “Golden Dome” are easy to conceptualize but impossible to build. They can be fooled by decoys and overwhelmed by an enemy with sufficient warheads (Russia).

But logic doesn’t matter here. Nor does morality. What matters is money, power, jobs, and the military-industrial-Congressional complex (MICC). That’s why history is rhyming here. The MICC will always fight for more ICBMs, more bombers, more submarines because that is its health, its wealth, its reason for being. To the MICC, the nuclear triad really is the holy trinity. It is something to be worshipped and preserved irrespective of cost and logic.

The U.S. should lead the world in reducing the deployment of nuclear weapons. Instead, the U.S. leads in nuclear escalation. And it does so always in the stated cause of “deterrence” when the real reason is the health and wealth of the MICC.

No one really knows how much nuclear triad modernization and the “Golden Dome” will cost; estimates for both reach $3 trillion over the next thirty years. But it’s not just the cost in dollars that matters — it’s the cost to our collective existence. These weapons systems are making the U.S. and the world less safe, less stable, rather than more so. They are possibly the very worst examples of human folly, and that’s truly saying something.

I very much doubt the average American wants more nuclear bombs and missiles, but what we want doesn’t seem to matter. The MICC wants — and it gets what it wants. It does so by scaring us about Russia or China or Iran while selling these genocidal weapons as job-creators. It’s a living, they might say. But as the Outlaw Josey Wales once said, “Dyin’ ain’t much of a living,” especially when you’re talking about murdering most of humanity in a genocidal nuclear war.

We must put a stop to this madness while we still can.

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The World Government That Wasn’t

There are certain episodes in Cold War history that modern conservatives are expected to treat as either sinister fantasy or liberal delusion. The McCloy–Zorin Accords of 1961 occupy a curious place. Explain the concept today and half of the audience assumes you are describing a proto-globalist fever dream hatched in Manhattan conference rooms full of Scandinavian furniture and earnest men in rimless spectacles.

Yet for a brief moment — and this is the part that ought to unsettle both the utopians and the cynics — the United States and the Soviet Union formally agreed that the ultimate goal of international politics should be the abolition of war itself.

Not metaphorically. Literally.

The “Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations,” better known as the McCloy–Zorin Accords, was negotiated between American statesman John J. McCloy and Soviet diplomat Valerian Zorin in September 1961 and endorsed unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1961. It envisioned phased and verified general disarmament under international control, including the eventual elimination of national military establishments and the creation of a United Nations peace force.

This was not drafted by Woodstock pacifists smoking hashish in Vermont. McCloy was the very model of the American establishment insider: Wall Street lawyer, banker, Assistant Secretary of War, and one of the founding grandees of the postwar Atlantic order. Zorin, meanwhile, was a hard Soviet apparatchik who had spent decades navigating the darker corridors of Kremlin diplomacy.

And yet there they were, at the height of the Berlin Crisis and only a year before the Cuban Missile Crisis, jointly sketching a roadmap toward “general and complete disarmament.”

The irony is that the men closest to this project were not starry-eyed internationalists in the modern sense. They were realists in the older and more serious tradition. They had lived through industrial slaughter on a civilizational scale. Twenty-seven million Russians had died in World War Two. They understood that thermonuclear war was not a talking point but an extinction event. The generation that built the United Nations had watched Europe commit suicide twice in thirty years and concluded, however imperfectly, that sovereign states armed to the teeth and gripped by ideological hysteria might not indefinitely coexist.

Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish Secretary-General of the UN, became the moral and administrative face of this ambition. Today he is remembered, if at all, as the Nordic bureaucrat whose name adorns the plaza outside the UN building by the East River in New York and the library inside that skyscraper. In his own time he was treated almost as a secular pope. The press followed him obsessively. In the newsreels, he emerged from turboprop airliners with a mysterious Swedish smile. A new conflict, a new day for Dag. For a few years from the mid-fifties to very early sixties, the UN became a repository for a tired planet’s hopes. Diplomats regarded him with awe, irritation, or both. He believed the UN could become not merely a debating chamber but an actual mechanism for preventing great-power war.

This is the part modern conservatives are supposed to laugh at.

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Israel not Iran is major nuclear threat in Middle East – professor

The major nuclear danger facing the Middle East originates not from Iran but from Israel, Professor Theodore Postol, a former Science and Policy Adviser on Strategic Nuclear Issues to the Chief of Naval Operations, has told RT. The expert warned that the leadership in West Jerusalem had placed the Jewish state on an increasingly perilous course.

Israel is widely believed to possess an undeclared nuclear arsenal, although authorities in West Jerusalem have consistently refused to either confirm or deny the allegations. The issue of Iran’s nuclear program has served as the justification for launching strikes against Iran earlier this year.

“Do not think Iran is the big nuclear threat, is the big nuclear instability in the Middle East, Israel is,” the prominent MIT physicist said during an interview with Going Underground host Afshin Rattansi, which aired on Friday.

Postol noted that Israel’s leadership pushed the country into a situation where even its own military commanders are warning that their forces are “on the ropes” and have reached the limits of what they can do.

Citing reports, the former strategic adviser to Pentagon said that Israeli military leaders have told PM Benjamin Netanyahu that they “cannot do any more,” adding that the country is suffering heavy troop losses.

Postol said he found Trump’s apparent fear of nuclear weapons somewhat reassuring, describing it as a positive trait. The expert said that Trump is “extremely horrified and afraid of nuclear weapons, which is good,” adding that he believes the head of state would be warned that any decision to use such capabilities would “open a box that none of us want to see opened.”

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