Taiwan President Lai Ching-te (William Lai) appears to be missing signs from multiple sources that he lacks both international and domestic support for pursuing a more assertive policy regarding the island’s de facto independence. Taipei heavily depends on two protectors, Japan and the United States, for firm political support against Beijing’s periodic bullying tactics. In the event of a military crisis, Taiwan would be even more reliant on those two powers for armed defense.
However, Tokyo and Washington seem to be moving in opposite directions with respect to their longstanding, albeit informal, security commitment to Taipei. With the Liberal Democratic Party’s landslide election victory in February 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi received a popular mandate for a more hardline policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regarding Taiwan and other issues. The election outcome reinforced her already strong personal preference.
The trend in the United States appears to be quite different. Throughout his first term, President Donald Trump was one of Taiwan’s strongest backers, both diplomatically and militarily. Indeed, by the end of his term, U.S. security ties with Taiwan were the strongest they had been since Washington switched formal diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing in 1979.
But Trump has embraced a noticeably more cautious stance on the Taiwan issue since the start of his second term. The administration’s discontent with Taipei’s trade and investment policies were especially evident. Even as president-elect, Trump had accused the Taiwanese government of illegally discriminating against American firms, especially in the arena of advanced computer chips and other cutting-edge electronics. He also continued to hector Taipei to assume a greater share of the financial burden of Taiwan’s own defense instead of continuing to free ride on U.S. military exertions. The incoming president appeared to be more than a little annoyed at Washington’s longstanding client.
Indeed, Trump seems to regard stable and cooperative bilateral relations with the PRC as a significantly higher priority than Washington’s relations with Taipei. That became quite evident during and immediately after the May 2026 summit between Trump and PRC President Xi Jinping. Xi cautioned his counterpart not to let the United States become too supportive of Taiwan and allow Lai’s government to pursue reckless initiatives. The adverse consequences of such excessive tolerance, the PRC leader emphasized, could be most unfortunate. Noticeably, Trump did not push back with defiant rhetoric stressing Washington’s longstanding firm support for Taipei. Instead, shortly after the summit, he explicitly warned Lai not to push the envelope regarding formal independence.
Hawkish analysts in the United States, led by former national security adviser John Bolton and the editors of the Wall Street Journal, openly accused Trump of insufficient support for Taiwan. They pressured the administration to accelerate U.S. arms sales to Taipei and increase the quantity and quality of the weapons in future aid packages.
Not only does Lai’s government need to be uneasy about firmness of the Trump administration’s security commitment to Taiwan, but also domestic support for a more conciliatory policy toward Beijing appears to be rising. The Kuomintang Party (KMT), the principal opposition to the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is increasingly vocal in calling for a less risky approach to cross-strait relations. Not surprisingly, Beijing is enthusiastically encouraging that trend. PRC officials repeatedly remind the Taiwanese people that tensions were far milder during the administration of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s last KMT president, who governed the island from 2008 to 2014. During his administration, cross-strait trade and tourism soared and the two capitals signed numerous agreements.
Beijing’s attempt to revive that cooperative atmosphere was evident when Xi and other prominent PRC figures accorded KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun an extremely cordial reception during her April 2026 visit to the mainland. Cheng reciprocated with a highly conciliatory tone during her interview with the South China Morning Post the following month. She explicitly contrasted the calm years experienced during Ma’s presidency with the acute tensions characterizing Lai’s administration. During the former period, Cheng stated, “cross-strait relations were characterized by very friendly exchanges and were entirely free of major issues. At that time, we enjoyed significant space for international participation.” In contrast, “the nearly 10 years that followed have seen cross-strait relations rapidly deteriorate to the point of a perilous and dreadful prospect of war. This has created a sense of extreme danger, with the situation appearing to be on the verge of a breakout.”
Her strong implication was that a new KMT presidency would resume the cooperative policies that Ma had pursued. Indeed, the KMT has already seized multiple opportunities to thwart Lai’s policy agenda. As part of a broader opposition coalition that controls the national legislature, the party has scored some significant successes.
Taiwan is deeply divided politically. Lai and his pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have a strong, vocal cadre of supporters. But other Taiwanese people have become very uneasy about the surge of military tensions in the Taiwan Strait that has typified the last 6 years of DPP rule. Restless Taiwanese voters may seek a return to the less confrontational style of the KMT.
The overall situation is murky. One point is clear, however. Lai lacks a strong domestic mandate to continue his confrontational posture toward Beijing. Nor does he seem to have a united front between Japan and the United States in favor of his policies. Tokyo may back him, given Takaichi’s attitude, but the Trump administration’s waffling raises major questions about Washington’s stance. Lai would be wise to beat a tactical political retreat and seek to make the Taiwan issue as quiescent as possible during the remainder of his term.
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