Tag: iran

Iran Demands China’s Anti-American BRICS Coalition Provide More Support During War

Iran’s representative at a meeting of the anti-American BRICS coalition on Wednesday used the opportunity to demand that member countries invest more of their time, money, and energy into “practical initiatives” to help Iran, a call that follows months of minimal support from the bloc during the ongoing war with America.

BRICS — named after core countries Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — is an economic, security, and diplomatic coalition largely led by communist China that seeks to overthrow the current, Western-led global order. It presents itself as a vehicle to aid the development and prosperity of the “global south” despite the presence of Russia and China, promoting interdependency among its members at the expense of ties with America. In addition to its core members, the group consists of Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and Indonesia. Another 13 countries, mostly rogue states such as Cuba and Belarus, received BRICS “partner” status in 2024, a second tier of cooperation inferior to full membership.

The BRICS coalition has persistently been challenged by the fact that the member countries do not fundamentally share national interests. Since the founding of the bloc, India and China have engaged in territorial warfare, South Africa has had to protect its economy from China’s malignant goods dumping schemes, and the UAE has supported Ukraine against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Iran has been the most overtly problematic member of the group, however, actively bombing the UAE then diverting the agenda of BRICS meetings to demand other countries support its terrorist activity.

Wednesday’s BRICS finance minister and central bank governor meeting continued the trend of Iran hijacking the coalition to prioritize its own interests. Iranian Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati lamented in his remarks, according to Iranian state media, that BRICS was not doing all it could to offer concrete support to Tehran.

“BRICS will have the greatest impact when it can turn policy dialogues into practical initiatives and operational mechanisms,” Hemmati stated, according to Iran’s Tasnim News Agency.

“Referring to the difficult and complex regional and international circumstances, as well as the U.S.-Israeli military aggression against Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Tasnim added, “Hemmati said economic and financial stability cannot be achieved without peace, respect for international law, and adherence to the principles of the U.N. Charter.”

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The Long Road to War

If you’re wondering why the United States and Iran have been bitter antagonists for more than a half century, and why they are now at war, you won’t find the answer in today’s media coverage where the conflict is portrayed as a dispute over terrorism and nuclear weapons. To truly understand what underlies this ongoing conflict you need to look back much further to a history that has been forgotten, or ignored.

Known for most of its history as Persia, Iran is one of the oldest continuous civilizations in the world, with human habitation dating back more than seven millennia.  Despite this foundational history, by the early twentieth century Persia had become a semi-colonial state dominated by British and Russian influence. A rising nationalist movement arose determined to restore the country’s political and economic independence.

The 1953 Coup

A crucial turning point came in 1953. Iranian oil resources had been controlled by the British, who kept most of the vast profits and left little to the Iranians. Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, a popular reformist who resisted foreign domination, took the bold step of nationalizing his country’s oil industry in 1951. In response, the CIA working with British intelligence organized a successful coup that overthrew his government. Although most citizens of the US and UK have little if any knowledge of this event, the 1953 coup and its consequences remain deeply embedded in Iran’s national memory, even today.

The Shah’s Iron Rule

In Mossadegh’s place, they installed a brutal dictatorial regime headed by the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran’s monarch who ruled the country ruthlessly for the next 26 years. To protect his new-found power, the Shah condemned Mossadegh to three years of solitary confinement, then kept him under house arrest until his death in 1967. In the years following the coup, the Shah and his CIA-trained secret police, Savak, became notorious for their vicious murder, imprisonment and torture of political dissidents. Much of Iranians’ growing hatred of the Shah was focused on the United States, since the Shah was viewed as a puppet of the Americans who put him in power. 

CIA Audacity

The overthrow was considered a resounding success by the CIA, which then became emboldened to undertake a series of regime change operations in other parts of the world. This newfound bravado also influenced America’s decision to undertake its disastrous involvement in the Vietnam War starting in 1954.

A partial list of the countries destabilized and overthrown by the United States following the 1953 coup includes Guatemala (1954), Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), and later Panama (1989), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Regime change is now considered an accepted instrument and goal of US foreign policy. Destabilizing and supporting the overthrow of unfriendly governments has become a central function of the CIA and the State Department. 

The Islamic Revolution

Resistance to the Shah and his totalitarian rule grew over the years, and finally culminated with the Islamic Revolution in January 1979. The Shah was driven into exile, eventually settling in Egypt. His government was replaced by a theocracy headed by the previously exiled religious figure Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who became Iran’s Supreme Leader. Although Khomeini was revered among religious conservatives, he was a ruthless tyrant who executed thousands of political prisoners, often hanging his victims in public from construction cranes for everyone to see. Nonetheless, his anti-Americanism resonated with many Iranians as he stirred up further hatred and a desire for vengeance, calling America the “Great Satan.”

The Embassy Takeover

When the Shah was admitted to the United States for cancer treatment in October 1979, Iranians demanded that he be returned to Iran to face prosecution for his crimes. In a dramatic confrontation in Tehran, an angry crowd besieged the US embassy. A group of militants stormed the embassy and took the American diplomats hostage, outraging American leaders. The Iranians insisted on the Shah’s return as a condition for release of the hostages. President Jimmy Carter refused and the hostages remained captive in Iran for more than a year. Carter would spend the rest of his presidency struggling to find a way to free them. His reelection depended on it.

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The Silver Lining: The Donald’s Impending Defeat in Iran May Finally Bring the Empire Home

It is damn obvious that Washington has lost Donald Trump’s idiotic war on Iran. After all, it is now five months since the opening salvos of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, which was advertised to last only 3-4 weeks. Instead, the conflict has settled into a grinding, inconclusive stalemate at best, and, more importantly, a strategic fiasco that reveals the bankruptcy of America’s entire Empire-based foreign policy.

The fact is, the War on Iran was misbegotten from the get-go because Iran posed no credible threat whatsoever to the homeland security of the United States. Period. Full stop.

In that regard, no American president has ever launched a war on such thin, specious grounds: The one and only reason for unleashing the bombers and missiles on February 28th was to honor the request of a so-called “ally” in furtherance of his desperate need to maintain a 61-vote coalition in the Knesset.

That’s right. The Donald took America to war lest Netanyahu be thrown from office, tried and convicted for years of egregious corruption and put behind bars where he belongs.

After all, on the eve of the strikes Iran possessed no nuclear weapons; no active weaponization program that had crossed the threshold of a deployable bomb; no blue-water navy capable of projecting power across oceans; not a single of long-range strategic bombers capable of dropping bombs anywhere, let along on the far side of the Atlantic; and no ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding the 2,000 kilometers to the Strait of Gibraltar – far, far short of Washington, D.C., or any American city at 10,000 kilometers or more distant from Tehran.

Likewise, Iran’s military budget at hardly $25 billion was a pittance (2.2%) relative to the Pentagon’s bountiful $1 trillion of annual rations – while its GDP of approximately $350 billion represented a tiny 1.1% of America’s $30 trillion economy.

Yet Ding Dong Donald and his Def Sec Gymboy Kegseth – all of the latter’s performative fitness videos and martial posturing notwithstanding – have flat-out managed to lose the war.

That is to say, the Pentagon is nearly out of critical munitions, meaning that short of a land invasion by US boots on the ground there is nothing left to do. Indeed, given Iran’s vast expanse, mountainous fortress like terrain and large, well trained and brutal IRGC militias, it would be a meat-grinder like no other; and surely one that even Bone-Spur Donald doesn’t have the stomach for (and appropriately so).

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Trump’s Iran War Raises a Midterm Question: Who Decides When America Goes to War?

On July 23, President Donald Trump threatened to carry out his “biggest attack yet” on Iran after nearly two weeks of renewed U.S. airstrikes. That same day, the House voted 214–208 to direct the president to remove U.S. forces from hostilities with Iran, while a parallel Senate effort failed 47–49. The contrast sharpened a question that has followed the conflict from the start: why can any president bring the United States deeper into another Middle Eastern war with so little meaningful involvement from Congress? The answer reaches beyond one administration, party, or operation to the functioning of American democracy itself.

Washington has long debated individual interventions while paying less attention to the expanding presidential authority that made them possible. Trump did not create this system; he inherited it. His presidency, however, exposed how much war-making power has accumulated in the executive branch and how far the country has moved from the constitutional balance the founders envisioned.

The Constitution’s principle is clear: decisions about war should not rest with one person. The president is commander in chief, but Congress received the authority to declare war because the framers feared concentrated power. Having lived under monarchy, they believed sending citizens to war required public debate, legislative consent, and political accountability.

That balance eroded from Korea through Vietnam, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and numerous counterterrorism missions. Presidents claimed wider discretion to use force without explicit authorization; Congress sometimes delegated authority and sometimes declined to challenge its use. The presidency consequently grew stronger in war-making while Congress retreated toward the sidelines.

This was not one party’s project. Republicans expanded executive authority, and Democrats preserved it. Administrations criticized presidential overreach while out of power, then retained its advantages in office. Executive war power thus became one of Washington’s genuinely bipartisan projects.

Reducing the problem to Trump therefore misses the larger danger. Critics see his reliance on instinct, personal judgment, and a small advisory circle as uniquely risky; supporters call the same qualities decisive leadership. Neither view changes the constitutional principle: a democratic system should not depend on the personality of whoever occupies the Oval Office. Even capable presidents can make catastrophic mistakes when meaningful oversight disappears.

History demonstrates the risk. Few expected Vietnam to consume a decade of national life. Iraq began as a limited mission with defined objectives but cost thousands of American lives and trillions of dollars, reshaped the Middle East, and left lasting regional consequences. Wars rarely begin by announcing how long or expansive they will become.

The United States now possesses unmatched military capabilities, global intelligence networks, and the ability to project force almost anywhere within hours. That makes executive flexibility valuable, but democratic oversight even more necessary. The faster a president can act, the stronger the institutions checking that power must be.

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Trump Threatens To Jail Arms Shortage ‘Leakers’

President Trump on Thursday threatened “leakers” with jail time over reports about dwindling US military stockpiles as a result of the Iran war, and claimed the US had plenty of munitions available.

“The US has massive amounts of ‘munitions,’ especially of certain types. Additionally, large amounts are being manufactured and shipped to the US as needed,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

“Defense companies are building the largest number of plants and factories in our country’s history. The ‘leakers’ of these treasonous statements are being hunted down,” the president added.

Some of the most significant reports about the shortage of advanced munitions didn’t come from media reports but from analysis published by the think tank the Center for International Studies (CSIS), which used publicly available data to produce its estimates.

CSIS found that the US has used about 60% of its advanced Patriot air defense missiles and about half of its interceptors for the THAAD missile defense system, though sources told CNN that the US had actually used about 80% of its THAADs during the war.

While Trump says that US arms makers are working to produce more munitions, the current rate of weapons use far exceeds the rate at which they can be produced, and it will take years to significantly increase production.

Media reports have also said that the US has used up nearly all of its ATACMS missiles and Precision-Strike Missiles, which were both used extensively in strikes on Iran.

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Camp David Clash: Trump Hammered Hegseth For Misleading Him On Arms Supply, WaPo Reports

Following reports that US forces have “used up virtually all” of their precision, long-range missiles in futile attempts to first trigger an Iranian regime change and then to compel Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, now comes reporting that an angry President Trump confronted Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in recent days, accusing the Pentagon of misleading him on critical munitions shortages that leave Trump increasingly powerless in the five-month-old fiasco of a war. 

According to sources cited by the Washington Post, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to concern about retaliation, Trump’s ire erupted alongside a cabinet meeting held Friday at Camp David. Trump expressed consternation that he’d been assured that the weapon shortage “had been fixed” when that is apparently far from true.     

According to “multiple officials” who — reading between the lines — clearly seem to have had it with Fox News talking-head-suddenly-turned-Defense-secretary, Hegseth defended his own actions and tried redirecting the blame to Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg, a billionaire GOP donor whom Trump plucked out of his role as co-CEO of Cerberus Capital Management to give him the number-two job at the Pentagon. Hegseth was said to have thrown Feinberg under the bus for both the shortages and failing to keep Trump fully informed.  

The officials characterized Trump as increasingly exasperated by Hegseth, whom they describe as one of the most enthusiastic supporters of launching a war on Iran, saying he persuaded Trump that victory would come quickly and easily. The war that the administration once projected to last three or four weeks is now in its sixth month. Iran has used both its sophisticated missile technology and its inexpensive but huge arsenal of drones to wreak havoc on US and allied forces around the Gulf. Hammered by a shock and awe campaign peppered with the multiple incidents involving mass casualties among innocents — including scores of elementary schoolgirls — the Iranian people have rallied around the Islamic regime, for all its faults. At least 18 US service members lay dead, several hundred have been wounded, and some estimates of the war’s cost to date exceed $100 billion.  

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Fresh Panic As Pentagon Has Used ‘Virtually All’ Its Long-Range Precision Missiles On Iran

US forces “used up virtually all” of their precision, long-range missiles during the course of the Iran war, and during the earlier heavy US-Israeli campaign of Operation Epic Fury, Reutersreported Tuesday.

This has raised serious “concerns about the military’s ​readiness for future conflicts,” informed sources told the outlet. In particular it is the Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) which are said to be running critically low.

“Washington has used virtually all of these weapons,” two sources told Reuters, after several media reports and think tank studies had already sounded the alarm over dwindling missiles amid both the Iran war and in the years-long process of supplying Ukraine. Low Patriot defense missile supplies have also been a persisting issue in the headlines.

They are costly and time-consuming in terms of manufacturing replacements. For example a single ATACMS munition costs about $1 million.

One immediate consequence could be that if heavy bombardment of Iran starts up again, the US would have to conduct riskier piloted aerial bombings – instead relying on longer range precision strikes afforded by the land-based systems at safer distances.

And another, somewhat obvious consequence, is highlighted in the following: “But as ​the war drags on, the three people familiar with the matter expressed worry that the falling missile supplies could limit the U.S. ability to deter adversaries, including Russia and China.”

The report added: “A fourth person ⁠familiar with the matter said that while Central Command — which oversees U.S. forces in the Middle East — has nearly used up the land-based missiles it had before the war began, it has been able to reload from U.S. military supplies elsewhere in the ​world.”

President Trump has of late responded to these now widespread reports of badly depleted advanced munitions, explaining that “Our defense companies are, at this moment, making more munitions than they have ever made before, ​in addition to expanding their plants and equipment at record levels.”

Additionally,  Secretary of War Pete Hegseth took to social media to refute the report, calling it false news.

“That banner is NOT TRUE, CNN. Shame on you,” the Pentagon chief said in a post on X. “We don’t hate the Fake News media enough.”

Hegseth was specifically referring to a CNN on-screen banner that read: “Sources: U.S. has used nearly 80% of key missile interceptors in Iran war, top commanders warn stockpiles dangerously low.”

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Before Hormuz, There Was Suez: What Trump Can Learn From Eisenhower

Oman and Iran appear close to a temporary arrangement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, potentially providing both an exit from the current round of fighting and the foundation for a more durable maritime order. Washington should welcome such an agreement – even if it acknowledges a degree of Iranian authority in administering traffic through the strait – because US interest dictates that open and non-discriminatory passage must be given priority over control.

The emerging formula would reportedly divide responsibility for the shipping lanes. Vessels entering the Persian Gulf would travel through waters administered by Iran, while outbound traffic would pass through an Omani-administered route. Iran would be notified of departing vessels and, while this has not yet been discussed, Tehran appears open to also ensuring that Oman would be notified of incoming traffic. Tehran and Muscat may collect and share fees for specified security and environmental services, although this sensitive issue has not yet been settled. The negotiations remain fluid, and any agreement is reportedly linked to the lifting of the American blockade on Iranian ports.

The arrangement would represent a slight climbdown by Tehran. Iran’s earlier position would have required traffic in both directions to pass through some portion of Iranian waters as well as Omani waters. That would have brought even ships already inside the Persian Gulf under an Iranian-administered transit system. The emerging division of lanes would give Oman primary responsibility for outbound shipping and limit the universe of vessels requiring Iranian approval or coordination.

If successful – and if Washington accepts it – the agreement could help end the present fighting. It remains unclear whether that would restore the previous American-Iranian memorandum of understanding or require a new framework. Nor does it in and of itself move the needle on two other major stumbling blocks: Iran’s demand for a regional ceasefire and Washington’s demands on Iran’s nuclear activities.

The Trump administration will likely receive strong pushback from hawkish elements in Washington and Israel who will complain over the arrangement’s de facto acceptance and legitimization of Iran (and Oman’s) management of the Strait.

But this critique is borne out of a confusion of what the US’s actual core interest in the Strait is: The free and predictable flow of commerce or preventing the ability of a hostile power to assert control.

The Trump administration has increasingly framed the objective as preventing Iran from “controlling” the strait. Yet the central American interest in strategic waterways has historically been less about who administers them than about whether ships can pass through them freely, predictably and without discrimination. Preventing a hostile state from acquiring coercive leverage has generally been a means of preserving passage, not an end that supersedes passage itself.

That hierarchy of interests matters. If reopening the strait requires acknowledging that Iran possesses some capacity to regulate traffic in waters along its coast, Washington should not reject an agreement merely because it fails to preserve the appearance of unqualified American dominance.

The Suez crisis provides the clearest example. In 1956, Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal Company, displacing the British- and French-controlled corporation that had operated one of the world’s most important commercial arteries. Britain and France regarded nationalization not merely as an economic injury but as a strategic humiliation and, together with Israel, invaded Egypt.

President Dwight Eisenhower refused to support them. After rejecting the Anglo-French invasion, Eisenhower’s administration did not make restoration of British or international ownership a condition for accepting Egypt’s continued administration of the canal. Instead, Washington opposed the invasion and pressed for a diplomatic arrangement that would preserve international access. The applicable legal regime emphasized the canal’s free use by ships of all countries on equal terms, while leaving Egypt responsible for administering and defending the waterway.

Egyptian control was not the same as unrestricted Egyptian discretion. The distinction was crucial. Washington could accept Egyptian sovereignty over the canal while insisting that sovereignty be exercised within rules guaranteeing nondiscriminatory passage. The overriding American interest was not which flag flew over the canal authority, but whether the canal remained open under internationally accepted rules.

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America’s Middle East Bases: An Imperial Burden

By all conventional measures, America is losing the war with Iran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has survived the U.S.-Israeli regime change effort, and it seems as though the hardline factions in Iran have been empowered. They also maintain their stockpiles of drones and missiles, while the U.S. is running dangerously low on crucial munitions.

Perhaps the most tangible sign of strategic defeat for the U.S. comes in the form of destroyed bases. Throughout the conflict, Iran has dealt severe blows to U.S. bases across the region, resulting in 18 troops having been killed and over 600 sustaining injuries.

A predictable outcome

Iran’s ability to touch American bases across the Middle East was not surprising to many of those advocating against this war. In fact, it was one of the foremost reasons to show restraint. In August 2025, Dr. Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, warned that in the case of a renewed conflict, Iran would likely act with much less restraint than they did during the 12-day War.

“It’s not going to be like last time,” Dr. Parsi explained, “the Iranians may this time around strike at U.S. bases in a manner that they didn’t last time. Last time, as one Pentagon official said, it was a polite response because it was all about ending the war. This time around, it’s likely going to be much worse.”

Dr. Parsi also expressed concern about American defensive systems, saying “we know now that the Iranians have missile capabilities that can penetrate all layers of Israeli and American air defense systems and can lead to a large number of American deaths. So we will once again have Americans coming home from the Middle East in coffins.”

Tragically, these predictions have proven entirely correct.

From the early days of this war, the damage became apparent. The New York Times reported in late March that many American bases in the region had been rendered “all but uninhabitable.” The Iranians attacks have been effective at knocking out key defensive and communications infrastructure as well. All of this information has been intentionally underdiscussed by the Trump administration, in the hopes that Americans will buy their narrative that an easy U.S. victory has occurred.

Despite their decision to not inform the public of this troubling data, the risks are very real for troops still positioned in the region. Since the collapse of the Memorandum of Understanding, four U.S. soldiers have been killed, and roughly 100 have been injured by Iranian attacks.

Many of America’s bases in the Middle East simply weren’t prepared to face Iranian retaliation at the scale we’ve witnessed. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fighting occurred predominantly within the borders of the respective countries, so many U.S. military facilities weren’t designed to withstand extensive enemy fire.

Iran, however, is a much different story.

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War With Iran: A Double-Edged Sword for the US Economy and Agriculture

The sharp swings in oil prices following the latest round of attacks and negotiations over safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that wars do not always reveal themselves first on the battlefield. Sometimes, their earliest signs appear on gas-station price boards, in transportation bills, and on the balance sheets of farmers standing thousands of miles from the front lines. Now that the confrontation between the United States and Iran has moved beyond pressure and deterrence and turned into direct military conflict, the issue is no longer limited to security calculations. It is about the real costs of war – costs increasingly borne by American farmers, truck drivers, and consumers.

The economic effects of this war are being transmitted through channels that are highly sensitive for Washington politically: energy markets, inflation, supply chains, and, above all, agriculture. A war that Trump justifies in the language of national security and displays of strength could, in practice, become a self-inflicted shock to the U.S. economy. That is the central contradiction: the most direct pressure is falling on the very social and economic constituency Trump has repeatedly claimed to defend – the American farm belt.

The Energy Shock, From Hormuz to American Farms

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption passes, now lies at the center of the conflict. Repeated surges and declines in oil prices show that even news of a temporary pause – or the possibility of renewed escalation – can shake the energy market. Higher fuel prices feed directly into transportation, production, and consumer-goods costs, adding to inflationary pressure. This also leaves monetary policymakers caught between controlling inflation and preventing a further slowdown in economic growth.

Market instability and direct military expenditures are rising as well. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the true cost of military conflict often extends far beyond initial estimates. Brown University’s Costs of War Project has placed the cost of the post-9/11 wars at approximately $8 trillion. A war with Iran, particularly if it becomes prolonged or expands geographically, could generate new and uncertain financial commitments. Yet one of its deepest and least visible consequences may be felt not on Wall Street, but on American farms.

Modern American agriculture is intensely dependent on energy. Diesel powers farm machinery; natural gas is a primary input in the production of nitrogen fertilizers; and gasoline and transportation fuels move crops from farms to markets. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has repeatedly shown that higher energy prices increase production costs and reduce farm income, ultimately affecting food prices.

The pressure is even more severe in the fertilizer market. The production of ammonia and urea is directly dependent on natural gas, while disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has constrained global supplies of raw materials and fertilizer. During the first weeks of the war, urea prices nearly doubled, leaving American farmers to confront fuel-price increases and supply shortages at the same time. Under such conditions, corn production, which requires more nitrogen fertilizer, becomes especially vulnerable. Farmers may be forced to choose among reducing planted acreage, switching crops, or accepting substantially higher costs.

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