Bolivia’s Energy Crisis Deepens As Natural Gas Reserves Run Dry

Years of underinvestment in Bolivia’s gas industry have left the South American country facing a severe fuel shortage, as energy prices rise ever higher owing to the ongoing war in Iran. The energy shortages and economic crisis follow years of poor decision-making by the government.

In 2006, then-president Evo Morales took control of Bolivia’s fossil fuel industry, renegotiating contracts with international oil and gas companies and benefiting from the revenue. Much of the country’s newfound wealth was invested in public spending programs, expensive fuel subsidies, and the maintenance of a fixed currency exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar. Fossil fuel revenues contributed heavily to Bolivia’s economy for several years, supporting GDP expansion and the development of social programs that helped halve poverty rates.

For many years, Bolivian’s were led to believe that they had more extensive gas supplies than they actually did. However, in recent years, Bolivia’s fossil fuel sector has suffered as reserves have dwindled and no successful gas discoveries have occurred. As of April, Bolivia has an estimated 3.7 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves. The fall in gas production led exports to fall by almost 60 percent over the last decade. Bolivia continues to rely heavily on natural gas, which accounts for around 70 percent of its electricity mix.

Meanwhile, little progress has been made in developing the country’s green energy sector, leaving it facing severe energy shortages. The fall in gas revenues has left the economy suffering terribly, as inflation soars and the price of imported goods becomes ever more unaffordable. Luis Fernando Romero, the former head of an association of economists in southern Bolivia, stated, “We failed to take advantage of a historic opportunity that brought in immense revenue.”

This situation is not uncommon, with many other oil-rich states having had similar experiences. Several Middle Eastern states have long depended on oil and gas revenues for economic growth, and most have only recently announced plans to diversify their economies to reduce reliance on fossil fuels. Several countries across the MENA region announced new economic strategies following greater talk of a global green transition, which could leave them missing out on vital oil revenues if they don’t take moves to diversify and invest in value-added sectors.

The lack of investment in Bolivia’s other domestic sectors has left it struggling to stay afloat as it runs out of fuel and is forced to pay high fuel import costs. President Rodrigo Paz warned that “International prices are forcing us to make complex choices.”

In September, Bolivia’s Congress approved a $1.9 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), even though the terms of the deal require the government to impose strict austerity measures that could fuel social unrest. The loan received approval from the IMF’s Executive Board on October 2, and the government will now be required to cut its fuel subsidies and significantly reduce public spending. It has already increased fuel prices and is expected to scrap further gasoline subsidies from the beginning of next year. The loan is expected to unlock up to $4 billion more in financing from the World Bank and other lenders.

However, there are major concerns that the new financial plan will significantly increase the cost of living for households already struggling. Last December, the government reduced fuel subsidies, leaving little support for the most vulnerable Bolivians. This led to widespread protests as people called for President Paz’s resignation. In February, there was further social unrest after the distribution of poor-quality gasoline ruined thousands of vehicles. Then, in June and July, several weeks of road blockades by protesters occurred.

Meanwhile, to tackle the ongoing fuel shortages, Bolivia’s government announced plans in September to triple the fund financing refined fuel purchases, following similar announcements by Peru and Ecuador. This is expected to help mitigate diesel shortages and rising prices. Both Peru and Ecuador have increased fuel subsidies in recent months and are focusing on increasing production at state oil refineries to alleviate the price pressure of expensive fuel imports.

In July, Bolivia’s Energy Minister Marcelo Blanco announced that the government had authorized the private sector to import and sell refined fuels to mitigate severe shortages. Then, in September, the government said that the state hydrocarbons firm plans to focus on exploration, extraction, and refining to continue developing Bolivia’s gas resources. However, experts warn that Bolivia could become a net fossil gas importer by around 2030.

As Bolivia continues to battle fuel shortages and seeks to support economic recovery by borrowing from international organizations, the government must focus on diversifying the economy by developing other value-added sectors to sustain long-term growth. In addition, the government must also develop Bolivia’s renewable energy sources to reduce dependence on expensive fuel imports and ensure the country’s energy security.

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Europe Is Still Buying Record Russian LNG Under Its Own Contracts

Much of Europe continues to buy Russian liquefied natural gas, and this explains many of the targets and non-targets of the ongoing war in Ukraine. While long-range strikes by the Ukrainians have targeted to destroy Russian oil refining and related products infrastructure, the country’s major LNG export facilities have, for the most part, been left intact.

Refining: Crude runs at Russian refineries have reportedly dropped to multi-decade lows. Export restrictions are in place for diesel, with half of the country’s top diesel producers reported offline or heavily restricted by September 2026.

The deep strikes of September 2026 hit gas-condensate processing plants in the Yamalo-Nenets region, in the towns of Novy Urengoy and Purovsky. The plants that were hit by the strikes are not part of the Russian LNG production, and the Yamal LNG trains were not struck. The largest share of Russia’s total LNG exports is produced by the Yamal LNG terminals, which have a production capacity of about 17.4 million tonnes of LNG per year and sit further north than the plants that were hit.

Ukraine has so far avoided targeting operational LNG plants in the conflict. Analysts have noted that Western sensitivity to the global gas market and Europe’s continued imports are frequently cited as the reason.

European importers continue to receive large volumes of LNG under long-term contracts, including Yamal LNG, and the full statutory ban is only being phased in through 2027. In the first nine months of this year record volumes of LNG were delivered to EU terminals by Yamal cargoes.

This is uncomfortable for the governments in Brussels. While for years the Governments of Europe and of the world have been imploring others to cut off the Russians, they themselves continue to take delivery of record quantities of Russian gas and the plants that produce it have been ‘off target’. The assault on the diesel production of Russia has had a measurable effect, while Europeans continue to buy the same country’s LNG.

And it clearly illustrates just how much the requirements of the European energy supplies determine the course of this war. The power generating gas and the industrial gases that Europe needs are left untouched by the Ukrainian strikes – for the time being, and as long as the contracts are running.

We will have to wait and see whether European importers are still prepared to take Russian LNG when the ban is finally phased in through 2027.

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Western Media Accept Trump’s Plundering of Venezuelan Oil as Business as Usual

Since the January 3, 2026, military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed semi-colonial rule over Venezuela, forcing dramatic shifts in the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

The capstone of the new tutelary regime is an oil deal announced in late August that Trump called “the biggest in history.” The agreement turns over 17 prime oilfields, holding over 20% of the country’s reserves, to a Pentagon-controlled corporation tasked with supplying cheap fuel to the US war machine for decades to come.

After spending years manufacturing consent for US-sponsored regime change in Venezuela (e.g., FAIR.org, 6/4/21, 1/11/23, 2/12/25), having a government in Caracas subservient to Washington represented a new scenario for the corporate media. The novel conditions have raised few significant qualms for Western outlets. Tactical objections notwithstanding, there is no fundamental disagreement with the US running the affairs of a Global South country.

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Another Major US River Running Dry Leaving Millions Facing Water Crisis

While concerns over the depletion of the Colorado River have dominated headlines in recent months, a longer river has been quietly battling “a severe water crisis demanding urgent attention.”

The Rio Grande has faced some of the most significant water shortages in the western United States, which could leave millions of locals without drinking water.

Running 1,900 miles, the Rio Grande is one of the longest rivers in the U.S. It flows from Colorado to the Gulf of Mexico and provides water to several Mexican and U.S. states, including New Mexico and Texas.

With around 15 million people relying on it for drinking water, the Rio Grande is said to have lost around 85 percent of its historic flows due to overuse and major droughts for several years, the World Wildlife Fund noted in June.

A spokesperson for New Mexico’s Office of the State Engineer (OSE) told Newsweek: “Despite recent rains, the New Mexico Office of the State Engineer and Interstate Stream Commission remain very concerned about the water outlook for the Rio Grande over the next few years and in the coming decades.”

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Who Is Hitting Syria’s Gas Lines As The Energy Corridors Take Shape?

Over recent weeks, gas lines in eastern Syria and near Damascus have been hit by explosions, interrupting supplies to power stations and cutting electricity across large areas. Two attacks on sections identified as the Jbessa gas line were officially described as sabotage. 

A separate blast at the Tishreen plant remains under investigation. Their timing has drawn attention as Syria negotiates a role in the routes carrying Iraqi oil and regional gas to the Mediterranean and beyond. Even a limited strike on a pipeline can delay repairs, reduce power generation, and unsettle investors weighing projects that will cost billions. 

The question is who stands to gain from keeping Syria’s energy network vulnerable, and how much the available evidence can tell us about the perpetrators.

The Jbessa line & the Tishreen blast

The first confirmed incident came on August 18, when an explosion stopped pumping through the gas export line from the Jbessa gas plant in the countryside of Hasakah, northeastern Syria. The Syrian Petroleum Company said its preliminary investigation found deliberate sabotage. 

The line serves a region containing much of Syria’s oil and gas infrastructure, and the interruption affected gas deliveries to electricity turbines. Crews isolated the wells, closed the safety valves, and began repairs. No injuries were reported. That first attack showed how a strike on a single valve could reach far beyond the site itself, with electricity users elsewhere bearing the consequences.

On September 28, the Jbessa gas line was attacked near Al-Shula in the Deir Ezzor countryside. An explosion at a sectional valve set off a fire and again halted the flow of gas from Jbessa toward power stations. Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir later said explosives had been used. This time, the repair crews had to replace an 18-meter section of 16-inch pipe. The company announced on October 2 that pumping had resumed after the work was completed. 

According to its land-gas director, the line had carried about 950,000 cubic meters a day. Its repeated targeting has therefore struck a significant part of the gas supply on which Syrian power generation depends. The Jbessa line feeds the gas network through the central region, including the area around Al-Furqlus in eastern Homs. This matters at a time when Damascus is trying to repair existing infrastructure and build new cross-border links. 

The proposed Iraqi oil route to Baniyas on the coast is a separate project, and there is no evidence that the attacks on Jbessa directly targeted that future pipeline. Yet damage to operating energy facilities carries an obvious warning for governments and companies contemplating a much larger transit system across Syrian territory. They would need confidence that long stretches of pipe, pumping equipment, and the workers maintaining them could be protected.

Two other violent incidents occurred on September 30. On the Masyaf Bridge in western Homs, unidentified gunmen opened fire on a bus carrying civilian workers, killing seven and wounding four. Initial SANA reports described civilian workers, while regional reporting identified them as engineers and employees of a private electricity company. The attack occurred two days after the Shula sabotage, but no investigation has established a link between the incidents.

That evening, an explosion on a gas line supplying the Tishreen thermal plant in the Damascus countryside forced Tishreen, Deir Ali, and Al-Nasiriyah out of service, bringing wider power cuts. Firefighters contained the blaze, and the authorities began restoring gas supplies. Unlike the two Jbessa incidents, the cause was unresolved when Energy Minister Bashir spoke at the site. He said inspectors would determine whether a technical fault, an attack, or sabotage had caused the blast after the area cooled. 

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HYPOCRISY: Crazed Democrat Gov. Maura Healey, Who Sued Exxon and Bragged She “Stopped Two Gas Pipelines,” Now Begs Trump’s Energy Secretary to Fast-Track a Natural Gas Expansion Days Before Re-election

Massachusetts Democrat Governor Maura Healey is suddenly singing a very different tune on natural gas.

Far-left Massachusetts Governor Maura Healey, the same Democrat who sued ExxonMobil over climate change and once boasted that she stopped gas pipelines from entering the state, is now pleading with the Trump administration to rush federal permits for a natural gas pipeline expansion.

Healey sent a letter Thursday to Energy Secretary Chris Wright urging the administration to speed reviews and permits for Enbridge’s Algonquin Reliable Affordable Resilient Enhancement project, known as RARE, according to her office and CommonWealth Beacon.

She asked Wright to “work across the Administration to ensure that the federal reviews and permits needed for RARE move without delay,” and that “sufficient staff and resources are dedicated to completing the required reviews in time to preserve the project’s planned 2028 in-service date.”

The governor’s own press office confirmed the ask. In an October 1 release, Healey called on the Trump administration to expedite federal review of the Algonquin expansion she says she has previously supported.

Her office said the project would supply gas to about 600,000 customers and cut gas bills by roughly $40 million a year. The savings would come largely from reducing reliance on higher-cost imported liquefied natural gas through the Everett LNG terminal.

In January, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities approved two 10-year agreements between Eversource gas utilities and Algonquin to take the new supply. Enbridge, not ratepayers, would pay for the development, Healey said.

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DOJ Seeks $61M in Iranian Oil Proceeds Laundered Through Binance Accounts

The U.S. Department of Justice has filed to forfeit $61 million in crypto it says was generated from Iranian black-market oil sales.

The U.S. Department of Justice said Monday it is seizing and seeking to forfeit $61 million in cryptocurrency that it alleges came from black-market sales of sanctioned Iranian oil.

That sum is a fraction of the operation prosecutors describe in the civil forfeiture complaint. A cluster of self-custodied wallets received and distributed more than $1.5 billion in oil proceeds, routing funds to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked businesses, other crypto addresses and an Iranian exchange, according to the filing. Two China-based firms, Blessed Trust and Hexa Whale, allegedly used trading accounts at Binance to launder proceeds and funnel them to the Iranian government and its proxies.

It comes after the U.S. tries to crack down on Iran’s use of the leading cryptocurrency: the U.S. in July said that it had frozen crypto linked to the Iranian regime, mostly in the form of Tether’s stablecoin; Iran started a bitcoin-backed insurance service for its counties shipping companies earlier this year.

There was no mention of bitcoin in Monday’s claim — but the Iranian government is also using bitcoin to skirt around sanctions. Bitcoin has no issuer, so no blacklist function and bitcoin held without intermediaries can’t be frozen

“The Government of Iran relies on black-market sales of sanctioned crude oil to fund its military and foster terrorism in the Middle East and around the world, along with other malign efforts to develop a nuclear program and ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads,” Deputy U.S. Attorney Sean S. Buckley said in a statement. 

“As alleged in the complaint filed today, the Government of Iran used a network of cryptocurrency actors in China and elsewhere to launder more than $1.5 billion in illicit oil money intended to benefit the Iranian military and the terror-designated IRGC.”

The filing alleges that the illicit oil money was laundered via Chinese companies Blessed Trust Limited and Hexa Whale Trading Limited.

Once the money was laundered, it was funneled back to Iran’s government, its agents, and its proxies, feds said. 

The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control in July said Iran had been dodging sanctions by accepting pay in bitcoin from ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. 

OFAC said at the time that Hormuz Safe, developed by Iran’s Ministry of Economy, “accepts payment in bitcoin and other digital assets” so it can bypass sanctions. 

The Financial Times last week reported that the Middle Eastern country was using bitcoin to settle cross-border transactions through Iranian crypto exchanges after the central bank advised its countrymen to do anything necessary to help the economy.

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Iran’s Disappearing Oil Is Becoming Everyone’s Problem

Iranian oil is disappearing from the market just as its biggest buyer returns for more. China’s recovering crude demand is colliding with the loss of a supplier that sustained its independent refiners through the crisis, forcing them to compete for increasingly expensive alternatives. The consequences reach beyond China: every replacement barrel tightens supplies for other buyers, while Tehran faces a growing incentive to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, which is now carrying an unexpectedly strong 13 million barrels a day (just 5 million below pre-crisis level), while its own oil remains trapped.

Iranian crude has long been an underestimated part of the global oil balance. After Bashar al-Assad’s government fell in December 2024, breaking the political relationship that sustained Iranian shipments to Syria, China became Iran’s only crude buyer – in 2025, it received an average of 1.4 million b/d. The war initiated by the US and Israel in late February initially made Iran even more important to Chinese buyers: while Tehran blocked other tankers from crossing Hormuz, its own cargoes passed freely, lifting Chinese intake of Iranian oil to around 1.76 million b/d in April.

That competitive edge ended with the US blockade announced on April 13. Loaded tankers could no longer leave the Gulf, while empty vessels could not enter. Loadings at Kharg Island, Iran’s main export terminal, collapsed from 1.8 million b/d in March to 260,000 b/d in May. A June 17 memorandum allowing Iranian cargoes to pass for 60 days offered temporary relief: loadings recovered to 740,000 b/d in June and 890,000 b/d in July. But the reprieve expired in August, shipments slumped again to 250,000 b/d, and no Iranian loadings were observed in the Gulf in September.

The more important part of the story, however, was unfolding outside the Strait. Iran had accumulated a vast floating stockpile that allowed deliveries to China to continue even when fresh cargoes could not leave the Gulf. In mid-April, that cushion stood at about 160 million barrels, spread across waters around South, Southeast and East Asia. Drawing on those stocks, China still imported 1.37 million b/d of Iranian oil in May, just 10% below February’s level. But the buffer was shrinking; floating storage fell to 106 million barrels by mid-June before the temporary reopening replenished it to 128 million by mid-July.

That replenishment of available floaters has since stopped. China still received 980,000 b/d of Iranian crude in August, but only 475,000 b/d in September, with arrivals ceasing from September 26 (all of the last arriving cargoes had been loaded in June).

Iran still has around 86 million barrels on the water, the lowest volume since January 2025. Yet 23 million barrels (more than a quarter) are trapped inside the Gulf. The total has barely changed since Chinese arrivals have wound down to an almost complete halt over the past two weeks, with evident loadings in the Kharg island stopping completely. With onshore storage gradually filling up (Kpler data suggests Iranian storage tanks are now 60% full, storing around 70 million barrels), Iran will face the inevitable choice of cutting production. Whilst roughly 2.2 million b/d of production is relatively safe due to demand from its refineries, Tehran’s pre-war crude output of 3.2 million b/d seems to be no longer achievable.

For China’s ‘teapots’ (the smaller independent refineries concentrated in Shandong province), this removes a cornerstone of their crude supply. Accounting for roughly a fifth of Chinese crude imports, these refiners have built their purchasing strategies around discounted sanctioned barrels, particularly from Iran and Russia. Now they must search for barrels farther away, from the Middle East, West Africa and South America. In mid-September, ten Chinese independent refiners reportedly sent traders to Singapore to secure available supplies from the mentioned regions.

The shift is visible at Shandong’s ports. Qingdao, connected by pipeline to 12 independent refineries, relied on Iran for 40% of its 690,000 b/d incoming flows in 2025. In recent months, it has increased purchases of Brazil’s Tupi and Buzios grades and even started receiving Guyana’s Golden Arrow in July, while still relying on Saudi and Russian supplies. Nevertheless, intake has fallen to a record low of around 150,000 b/d over the past three months.

At Dongying, on Shandong’s northern Bohai coast, situated near 32 independent refineries, Russia and Iran supplied virtually all of last year’s 330,000 b/d intake, accounting for two-thirds and one-third respectively. Iranian deliveries started to decrease in summer months, with just two cargoes arriving in August and just one in September. Total intake fell to a mere 220,000 b/d in September as crude-deprived refiners were compelled to cut refinery throughputs.

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Trump Maps Out $200 Billion in Korean Investment, but the Biggest Deals Aren’t Done Yet

President Donald Trump put some yuge numbers on the table Wednesday: up to $200 billion in South Korean investment for American energy projects, including Alaska LNG, eight nuclear power plants, and a massive natural gas power project in Texas.

The announcement finally gives shape to part of the $350 billion investment package South Korea agreed to as part of last year’s trade deal with Washington. Of that total, $150 billion was set aside for shipbuilding and another $200 billion for strategic investments selected in cooperation with the United States.

From Reuters:

“Thanks to the agreements my administration has secured with the Republic of Korea, they will invest up to $200 billion,” Trump said.

He said that the investment would include the construction of eight large-scale nuclear power plants, a liquefied natural gas pipeline in Alaska and a 6-gigawatt power generation facility in Texas.

The announcement is part of a series of economic and investment deals Trump is highlighting ⁠ahead of November’s midterm elections, as he seeks to reinforce his economic record amid voter concerns over the Iran war and high gasoline prices. The Alaska LNG project also comes as Republicans seek to retain incumbent Senator Dan Sullivan who faces Democrat Mary Peltola. Sullivan was in the Oval Office for the Wednesday announcement.

The Alaska LNG project includes an 807-mile (1,299-km) pipeline carrying natural gas from the North Slope to a liquefaction facility on Alaska’s southern coast, allowing the fuel to be shipped to Asian markets. The project is designed to transport about 3.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day and produce up to 20 million metric tons of LNG annually, according to the White House.

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Massive Gas Pipeline Blast Rocks Damascus Suburbs – 2nd Suspected Sabotage This Week

A huge explosion has rocked a Damascus suburb area on Wednesday evening (local), in what could be the second act of suspected sabotage against natural gas infrastructure in just a few days.

“A gas pipeline exploded Wednesday near the Tishreen power station in Syria’s Eastern Ghouta area in the Damascus countryside,“ Alikhbariah TV reported.

According to more per regional sources, “It said the loud blast heard in Eastern Ghouta was caused by the pipeline explosion near the power station.”

Unconfirmed images are already widely circulating…

Syria had reported at least two acts of major sabotage against its gas infrastructure in the prior six weeks.

One of these events happened Monday, and saw a fire rage out of control for many hours at a gas pipeline between al-Shola and Deir Ezzor following a mystery explosion.

For several years stretching through much of the last decade, Syrian cities – including the capital – have suffered intermittent and long power outages. It was especially during the tail-end of the proxy war to oust Assad that lack of fuel and electricity became a prolonged crisis.

Damascus residents, for example, often had a mere one hour of electricity in their homes per day – if at all. Entire remote villages and towns simply proceeded with daily life amid a total and persistent blackout.

This was to a large degree the result of a US-led sanctions war which in effect strangled the population. US troops had even for years directly occupied Syria’s eastern oil and gas fields, which had been crucial for meeting domestic energy needs.

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