On September 2, it marked 80 years since Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, formally ending hostilities with the Allied powers. In 1945, Emperor Shōwa decided to surrender on August 14. Why did Japan choose to accept defeat at that moment? The United States had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. As a result, many claim that these bombings brought the war to an end. This past June, U.S. President Donald Trump compared American strikes on Iran to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stating, “That hit ended the war.” But did the atomic bombs truly end World War II?
To explore this question, we must consider two perspectives: how the Japanese government perceived the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and whether the United States intended to use them specifically to force Japan’s surrender.
What was the Japanese government’s response to the atomic bombings?
To begin, let us examine this first question. Experts have pointed out that the role of the Soviet Union’s entry into the war is often underestimated. While many believe that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the war to an end, another perspective holds that the Soviet declaration of war was the decisive factor. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8 – two days after the bombing of Hiroshima – and launched an invasion of Manchuria on August 9.
On June 22, 1945, Japanese leaders convened a conference in which Emperor Shōwa urged peace negotiations through Soviet mediation. This was despite the fact that, back in April, the Soviet Union had formally notified Japan of its intention to terminate the Neutrality Pact. Yet Japan continued to pin its hopes on Soviet goodwill, reasoning that the pact remained legally valid until April 1946. The Soviets, for their part, offered no clear response, leaving Japan to wait in vain for a gesture that was never likely to come.
Japan had come to recognize that it could not defeat the United States and the United Kingdom on its own. The Imperial Japanese Army’s plan for a decisive mainland battle would be rendered impossible if the Soviets joined the conflict. Thus, Japan placed its hopes on Soviet mediation, aiming to secure favorable terms for peace – most importantly, the preservation of the Emperor’s position.
Yasuaki Chijiwa, Director of the Department of International Conflict History at the National Institute for Defense Studies, notes that Japanese leaders continued to await a response from the Soviets even after the bombing of Hiroshima. It took two days to assess the devastation in Hiroshima, but once the Soviets entered the war, Japan acted swiftly. Just six hours after the Soviet invasion began, Japanese leaders convened to discuss surrender terms.
Emperor Shōwa stated, “Now that we are at war with the Soviets, it is imperative to bring the conflict to a swift conclusion.” Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō echoed this urgency: “We must end the war immediately.” Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki declared, “I have decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration in order to end the war.”
Although the Army continued to insist that a mainland battle could inflict significant damage on the enemy and strengthen Japan’s negotiating position, Emperor Shōwa expressed growing distrust toward the military. He had been informed as early as June 1945 that Japan’s forces lacked the capacity to sustain such a campaign, and this realization is believed to have shifted his stance toward seeking an early peace. He resolved to accept the Potsdam Declaration, provided that the Emperor’s position would be maintained.
The Byrnes Note – a diplomatic reply issued by U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes on August 11 – did not explicitly guarantee the continuation of the Japanese monarchy. Nevertheless, despite resistance from factions within the military, Emperor Shōwa accepted the terms of the declaration on August 14.
In summary, the two atomic bombs were not the sole or decisive factor in Japan’s decision to surrender. Japanese leaders referred to so-called “new-type bombs,” yet they struggled to comprehend the full extent of their impact in such a short time. Moreover, by that point, roughly 60 Japanese cities had already suffered catastrophic damage from large-scale incendiary bombing campaigns targeting urban populations.
A 1946 report by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey – commissioned by the U.S. military to assess the impact of aerial bombardment during World War II – concluded:
“Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”
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