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After one month of war against Iran, one conclusion stands out more clearly than anything declared in all the press briefings: Neither the US nor Israel entered this confrontation with a plan for a long war.

The campaign was conceived as a short and brutal episode, a shock operation designed to break Iran’s will, force Tehran back to the table on humiliating terms, or in the most ambitious fantasies circulating around Donald Trump’s political circle, trigger internal collapse and perhaps even regime change. Israel’s aim was somewhat different, though complementary. It wanted to inflict the maximum possible damage on Iran’s military and strategic infrastructure, weaken it for years, and reshape the regional balance through force. Yet in the first month of fighting, the central assumption behind both approaches began to collapse. Instead of folding and getting coerced into submission, Iran resisted like a state fighting for survival.

What doesn’t kill Iran makes it stronger

American planners appear to have imagined a limited punitive maneuver lasting perhaps a week or two. The logic was familiar and, from their point of view, elegant. Strike hard, generate fear, disrupt command structures, raise the economic cost, and create a moment in which Iran’s leadership would face a stark choice between capitulation and disaster. Some in the Trump camp seem to have believed that Iran’s political system was brittle enough to crack under pressure. That assumption now looks less like strategy and more like projection. Washington entered the war expecting quick leverage rather than a drawn out contest of endurance.

Israel, for its part, appears to have approached the opening phase with fewer illusions about diplomacy and more determination to degrade Iran by force. The strategic instinct in West Jerusalem was not primarily to negotiate with Tehran from a position of strength, but to use the cover of an American-backed offensive to hit as much as possible and to push Iran backward in military, technological, and geopolitical terms. In that sense, Israel’s goals were harsher and more concrete. But even here the first month exposed a contradiction. A state can damage Iran. It can kill, disrupt, sabotage, and bomb. Yet weakening Iran is not the same thing as breaking Iran. A campaign that hurts but does not decisively cripple can still end by strengthening Tehran politically, morally, and strategically if the attacked state manages to survive, retaliate, and turn endurance into legitimacy.

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In recent days, there has been a noticeable shift in US President Donald Trump’s rhetoric regarding Iran. Less than a week ago, Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran, threatening strikes against Iran’s energy infrastructure if it refused to unblock the Strait of Hormuz. Now, Trump has expressed openness to negotiations and even claims that some contact with the Iranian side has taken place. This rhetorical shift may not reflect a genuine diplomatic process but could be part of an information strategy. After it became clear that Tehran was unwilling to make concessions and was unresponsive to Trump’s coercive pressure, the US attempted to make it look like the Iranian side was the one suggesting talks.

Israeli news outlet Ynet claims that Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has agreed to negotiate with the US. However, no credible evidence has surfaced to back this, raising questions about the sources of the information and its purpose. Given the current dynamics, these reports can be seen as propaganda aimed at crafting an image of Iran as vulnerable and eager for urgent dialogue with Washington. These interpretations might serve to reinforce the narrative of Tehran’s weakening position.

In Tehran, this is perceived as an attempt to influence global energy markets. Public signals from the US, particularly from Trump, affect oil and gas price dynamics, especially amid tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz – a critical artery for global hydrocarbon supplies. In this context, talk of negotiations can be viewed as a tool for stabilizing expectations and reducing market volatility.

Iranian society and elites remain skeptical about negotiations with the US. Based on past experiences, Iran believes that diplomatic agreements with Washington do not lead to long-term de-escalation and are often followed by increased pressure or an escalation of the conflict. In the current situation, Iran maintains that its position does not necessitate immediate negotiations. Furthermore, within the regional landscape, Iran possesses the capability for asymmetric influence, utilizing allied actors and indirect means of leverage.

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