Tag: smartphones

Citizen Lab Exposes Israeli Spyware Infecting Phones Through Ordinary Ads

Israeli mercenary spyware reached potentially hundreds of millions of devices worldwide through ordinary online advertisements that required no user interaction to deliver their payload, according to research by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab. [1]

The findings published Thursday, Oct. 15, said the incident is likely to be the first confirmation of zero-click mercenary spyware delivered through targeted ads [2]. The ads, loaded with the Candiru spyware, were placed by Israeli firm Discover-Tech.

What The Citizen Lab Investigation Found

During a four-month period examined by researchers, Discover-Tech ads appeared on almost 200,000 unique websites and Android and iOS applications across dozens of countries. [1] The Citizen Lab said the advertising supply chain effectively functions as a mass-profiling and infection system capable of reaching enormous populations with no user action whatsoever.

Scope Extended to Sensitive Networks, Researchers Say

According to The Citizen Lab, Discover-Tech ad impressions were also found in North Atlantic Treaty Organization and United Nations networks, the European Parliament, the European Commission and more than a dozen national governments. Ads also appeared within media organizations in eight countries, including Australia, Mexico and across Europe. The pattern suggests that the advertising infrastructure used in the campaign reached deeply into government, military and journalistic environments where surveillance would be most valuable.

Platform Access and Prior Blacklisting

Candiru’s rebrand to Integrity Labs followed a 2025 acquisition by the U.S. private equity firm Integrity Partners, which is not subject to U.S. sanctions. This corporate restructuring allowed the spyware operation to continue under a new identity while its prior entity remained on the blacklist.

Following the findings by the two research groups, Google, IAB Europe, Beeswax and other platforms disconnected Discover-Tech’s access to the digital advertising market. In November 2021, Candiru was also used to target Middle East Eye and other websites, according to the security firm ESET, in an attack that targeted links to the Middle East with a strong focus on Yemen and the surrounding conflict.

Researcher Comments and Context

“The way online advertising works today is a systemic security threat,” Wolfie Cristl, a senior researcher at The Citizen Lab, told Reuters. The reports describe an advertising model in which commercial ad platforms can be repurposed for tracking, reconnaissance and the automated delivery of malicious exploits without any interaction from the user.

The findings add to a growing pattern of documented abuses of commercial spyware. In September 2026, suspected spyware attacks targeted the phones of at least three Turkish ministers, with Apple sending notifications warning that the devices may have been compromised [3].

In December 2025, a joint investigation by media outlets in Greece, Israel and Switzerland revealed that Predator spyware from the Intellexa Consortium, led by a former senior Israeli intelligence official, continued to be used against targets in multiple countries despite U.S. sanctions [4]. These cases point to a broader ecosystem in which commercial spyware vendors operate across borders, adapt to sanctions and find new delivery channels.

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The Fourth Circuit Says Border Agents Can Search Your Phone By Hand, No Suspicion Required

The Fourth Circuit issued a disappointing opinion in U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo, a case in which EFF filed an amicus brief, alongside the national ACLU, its Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia affiliates, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).

We argued that electronic device searches at the border should require a warrant based on probable cause, but at minimum, regardless of whether an officer searches by hand or with forensic software that plugs into a device and downloads its entire contents for search, the same Fourth Amendment standard should apply to all device searches at the border.

Unfortunately, the court rejected that argument and ruled that a lower standard applies to manual searches, allowing the government to conduct extraordinarily invasive electronic device searches without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply because the border officer chooses to search by hand rather than with a forensic tool.

The Border Search Exception Meets Your Phone

The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches of persons or property be reasonable, which usually means obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a judge.

But a warrantless search can still be reasonable if it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, including the exception that allows officers to search your belongings at the border. The border search exception allows warrantless searches of persons or property crossing the U.S. border, including the functional equivalent of the border such as international airports, given the government’s interests in controlling who and what may enter the country.

Historically, courts have categorized border searches of luggage, vehicles, and personal effects as “routine” and thus reasonable even if conducted without any suspicion that the traveler has engaged in wrongdoing; courts have also held that more invasive “nonroutine” searches, such as certain body searches and searches that damage property, require reasonable suspicion.

But a person’s privacy interests in the personal data on a phone or laptop are extraordinarily different than their limited privacy interests in the contents of their suitcase.

The Supreme Court addressed cell phone privacy in Riley v. California (2014), holding that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to cell phones, thereby generally requiring a warrant for phone searches, at least at the interior of the country. The court recognized the unprecedented privacy interests people have in their cell phones and how even brief manual searches can reveal the “sum of an individual’s private life,” including our political affiliations, religious beliefs, sexuality, and more. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that because electronic device searches bear “little resemblance” to searches of bags or physical containers, they should be evaluated differently.

Following Riley, the Fourth Circuit considered two border device search cases involving forensic searches, in which border officers used external software to extract and analyze a device’s data.

In U.S. v. Kolsuz (2018), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic search of a cell phone at the border “must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion” of a transnational offense, but the court declined to decide whether the standard is only reasonable suspicion or instead a probable cause warrant.

Then in U.S. v. Aigbekaen (2019), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic device search at the border in support of a purely domestic law enforcement investigation requires a warrant. The court also reiterated the general Kolsuz rule for a forensic border-related device search: the “Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception’s purposes of protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import contraband.”

In Belmonte Cardozo, manual searches were finally before the court.

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Amish farmers fined for not using COVID-era ArriveCan app as legal battle over religious freedom continues

Picture rolling fields, hand-built barns and a way of life largely untouched by modernity. Around two and a half hours west of Toronto, Amish communities continue to farm using animal and human power, rejecting electricity, automobiles and most modern technology.

For the Amish, this is not simply a lifestyle choice. It is a religious practice rooted in their Christian faith. Their communities live much as they have for generations, keeping a low profile, avoiding conflict and turning to a simpler way of life.

That changed during the COVID pandemic hysteria.

Amish families regularly crossed the Canada-U.S. border for family, religious and everyday reasons. When returning to Canada, they were asked the same question as other travellers: had they downloaded the ArriveCan app?

For the Amish, the question created an impossible situation. They do not use smartphones, and their faith prevents them from adopting much of the modern technology required by the app.

Without realising it, Amish families were issued fines that eventually totalled hundreds of thousands of dollars across the community. Some only discovered what had happened when liens were placed on their farms, threatening properties that had been passed down through generations.

Around 40 farms were affected, leaving Amish families facing a legal battle they never expected to fight.

The Democracy Fund stepped in to challenge the cases, with lawyers Marc Joseph and Adam Blake-Gallipeau working to reopen the convictions. So far, 24 families have had their cases reopened and stayed, removing the immediate legal threat. However, eight families were denied that relief and are continuing their appeals through the Ontario courts.

The cases have highlighted the challenges faced by a community that avoids conflict and does not use modern communication systems, yet found itself navigating a complex legal process involving courts, paperwork and technology.

The legal fight continues, with the remaining families seeking to have their cases reconsidered through the appeals process.

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The Fourth Circuit Says Border Agents Can Search Your Phone By Hand, No Suspicion Required

The Fourth Circuit issued a disappointing opinion in U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo, a case in which EFF filed an amicus brief, alongside the national ACLU, its Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia affiliates, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).

We argued that electronic device searches at the border should require a warrant based on probable cause, but at minimum, regardless of whether an officer searches by hand or with forensic software that plugs into a device and downloads its entire contents for search, the same Fourth Amendment standard should apply to all device searches at the border.

Unfortunately, the court rejected that argument and ruled that a lower standard applies to manual searches, allowing the government to conduct extraordinarily invasive electronic device searches without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply because the border officer chooses to search by hand rather than with a forensic tool.

The Border Search Exception Meets Your Phone

The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches of persons or property be reasonable, which usually means obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a judge.

But a warrantless search can still be reasonable if it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, including the exception that allows officers to search your belongings at the border. The border search exception allows warrantless searches of persons or property crossing the U.S. border, including the functional equivalent of the border such as international airports, given the government’s interests in controlling who and what may enter the country.

Historically, courts have categorized border searches of luggage, vehicles, and personal effects as “routine” and thus reasonable even if conducted without any suspicion that the traveler has engaged in wrongdoing; courts have also held that more invasive “nonroutine” searches, such as certain body searches and searches that damage property, require reasonable suspicion.

But a person’s privacy interests in the personal data on a phone or laptop are extraordinarily different than their limited privacy interests in the contents of their suitcase.

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Carney wants sweeping powers over your phone while using a foreign one himself

Prime Minister Mark Carney wants sweeping new powers over Canada’s telecommunications system. But according to a recent Wall Street Journal report, when it comes to his own communications, he’s reportedly relying on a U.K.-based cellphone to communicate with foreign leaders.

If true, the irony is impossible to ignore.

The Carney government is pushing Bill C-22, legislation that would significantly expand Ottawa’s authority over Canada’s telecommunications sector in the name of national security. The bill would give the federal government broad powers to issue security orders to telecommunications companies, require providers to comply with government directives, and increase federal oversight of Canada’s communications infrastructure.

Canadians are being told these extraordinary powers are necessary because secure communications matter.

Apparently, that principle may not apply to the Prime Minister himself.

According to the Wall Street Journal, Carney has continued using a British cellphone while speaking with foreign leaders. If that reporting is accurate, Canadians deserve answers.

The issue isn’t simply where the phone was purchased; it’s about whether the Prime Minister is following the same security, transparency, and record-keeping standards imposed on everyone else in government, and now on the public. 

Among the questions that should be answered:

  • Communications security: Was the device approved for sensitive government communications under standards established by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and Treasury Board?
  • Government records: Were official calls, text messages and other communications retained in accordance with the Library and Archives of Canada Act and federal information management policies?
  • Access to Information: If government business was conducted using a foreign device or foreign telecommunications provider, are those records preserved in a manner that complies with the Access to Information Act, or could they be more difficult for Canadians to obtain?
  • Government device policies: Was the phone issued, managed and secured by the Government of Canada, or was it a personal device used for official business?
  • Foreign jurisdiction: Were official communications routed or stored through infrastructure subject to U.K. law, and what security assessment was conducted before using that device to communicate with foreign leaders?
  • Bill C-22: Why is the government demanding unprecedented oversight of Canadian telecommunications providers on national security grounds while the Prime Minister reportedly relies on a foreign telecommunications provider for his own communications?

Ottawa insists foreign technology, foreign influence and foreign infrastructure pose national security concerns. Yet the Prime Minister himself reportedly chose a foreign cellphone and foreign carrier while conducting international diplomacy.

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Starmer Calls for Spyware on All Phones

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer strode onto a stage at London Tech Week and handed Apple, Google and friends a three-month ultimatum with all the menace of a substitute teacher confiscating phones at the door. Build us controls that stop children from taking, sharing, or viewing nude images, switch them on by default across every phone and tablet already humming away in the nation’s pockets, and look sharp about it.

“This government will not stand by while children are put at risk online,” he announced, before adding the line every tech executive in the room heard as a polite threat.

“Today I am calling on the tech companies to introduce device-level controls to prevent children from taking, sharing or viewing nude images. And if they don’t act, we will.”

Stirring stuff. Nobody wants children harmed, and saying so out loud is the cheapest applause line in British politics.

The trouble is the two innocent-looking words tucked into the speech like a wasp in a picnic basket, the words “device-level.”

Here is what “device-level” means once you peel off the cuddly branding. To catch one naughty photo on your phone, something has to inspect every photo on your phone. All of them.

It is software that leans over your shoulder the instant you raise your camera, squints at whatever you are making, and decides whether you may keep it or it gets reported to authorities.

Engineers named this trick years ago, client-side scanning, and even Apple, a company that would happily sell you the air inside its packaging, built a version of it in 2021 and then sprinted away from the idea the moment people worked out what it did to private messaging.

The worst part is what it does to encryption. End-to-end encryption is meant to mean nobody in the middle can read your stuff, not the app, not your internet provider, not a bored government with a search warrant fetish.

Client-side scanning waltzes around all of that by reading your photo on your own device first, before the encryption clicks shut. The lock on the front door stays bolted. There is just a man with a clipboard standing in your hallway, jotting notes before you turn the key. The math survives. The privacy, meanwhile, is dead.

Step back and admire how casually people are treating this. A government politely asking every phone maker to install a tiny invigilator inside the camera lens, marking your snapshots as they form, would have been thrown out of a Black Mirror writers’ room a decade ago for being too on the nose.

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