At last week’s Paris meeting of the ‘coalition of the willing’, Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron congratulated themselves on reinserting Europe into the peace process opened up by President Trump. In practice, they have done their best to derail it.
Nothing is more foolish than their idea of placing British and French military soldiers and aircraft in Ukraine to provide ‘reassurance’ against renewed Russian aggression after a ceasefire.
Not only cannot it not be made to happen – since both America and Russia reject it – but the attempt to make it happen distracts attention from the serious business of making peace. It is, rather, a desperate attempt to make Britain and France relevant to a peace process which they did not initiate and never wanted.
What might be made to happen, because potentially acceptable to both Russia and the United States, is a UN-supervised ceasefire with non-NATO peacekeepers. But there has been no European suggestion to this effect.
Scarcely less foolish is the Paris decision to ‘accelerate’ and ‘toughen’ economic sanctions against Russia. To keep sanctions as a pressure point is perfectly sensible, but to urge their expansion now is to derail peace talks just at the moment when a real prospect of peace has opened up.
Economic sanctions are instruments of war, successors to the blockades. Their phased withdrawal should be part of peace-making.
The project of ‘reassuring’ Ukraine against renewed Russian aggression says nothing about reassuring Russia against future NATO aggression.
This reflects the dominant western view that NATO is a purely defensive alliance, that Russia’s attack on Ukraine was unprovoked, and that therefore any Russian demand for reassurance is bogus.
This flies in face of credible evidence that NATO’s leader, the United States, played an active, and possibly crucial, role in destabilizing the elected pro-Russian government of Yanukovych in 2014, and installing a Ukrainian nationalist alternative.*
That the Russian invasion was provoked, is not to say that it was justified. It was a moral and strategic blunder, one of whose consequences was to add two new members to the NATO alliance. Nevertheless the hostility to NATO expansion which underlay it was a product not just of a long history, but of insistent repetition from Gorbachev onward which the West, confident of its victory in the Cold War, cheerfully ignored. It was naive to believe that vengeance would limp after Russia had recovered its strength.
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