Trump has a mandate to end the Ukraine War

While no single foreign policy issue commanded anything near voters’ concern for domestic challenges, the twin spiraling crises in Europe and the Middle East led a large swathe of the electorate to conclude that foreign policy is too important to be left to the technocrats.

President-elect Trump deftly exploited this lingering anti-establishment sentiment first by picking JD Vance as his running mate and then by defining himself against Harris — who did everything she could to advertise the Democratic party to anti-Trump neoconservatives, up to and including by christening Liz Cheney a core campaign surrogate — as the anti-war candidate.

The difficult but necessary work of resolving the Ukraine war, the most dangerous and destructive conflict on the European continent since 1945, now falls to the incoming Trump administration. But doing so requires coming to grips with, and rejecting, the shibboleths and superstitions that have characterized the established approach to Ukraine.

When diagnosing the crises facing U.S. foreign policy, it pays to consult the prior generation of American diplomats. As is well known, the Cold War exercised a disciplining effect on its American and Soviet figurants. The neck to neck nature of that rivalry, coupled with what both parties recognized as the catastrophic consequences of direct confrontation, meant that neither side was in a position to dictate to the other.

The two superpowers were bound to a shared logic of strategic caution that permitted and, indeed, necessitated competition on the margins but harshly discouraged an uncompromising “winner takes all” mentality on existential questions of war and peace.

This provided fertile ground for the development of a decision-making community eager to learn from their mistakes, obsessively grasping for even the most minute ways in which U.S. policy can be refined or reformed. It is not brute coercive force but rather a persistent open-mindedness, tempered by a nagging recognition and respect for the limits of American power, that produced such exertions of political genius as the long telegram and policy of detente that enabled the U.S. to contend on favorable footing with its Soviet competitor.

Keep reading

The Man Who Can Help Trump Bring Peace to Korea

Columbia Professor of Genetics Joseph D. Terwilliger has an exceptional resume. Along with his post at an elite institution, he is an accomplished tuba player, speaks a multitude of languages, has traveled to nearly every country on Washington’s official enemies list, and served as translator for NBA legend Dennis Rodman when he traveled to North Korea to meet with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un.

So, how did Terwilliger translate the conversation between two of the most fascinating people on the planet?

Part of the story involves his career as a geneticist. He spent years teaching at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Unlike the perception most Americans have of North Koreans, Joe speaks highly of the people and paints a picture distinctly different from the Kim-run death cult that is often presented.

The other part involves Terwilliger making a $2,500 gamble. After Rodman made his first trip to North Korea, Joe saw an opportunity.

Terwilliger was in North Korea during Rodman’s first visit. He told the Libertarian Institute that he witnessed the students “[rethinking] their stereotypes about Americans” because Rodman was willing to say positive things about their country.

So, Joe won a game of HORSE against Dennis with a $2,500 silent auction bid. There, he and Rodman discussed a return visit to North Korea.

“[The] hope was to engage Kim Jong Un to try and build a relationship based on trust,” a mission Joe believes he was able to accomplish. “When we took the basketball players to [North Korea on Kim’s] birthday, [the supreme leader] remarked that we were the first Americans that ever kept their word.”

During Donald Trump’s first presidency, he showed a willingness to break with long-established policy in Washington, which has insisted that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear weapons before any talks can begin.

Of course, Kim would never give up his nuclear arsenal, as it serves as a deterrent to an attack from the United States. But that does not mean relations with the DPRK could not improve.

Keep reading

Critiquing The Former CFR Chief’s Proposed Compromise For Ending The Ukrainian Conflict

He deserves credit for saying what no policy influencer of his caliber has dared to, and his proposal for phased sanctions relief is also very pragmatic, but other parts of his proposed compromise are unrealistic.

Former Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) President Richard Haass recently published a detailed article for his think tank’s journal about how “The Perfect Has Become the Enemy of the Good in Ukraine: Why Washington Must Redefine Its Objectives”. He observed that the US never clearly defined what victory means, which has led to false expectations, deep disappointment, and confusion about the endgame. Haass then proceeds to explain why the US should push Ukraine to compromise with Russia.

According to him, it can’t realistically restore its pre-2014 borders, nor outlast Russia in the ongoing “war of attrition”. Zelensky’s much-ballyhooed “Victory Plan” “is not a plan for victory, but a prescription for continued war”, Haass wrote, warning that “If Kyiv’s allies walk away, it could end up being a prescription for defeat.” Instead, he suggests settling for Ukraine remaining “an independent, sovereign, and economically viable country”, which requires ending hostilities as soon as possible.

To that end, its Western partners “should tell Kyiv that Western support cannot be expected to continue at or near current levels without it. But they should also make an ironclad pledge to do everything in their power to provide Ukraine with arms for the long haul.” This includes giving it long-range weapons as a deterrent to Russia resuming the conflict at a later date. A buffer zone would also ideally be carved out along the Line of Contact, potentially with peacekeepers, but neither side would give up their claims.

Keep reading

What’s Really Going On In the South China Sea Between the Philippines and China

Maritime clashes between the Philippines and China had been mostly over the Philippines’ military outpost, BRP (BRP – Barko ng Republika ng Pilipinas, which translates to “Ship of the Republic of the Philippines” – the ship prefix for the Philippines) Sierra Madre, in the Spratly Islands, which is disputed by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan (a province of China, as recognized by the United Nations’ Resolution No. 2758), and Vietnam. The BRP Sierra Madre was intentionally run aground on a reef near the Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands, in 1997, so that the Philippines could stake their territorial claim.

The WWII-era ship is rusted out and on its way to disintegrating.  In December 2023, the Philippines allocated funds to replace the ship with a permanent structure. Coincidentally, in September 2023, Blake Herzinger, a research fellow at the United States Studies Centre of the University of Sydney, penned an article titled, “It’s Time to Build Combined Forward Operating Base Sierra Madre.” This outpost would be “manned by combined rotational forces from both the Philippines and the U.S. Marine Corps,” according to Herzinger.  In it, he admits that doing so, “would be a provocative move, and it would not be without significant risk.”

In October 2023, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFU) admitted that their resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre were carrying materials that were used in the maintenance and repair of the ship. China had been accusing the Philippines of using its resupply missions to send “illegal building materials” to reinforce the dilapidated ship on several occasions.  In June of this year, The Financial Times revealed that the Philippines had “secretly” reinforced the BRP Sierra Madre at the Second Thomas Shoal.

On March 5, 2024, in response to an incident at the Second Thomas Shoal, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller stated that “Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft, including those of its coast guard, anywhere in the South China Sea.”  At the time, the crash was “not the time or reason to invoke a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States,” according to Philippine President Bongbong Marcos. Invoking the Mutual Defense Treaty by the Philippines could lead to an armed conflict between China and the U.S. Military.

Recently, these clashes have been occurring at the Sabina Shoal, another disputed atoll in the Spratly Islands. In May, the Philippines claimed that China was carrying out “small-scale reclamation” and anchored the BRP Teresa Magbanua at Sabina Shoal to “catch and document the dumping of crushed corals over the sandbars” (China denied this).  The Philippines had been using the BRP Teresa Magbanua as a staging area for their resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal. A new Philippine Coast Guard vessel was sent to Sabina Shoal, according to Jonathan Malaya, the spokesperson for the National Security Council of the Philippines, on September 26. However, he declined to comment on the specifics of their intentions or plans, citing operational security concerns.

Keep reading

Prepping Readers to Accept Mass Slaughter in Lebanese ‘Strongholds’

Back in May 2015, the New York Times’ Isabel Kershner decided to moonlight as an Israeli military propagandist by penning an alleged exposé (5/12/15)—headlined “Israel Says Hezbollah Positions Put Lebanese at Risk”—in which she diligently conveyed all that Israel had to say about Hezbollah’s infrastructure in south Lebanon.

The minuscule hamlet of Muhaybib, for example, was said to contain no fewer than “nine arms depots, five rocket-launching sites, four infantry positions, signs of three underground tunnels, three anti-tank positions and, in the very center of the village, a Hezbollah command post.” In the village of Shaqra, home to approximately 4,000 people, the Israeli army had meanwhile identified some “400 military sites and facilities belonging to Hezbollah.”

Only after 11 full paragraphs of transmitting the Israeli line did Kershner manage to insert the disclaimer that “the Israeli claims could not be independently verified.” But by that time, of course, the damage had been done, the reader having already been persuaded that south Lebanon was one big Hezbollah military installation, where Israel could not afford to concern itself with civilian lives in any future conflict. Driving the point home was former Israeli national security adviser Yaakov Amidror, who informed Kershner that “many, many Lebanese will be killed” in the next showdown with Hezbollah.

I happened to be in south Lebanon at the time of the article’s publication, and drove over to Muhaybib and Shaqra to check out the fearsome landscape. Though I did not encounter any Hezbollah command posts, I did see some schoolchildren, elderly folks, bakeries, farms, clothing shops and, in Shaqra, a colorful establishment offering “Botox filling.”

Keep reading

The long road to Beirut now Israel has bombed Syrian borders

On Thursday 7th of November I set off for Beirut. I could no longer use the direct road through the Masnaa border with Lebanon. Israel has now bombed the road at least twice reducing the stretch between the Syrian and Lebanese border to rubble. The US influence (on behalf of Israel) in Lebanon has prohibited any attempts by the Lebanese or Syrian side to repair the road. Israel has threatened to bomb it again if either side tries to restore operations.

The blue dotted line is the usual route which is fast and efficient. The purple dotted line is the route now needed to reach Beirut from Damascus. Israel has also bombed several points and bridges on the Homs western route so it is necessary to head for Tartous further north on the coast and then turn south to reach the border.

Keep reading

Five Reasons Why Trump Should Revive The Draft Russian-Ukrainian Peace Treaty

Trump has everything to gain by picking up where everyone left off over two and a half years ago.

The Wall Street Journal’s report that Trump wants to create a Western-patrolled DMZ along the Line of Contact (LOC) for freezing the Ukrainian Conflict, which was analyzed here and here, dangerously runs the risk of escalating tensions with Russia to the point of a Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis. It would therefore be much better for him to revive the draft Russian-Ukrainian peace treaty from spring 2022 instead.

Keep reading

10 Obstacles To Trump’s Reported Plan For Western/NATO Peacekeepers In Ukraine

It was recently assessed that “The Clock Is Ticking For Russia To Achieve Its Maximum Goals In The Ukrainian Conflict” after the Wall Street Journal reported that Trump plans to organize a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine without the US’ participation in order to freeze the conflict. This is obviously a lot easier said than done.

Here’s what can offset this scenario by either delaying it long enough for Russia to end the conflict on its own terms or capsizing Trump’s plan completely:

1. The Europeans Fear A Direct Kinetic Escalation With Russia

France’s tough talk earlier this year about conventionally intervening in the conflict and Poland subsequently refusing to rule out its participation as well mask the Europeans’ fear of a direct kinetic escalation with Russia. Trump will have to masterfully leverage the US’ influence over them and NATO as a whole in order to coerce his country’s European partners into putting their security on the line by going through with this risky plan. It could always backfire, after all, and inadvertently spark World War III.

2. Public Opinion In The Polish Lynchpin Is Strongly Against This

It’s difficult to imagine a Western/NATO peacekeeping mission in Ukraine without Poland’s leading participation, but public opinion is strongly against this after a reputable survey over the summer showed that 69% of Poles are opposed to dispatching troops to that neighboring country in any capacity. As mutual Polish-Ukrainian mistrust worsens as explained herehere, and here, it’ll become a very tough sell, plus Poles fear that they’ll once again be exploited by the West while getting nothing at all in return.

3. Trump’s Prior Rhetoric About Article 5 Doesn’t Inspire Confidence

Another hurdle that’ll have to be overcome is regaining confidence in Trump due to his prior rhetoric about Article 5 after he declared in February that the US won’t protect those NATO members who haven’t spent at least 2% of their GDP on defense. He even threatened that “I would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want.” Even though most now meet that target, they might still fear that he’ll attach more strings to Article 5, which they’ll rely on for defense if they participate in this mission.

4. It’s Unclear Exactly What Trump Would Do If Russia Hit NATO Troops

Trump will also have to convince NATO members that his response to Russia hitting their troops will balance the line between fulfilling Article 5’s perceived commitments while avoiding an escalation that could spiral into World War III. They also need to be sure that he’ll go through with it and not back down. Moreover, this would have to be clearly communicated to Russia too, who he’ll have to deter. There’s a lot that can go wrong anywhere along this sequence of events so its success can’t be taken for granted.

5. NATO Is Unprepared For A Prolonged Non-Nuclear Hot War With Russia

Even in the extremely unlikely scenario that neither Russia nor the US resorts to nukes in the event of direct kinetic exchanges between them, then NATO would be unprepared for waging a prolonged non-nuclear hot war with Russia. It’s losing the “race of logistics” by far, no progress was made during the last NATO Summit on the “military Schengen” for facilitating such movements eastward, and the bloc only has 5% of the air defenses needed to protect itself. NATO might therefore ultimately lose to Russia.

Keep reading

Netanyahu Admits Israel Behind Pager Explosion Operation

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has admitted Israeli responsibility for the Hezbollah pager explosion operation that kicked off the war on the north along the Lebanese border.

At today’s government meeting, Netanyahu acknowledged responsibility for the pager operation against Hezbollah for the first time, reported Amir Tsarfati.

“Senior security officials and the political leadership overseeing them opposed both the pager operation and Nasrallah’s elimination,” he said.

Keep reading