With debt near $40 trillion, GOP bills would tie debt hikes to spending cuts

As the U.S. nears a mid-2027 debt-limit deadline with debt approaching $40 trillion, two Republican bills would bar Congress from raising the ceiling without matching any increased spending with spending cuts elsewhere.

The Dollar-for-Dollar Deficit Reduction Act, introduced separately by U.S. Senate Republican Whip John Barrasso of Wyoming and Rep. Greg Steube, R-Fla., would require any increase or suspension of the debt limit to be matched by equal or greater spending cuts over the current year and the following 10 years. It would be enforced through a congressional point of order. The National Taxpayers Union supports the measure.

“Congress cannot keep raising the credit limit on the American people without cutting up the credit card,” Steube said in announcing the bill. “If Congress wants to raise the credit limit, Congress must cut spending by the same amount.”

The national debt stands at $39.9 trillion, according to the Treasury Department, closing in on the $41.1 trillion ceiling that Congress raised by $5 trillion in last year’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act, a tax-and-spending law.

Fitch Ratings projected that the government will hit that ceiling around mid-2027, with several months more before it exhausts the extraordinary measures that stave off default.

The Bipartisan Policy Center, which tracks the deadline, is trending toward the earlier end of that window. Shai Akabas, the group’s vice president of economic policy, told The Center Square that weaker-than-expected tariff revenue and higher deficits are pulling the date forward, leaving “another six to nine months” of extraordinary measures once the ceiling is hit “before the government could no longer pay all of its bills in full and on time.”

The bills would bar accounting methods that let past deficit deals count savings that never materialized. Net interest savings could not count toward the required cuts, and lawmakers could not shift spending outside the 10-year window to meet the target. The Congressional Budget Office would have to score any debt-limit bill and post the estimate publicly for 24 hours before a vote. Waiving the point of order would take 60 Senate votes.

All three major credit-rating agencies have downgraded U.S. debt – Standard & Poor’s in 2011, Fitch in 2023 and Moody’s in 2025 – each pointing to the nation’s rising debt and Washington’s failure to address it. S&P and Fitch specifically cited debt-ceiling standoffs. S&P warned more than a decade ago that “the statutory debt ceiling and the threat of default have become political bargaining chips.”

Neither bill has drawn a Democratic cosponsor. The mechanism draws its force from the debt ceiling itself: because the point of order applies only to debt-limit legislation, the pressure to accept the required cuts builds against the deadline for avoiding a default. House Budget Committee Democrats did not respond to a request for comment Friday afternoon.

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How The First World War Destroyed The Gold Standard

As Trump’s “Secretary of War” Pete Hegseth demands a fifty-percent increase to the war budget—topping an eye watering $1.5 trillion—it may be instructive to remember that war spending has always and everywhere been the primary enemy of sound money. Some advocates of the warfare state like to lay the blame on social spending, but it has historically been wars that end up ruining currencies and blowing the top off the public fisc. While social spending can indeed be crippling, and certainly empowers the ruling class, it is the fiscal demands of war that cause enormous surges in public spending to levels that would have never been politically unjustifiable for mere pension programs. Rather, it is during wars that government budgets will triple or quadruple, or, —in the case of Britain during the Great War—increase by a factor of twelve. Moreover, it’s important to note that in cases like these, tax revenues rarely keep up. During the war in Britain, for example:

Part of the military spending was paid for with cuts to other spending; civil spending fell from 10% of GDP to 5%. Still, even together with tax increases, this could not match the growth in war-related spending. While tax revenues quadrupled during the war years, expenses increased by a factor of twelve. So, only 25% of spending was met by taxes in the five fiscal years starting April 1, 1914. 

More “moderate” increases were also enormous. In France total government spending, fueled by war spending, increased from 10.5 billion francs in 1914 to 46.9 billion francs in 1918. The German state’s spending rose 17 fold during the war, rising from 3 billion marks in 1914 to 52 billion marks in 1918. 

In France, as in Britain, the United States, Germany, and the other belligerents of the war, massive war debts made up for enormous gaps between tax revenue and total government spending. The European governments generally chose to monetize much of this debt, rather than raise taxes enough to cover war costs. France, the UK, and Germany, “relied much more heavily on debt and inflation than on taxation to fund government spending.” Consequently, monetary inflation was significant: 

German debt … became monetized and the volume of new currency exploded. German currency in circulation rose 599 percent over the course of the war … Great Britain and France saw an increase of money in circulation of 91 and 386 percent respectively.

These enormous surges in deficits and spending over such a short period are rarely, if ever, seen in connection to social spending. Rather, runaway government spending, to the point of increasing total spending by five or ten fold, is justified on the back of a complex of nationalism, fear, and propaganda claiming that “winning” the war—what constitutes victory is defined by the elites, of course— is worth any expense.

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AI: The Ominous Opportunity

“You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.” — Robert Solow, 1987

The economy has been growing steadily since we started to recover from the 2020 pandemic and shutdown; the unemployment rate is and has been near the bottom of the range normally considered to be full employment; and, wages adjusted for inflation are the highest they’ve ever been. Nevertheless, the productivity slowdown observed by Robert Solow forty years ago seems to have returned, and surveys of consumer confidence are at or near their all-time lows. This essay explores possible reasons for the productivity slowdown and widespread economic uncertainty in the midst of our AI boom.

Measurement Problems

Among the possible explanations of the productivity slowdown or what merely appears to be a productivity slowdown is our limited ability to measure productivity in an economy increasingly dominated by services.

It wasn’t so long ago that productivity was measured in the sectors of the economy concerned with physical output such as agriculture and manufacturing. The productivity of office workers was either ignored or simply subsumed into the productivity of goods-producing companies.

There were problems of measuring quality differences in goods, but these could in theory be surmounted. For example, by comparisons of the prices of old and new vintages of similar products. And, the changing composition of production could be represented by slowly-changing weights in indexes of production.

As much effort as was put into measuring production, systematic discrepancies persist in indexes of the prices of services versus the prices of commodities. The CPI, for example, typically registers a 1 or 2 percentage point higher rate of inflation than the PPI. With the digital economy, now augmented by AI, a serious effort must be made to measure the production of information, entertainment and services. For example, an hour of broadcast time prior to the development of the internet might have cost something like $1 million (in today’s dollars). What about the several hundred thousand hours of video uploaded to YouTube nowadays?

Prototypes (as Opposed to Practical Inventions)

In the past, it took a while for breakthroughs such as the steam engine to have a discernible impact on production. It was more or less a century from prototype steam engines to when steam engines were first put to a practical use (in the refreshing of air in coal mines). Then, several more decades until steam engines were used to run industrial machinery. Then, yet several more decades until steam-powered locomotives were used in transportation.

Even when the steam-powered locomotive was developed, horse-drawn trains were more reliable. The story is told of a race in 1830 between a steam-powered locomotive and a horse-drawn train along the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad from Baltimore to Endicott City. The horse won the race since the locomotive broke down. Nevertheless, over the next century, horses lost their jobs in transportation.

Ditto, the steam-powered hammer. According to folklore, John Henry who—through superhuman effort—beat the steam-powered hammer, preserving jobs for the men of railroad work gangs. Nevertheless, over the next century, men lost their jobs to industrial machinery. Warehousemen who relied on their strength to manhandle barrels of pork, flour, and other produce were replaced by forklifts. Dockworkers lost their jobs to electric-powered derricks.

It is easy, looking back, to see the impact of the Industrial Revolution on productivity, on wages, and on standards of living. But, in real time, it took time for these benefits to accrue. In the meanwhile, workers had to deal with disruptive change.

More recently, in 1996, a super-computer named Deep Blue challenged Gary Kasparov, the world chess champion of the humans. Kasparov won the match 3 games to 1 game to 2 draws. However, the victory was fleeting. A year later, Deep Blue won a rematch; and, nowadays, a decent laptop computer can easily defeat a grandmaster. Today, in the current phase of the Industrial Revolution, computers, robots, and AI are coming after our jobs, not steam-, gasoline- and electric-powered machines.

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23,000 Jobs Lost, but the Number Washington Hates Is 53,000

President Donald Trump got handed an ugly jobs headline Friday. The economy lost 23,000 payroll jobs in July, and revisions erased another 103,000 jobs from May and June.

Both nonfarm payroll employment (-23,000) and the unemployment rate (4.1 percent) changed little in July, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Employment declined in local government education and retail trade. Employment continued to trend up in health care. This news release presents statistics from two monthly surveys. The household survey measures labor force status, including unemployment, by demographic characteristics. The establishment survey measures nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings by industry.

For more information about the concepts and statistical methodology used in these two surveys, see the Technical Note. Household Survey Data Both the unemployment rate, at 4.1 percent, and the number of unemployed people, at 6.9 million, changed little in July. These measures also changed little over the year. Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rates for teenagers (12.1 percent) and people who are Hispanic (4.6 percent) declined in July. The jobless rates for adult men (3.9 percent), adult women (3.7 percent), and people who are White (3.6 percent), Black (6.3 percent), or Asian (4.0 percent) showed little or no change over the month. 

Among the unemployed, the number of people on temporary layoff increased by 153,000 to 921,000 in July. The number of permanent job losers changed little at 1.7 million. In July, the number of people jobless less than 5 weeks edged down to 2.0 million and is down by 344,000 over the year. The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks or more) edged down over the month to 1.8 million but changed little over the year. The long-term unemployed accounted for 25.5 percent of all unemployed people in July.

That can’t be dressed up; a weak jobs report is a weak jobs report.

But buried one line deeper is a number worth noticing. Private employers added 30,000 jobs in July while government payrolls fell by 53,000. If government employment had simply remained flat, the headline number would’ve been a gain of 30,000 jobs.

Statistics can tell very different stories depending on where somebody stops reading. The easiest headline is “23,000 jobs lost.”

It’s accurate, but so is “private employers added 30,000 jobs.”

So is “government employment fell 53,000.”

We deserve all three numbers because together they show what actually happened.

The government decline needs context, too. Of the 53,000 jobs lost, 50,000 came from local government education. Federal employment fell by only 3,000 in July. Giving Trump credit for all 53,000 would be just as misleading as pretending the private-sector gain never happened.

The larger federal trend, however, belongs squarely in Trump’s column. Office of Personnel Management data show the federal workforce has lost 272,283 employees since Trump took office on Jan. 30, 2025.

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The Fourth Turning Global War Has Already Bankrupted America — And Nobody’s Counting the Bodies

The numbers came in just after dawn on the East Coast, and they told a story that no amount of White House spin could obscure. Oil futures had stabilized at $86 per barrel overnight—a figure that would have seemed catastrophic eighteen months ago but now represented a temporary reprieve from the $119 spike that had crippled global markets in April. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, that emergency backstop established after the 1973 crisis, had fallen to 305 million barrels, its lowest level since 1983. The Congressional Budget Office quietly released its revised deficit projections: $2.3 trillion for fiscal year 2026, with another $1.8 trillion locked in for 2027 before accounting for the war’s accelerating costs, currently running at $1 billion per day with no exit strategy visible on any horizon.

This is not a recession. This is not a “period of heightened geopolitical tension.” This is the systematic dismantling of the global economic architecture that has sustained Western prosperity for eighty years, compressed into a timeframe too brief for institutional adaptation. We are witnessing, in real-time, the transition from a unipolar American-led order to a fragmented multipolar system, and the violence of that transition is being measured not just in body counts—though those are mounting in ways the Pentagon refuses to fully disclose—but in the erosion of strategic leverage that cannot be recovered once spent.

The Fourth Turning Global War has entered its terminal phase, and the metrics suggest we are only beginning to comprehend the depth of the strategic trap into which American policy has walked.

To understand the present crisis, one must first abandon the comforting narrative of accidental drift—the notion that policy errors and miscalculation have led to the current impasse. The data suggests something more troubling: a decoupling of strategic decision-making from national interest calculation, producing outcomes that serve no identifiable American objective while advancing the interests of regional actors with disproportionate influence over U.S. policy formation.

Consider the timeline with the precision of a military after-action report. On February 27, 2026, the United States initiated a surprise decapitation strike against Iranian leadership while Israeli envoys maintained ostensible negotiations in Geneva. The strike eliminated Iran’s military command structure and political leadership in a forty-eight-hour bombardment that the White House initially projected would conclude within “four to five weeks.” That projection, made on March 1, has now stretched to month five with no conclusion visible. The Strait of Hormuz, through which twenty percent of global petroleum flows, has been effectively closed since mid-March. Iranian ballistic missile strikes, utilizing Chinese targeting data and Russian satellite intelligence, have damaged or destroyed every major U.S. installation in the Persian Gulf, including Al Udeid in Qatar, Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, and the naval facilities at Bahrain.

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These Are The States With The Most Empty Homes

America faces a housing shortage, yet about 14.5 million homes across the country are vacant. How can both be true?

Using the latest U.S. Census Bureau data compiled by LendingTree, Visual Capitalist’s Dorothy Neufeld created this map showing the share of vacant housing units in every state.

About one in 10 U.S. housing units is vacant, but most are not permanently sitting unused.

Nearly 4.7 million vacant units are seasonal or recreational homes, 2.6 million are available for rent, and fewer than 800,000 are actively listed for sale. This helps explain why states with large vacation-home markets, including Maine, Vermont, Florida, and Hawaii, record some of the nation’s highest vacancy rates.

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Global Diesel Crunch Deepens As Record US Distillate Exports Race To Supply-Starved Europe

US distillate exports surged to a record last week as global supplies tightened. Disruptions across the Gulf area and various surrounding maritime chokepoints, as well as Ukrainian one-way attack drone strikes that have paralyzed portions of Russia’s energy infrastructure, have been a major boon for US refiners and export terminals along the Gulf of America.

To begin the week, Samantha Dart, co-head of global commodities research at Goldman Sachs, told Bloomberg TV, “The situation in Russia is really one thing that worries us a lot.”

Dart warned, “I’d say on the oil side, as I mentioned before, diesel, I think is the oil product that is most vulnerable right now, not just because you have your seasonal demand strength ahead just in the winter, but on the supply side. And to your point in the beginning, it’s not just that you run war, it’s what’s happening to the Russian refineries as well. And Russia is usually a pretty big exporter of diesel. And now they have restricted it.”

Last month, Goldman analyst Daan Struyven warned that “Diesel is at the epicenter of the supply squeeze.” 

As global supplies dwindle, US energy exporters on the Gulf of America emerged as the winners, shipping a record 1.9 million barrels to overseas customers last week.

Shipments have exceeded 1.5 million barrels a day for five consecutive weeks, with recent cargoes heading to northwestern European ports – the epicenter of a global diesel shortage caused by Gulf area refinery disruptions through Hormuz and Ukrainian attacks on Russian refining capacity.

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Greer Blasts Democrat State Attorneys General For Choosing Foreign Sweatshops Over American Workers

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer accused Democratic-led states challenging President Donald Trump’s new tariffs of putting foreign sweatshops ahead of American workers and siding with China against U.S. efforts to eradicate forced labor from global supply chains.

“It’s official: Twenty-five Democrat-run states, spanning from Michigan to California, have made their priorities clear: foreign sweatshops come before protecting hardworking Americans,” Greer said in a statement obtained exclusively by Breitbart News.

The statement is the Trump administration’s most forceful response yet to lawsuits filed by 25 states seeking to overturn tariffs of 10 percent to 12.5 percent imposed last month on goods from more than 80 countries.

The states, led by New York, California and Illinois, filed their complaint Monday in the U.S. Court of International Trade. They argue the administration used forced labor as a pretext for rebuilding the global tariff system invalidated by the Supreme Court in February.

“After losing at the Supreme Court, the administration is once again trying to illegally raise taxes on families and businesses with a new round of tariffs,” New York Attorney General Letitia James said when the lawsuit was filed.

Greer rejected that characterization, saying the states are asking courts to give countries that tolerate forced labor in their supply chains a free pass.

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Trump demands oil companies lower gas prices for American consumers

President Donald Trump has taken to Truth Social to criticize Chevron CEO Mike Wirth following a television interview in which the executive touted his company’s success.

On Monday, the president argued that in the interview with Fox Business, Wirth failed to credit the administration’s efforts to assist oil companies, which the president said provided necessary strength and stability to the U.S. energy sector.

“The only thing he conveniently forgot to mention is that, without the genius, foresight, strength, and stability, of the TRUMP Administration, the Oil Industry, and our Country itself, would be DEAD!” Trump wrote.

Trump pointed to Chevron’s operations in Venezuela as an example of the administration’s influence, before calling on oil executives across the industry to lower fuel prices for consumers immediately.

“Get your consumer (retail!) Oil Prices DOWN, NOW!” the president stated.

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War With Iran: A Double-Edged Sword for the US Economy and Agriculture

The sharp swings in oil prices following the latest round of attacks and negotiations over safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that wars do not always reveal themselves first on the battlefield. Sometimes, their earliest signs appear on gas-station price boards, in transportation bills, and on the balance sheets of farmers standing thousands of miles from the front lines. Now that the confrontation between the United States and Iran has moved beyond pressure and deterrence and turned into direct military conflict, the issue is no longer limited to security calculations. It is about the real costs of war – costs increasingly borne by American farmers, truck drivers, and consumers.

The economic effects of this war are being transmitted through channels that are highly sensitive for Washington politically: energy markets, inflation, supply chains, and, above all, agriculture. A war that Trump justifies in the language of national security and displays of strength could, in practice, become a self-inflicted shock to the U.S. economy. That is the central contradiction: the most direct pressure is falling on the very social and economic constituency Trump has repeatedly claimed to defend – the American farm belt.

The Energy Shock, From Hormuz to American Farms

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption passes, now lies at the center of the conflict. Repeated surges and declines in oil prices show that even news of a temporary pause – or the possibility of renewed escalation – can shake the energy market. Higher fuel prices feed directly into transportation, production, and consumer-goods costs, adding to inflationary pressure. This also leaves monetary policymakers caught between controlling inflation and preventing a further slowdown in economic growth.

Market instability and direct military expenditures are rising as well. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the true cost of military conflict often extends far beyond initial estimates. Brown University’s Costs of War Project has placed the cost of the post-9/11 wars at approximately $8 trillion. A war with Iran, particularly if it becomes prolonged or expands geographically, could generate new and uncertain financial commitments. Yet one of its deepest and least visible consequences may be felt not on Wall Street, but on American farms.

Modern American agriculture is intensely dependent on energy. Diesel powers farm machinery; natural gas is a primary input in the production of nitrogen fertilizers; and gasoline and transportation fuels move crops from farms to markets. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has repeatedly shown that higher energy prices increase production costs and reduce farm income, ultimately affecting food prices.

The pressure is even more severe in the fertilizer market. The production of ammonia and urea is directly dependent on natural gas, while disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has constrained global supplies of raw materials and fertilizer. During the first weeks of the war, urea prices nearly doubled, leaving American farmers to confront fuel-price increases and supply shortages at the same time. Under such conditions, corn production, which requires more nitrogen fertilizer, becomes especially vulnerable. Farmers may be forced to choose among reducing planted acreage, switching crops, or accepting substantially higher costs.

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