Just a few thoughts on the three-hour indirect meeting yesterday at the UN between US and Iranian officials, facilitated by the indefatigable Qataris.
It is undoubtedly a good thing that the two sides have resumed contact again, even though we are now back to Qatari mediators shuttling messages between them rather than the two sides talking directly to each other.
But it is also true that the two sides remain very far from each other. The positive manner in which Trump, in particular, described the meeting, as a result, leaves the impression that this was more performative than substantive. That is, yet another effort to calm the markets and reduce further negative impact on the upcoming elections. Why else would Trump insist that a deal will be reached after the midterms? That specificity gives the game away.
Indeed, part of the calculation on the American side is to make moves now to reduce the likelihood of an Iranian escalation before the midterms. As I have written before, Round 3 of the war is very likely, and from the US standpoint, the preferred timing is after the midterms. But the Iranians are no longer in a reactive mode; if war is coming, they may take preemptive action to deprive Trump of the luxury of choosing the timing of the next round. The most optimal moment to preempt a US attack would be a week or two before the midterms, which is why some limited diplomacy now with the partial aim of reducing the likelihood of such a preemption is deemed useful. And why its achievement is overstated.
To go beyond this, real concessions from both sides are needed. But right now, the key blockage is Trump’s refusal to lift the naval blockade on Iran, even if Tehran agrees to open the Strait of Hormuz. The US side fears that lifting the blockade would enable Iran to refill its coffers and provide it with much more time. Tehran would use this reprieve not to strike a deal with Washington, but to prolong the conflict for teh purpose of destroying Trump’s presidency.
Tehran, in turn, is unlikely to give any concessions of significance unless Trump lifts the blockade. Trump’s refusal to do so is interpreted by the Iranians as a reflection of his desire to overthrow the Islamic Republic or force it to surrender.
To break such a deadlock, small steps like the meeting in New York may prove useful, if not necessary. But thus far, while the resumption of (indirect) talks is a breakthrough of sorts, it is not course correction: The US and Iran are unfortunately still headed toward another round of war.
I am also linking to my conversation with Glenn Diesen from earlier this week. It quickly went to very dark places. But the situation in the Middle East/US/Iran is unravelling, and measures and scenarios that were unthinkable just a few months ago are increasingly being discussed at the government level. So we had to have an honest conversation about these previously unthinkable scenarios.
