The European Union has taken yet another step in its long-running confrontation with Russia. But what now stands out is not only the scale – it is the restless, almost reflexive expansion of sanctions as a default instrument of policy.
In April, EU authorities unveiled their 20th round of sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus, while pointedly extending their reach toward China.
Sanctions spiral
What was once framed as a targeted response now resembles a sanctions regime without clear geographic or strategic limits. By including 56 designations tied to Russia’s military-industrial complex – 17 of them in China, the United Arab Emirates, Belarus, and Central Asia – the EU has effectively dissolved the boundaries of its own confrontation. Another 60 entities now face tightened export controls tied to alleged contributions to Russia’s defense sector.
For the first time, even a Chinese state-owned entity has been targeted by anti-Belarusian sanctions. In Brussels, this is justified through the language of “dual-use” goods. But outside Europe, the perception is of a growing tendency toward economic coercion that stretches legal authority across borders, fueled by an escalating appetite for pressure.
China’s response was swift: officials condemned what they described as “long-arm jurisdiction,” rejecting the EU’s attempt to discipline Chinese firms operating far beyond European territory. More importantly, Beijing read the move as a signal of the EU’s shifting posture toward China itself.
Within a day, China placed seven European entities on its control list over arms sales to Taiwan, imposing restrictions that mirror the EU’s own extraterritorial reach. These measures prohibit the transfer of Chinese goods to the targeted firms, extending the ripple effects well beyond those directly sanctioned.
The list includes one German entity, two Belgian firms, and four Czech companies – including military industrial manufacturers Omnipol and Excalibur Army, all deeply embedded in supply chains connected to Ukraine.