The present severed from the past is easily misunderstood. In discussions of the Russia-Ukraine war, not enough is made of the historical fact that, at the end of the Cold War, the newly independent Ukraine promised not to join NATO, and NATO promised not to expand to Ukraine.
Not enough is made of the fact that Article IX of the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, “External and Internal Security,” says that Ukraine “solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs…” That promise was later enshrined in Ukraine’s constitution, which committed Ukraine to neutrality and prohibited it from joining any military alliance; that included NATO.
Nor is enough made of the fact that in 1990 and 1991, the George H.W. Bush administration gave assurances to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev—assurances that arguably reached the level of a deal—that NATO would not expand east of Germany, including to Ukraine.
But even less is made of what the Bill Clinton administration later promised Russian President Boris Yeltsin, nor what the United States already knew at the time of where plans of NATO expansion to Ukraine would lead.
Recently declassified documents clearly show that, between 1993 and 2000, the U.S. already knew that a cornered Boris Yeltsin was distraught about NATO expansion and about the West’s broken promise, that expansion to Ukraine was a red line, and that if Russia ever enforced that red line, the U.S. would respond forcefully.
Though the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to begin accession talks in 1997 and joined NATO in 1999, a secret October 1994 policy paper, written by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and entitled “Moving Toward NATO Expansion,” makes it clear that the decision to expand NATO had already been made by that time. The paper explicitly keeps “the membership door open for Ukraine.”
Interestingly, though Russia is always publicly painted as a predatorial nation with imperial ambitions, a confidential 1993 cable states that most Eastern European states seek NATO membership “not [because they] feel militarily threatened by Russia” but because they believe “that NATO membership can help stave off the return of authoritarian forces” in their own countries. Though the cable makes the exception that Ukraine and the Baltic states may feel threatened by Russia.
By September 1994, Clinton had explicitly told Yeltsin that NATO would expand. While visiting Yeltsin in the hospital on December 16, 1994, Vice President Al Gore clarifies that “What Clinton told you in September was that eventually NATO will expand.”
But Gore promised Yeltsin that “the process will be gradual and open and we will consult carefully with you.” He added, “The process will be conducted in parallel with a deepening of the U.S.-Russia partnership and your partnership with NATO.”
Though less than a week later, a secret NSC memorandum clarifies that Russia will not be given “a veto or right of prior consultation over NATO decisions,” this promise of a deepening “institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia—possibly in the form of a Treaty (“alliance with the Alliance”) or Charter” that will be established in parallel with NATO expansion is repeatedly mentioned. A secret memorandum written by Anthony Lake to Clinton on July 17, 1995 identifies “plans to develop a formalized NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with enlargement.” The spirit of this promise would be broken.
Importantly, it is evident that the Clinton administration was very aware of Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion and of their feeling of betrayal. Knowing that expansion is an impossible sell in Russia, Gore promised Yeltsin that expansion wouldn’t occur before 1996 because “[w]e understand you have parliamentary elections in mid-1995 and it would be hard for you if we moved forward then.”
Hellbound and Down 
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