Locked up in a cell in Madrid since his arrest on July 10, 2026, the well-known left-wing philanthropist Fergie Chambers is waiting to learn whether Spain will hand him to Washington. According to a US indictment, his crime was moving $7.5 million – money he raised, his family says, after selling his stake in Cox Enterprises and walking away from a quarter-billion-dollar inheritance – some of which funded legal defense for activists and humanitarian aid for Palestinians in Gaza. He has been denied bail and, his supporters say, denied contact with the outside world. Stella Schnabel, his partner, has said he faces “political persecution,” telling the Irish Times: “Fergie is being jailed because he uses his wealth to support Palestine and those suffering genocide in Gaza.” Ghassan Abu-Sittah, the British-Palestinian surgeon who now serves as rector of the University of Glasgow, has said Chambers’ funding was vital to the care of wounded children in Gaza.
Six days later, on July 16, 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stood before representatives of more than 60 governments and gave the arrangement a name: a coordinated push against what he called “far-left political terrorism,” with intelligence sharing at its center, backed by border controls he defended as public safety and financial disruption dressed as counterterrorism.
This machinery, of course, is nothing new. In 1969, Switzerland, Britain, France and West Germany were among the founding members of a secret intelligence-liaison forum called the Club de Berne, joined eventually by the United States and Israel. By 1971 a daily communications channel had been set up between the member states, code-named Kilowatt. Aviva Guttmann’s research into declassified Swiss archives shows what became of this secret channel.
Mossad’s European Murder Spree
Mossad’s infamous campaign of assassinations began after the killing of 11 Israeli athletes and coaches at the 1972 Munich Olympics by the Palestinian Black September group. Teams of killers were sent across Europe after anyone linked, rightly or wrongly, to the attack. Zwaiter, Hamshari, and Boudia were among them.
Palestinian Wael Zwaiter had no proven link at all to the Munich attack when he was shot dead in the stairwell of his Rome apartment in October 1972 – indeed the PLO’s deputy chief at the time said that he was “energetically” against terrorism. Two months later, a bomb concealed inside Mahmoud Hamshari’s telephone blew up and killed him in his Paris apartment; the evidence for his personal involvement, historians now note, came almost entirely from Mossad’s own dubious assessments. The following June, Mohammed Boudia – an Algerian theater director whom Western intelligence cables described as an active militant – was blown up in his car, an assassination Le Monde reported the same day, June 29, 1973, while openly questioning what French authorities had known.
Whether the three men were guilty of wrongdoing or not – and it seems two of them were probably innocent – none were ever charged, tried, or given the chance to answer the allegations against them. They were killed on the strength of intelligence assessments that were, by the researchers’ own account, sometimes wrong and never tested in open court. These assassinations were state-sanctioned murder – and in each case, the assassins were aided and abetted directly by Western intelligence.
These three were not the only ones. Mossad’s Operation Wrath of God consisted of 10 missions in total, eight of them carried out in Europe, most using intelligence its Kilowatt partners supplied. None of the men killed were ever tried in a court. They were found, and then killed.
A continent turned into a hunting ground, with no right of appeal.
According to Aviva Guttmann, Kilowatt was set up to fix a gap: Mossad needed European intelligence to identify, track, and locate its targets in the first place. So in October 1971, Israel suggested opening a dedicated encrypted channel to share intelligence on Palestinian activity in Europe, and Western agencies agreed. The arrangement ran both ways. Mossad fed disinformation to its European partners about its own operations, leading French, Italian and other states to dismiss assassinations on their own soil as unsolved rather than face the reality of what an allied service had done in their backyards.
In a display of their political bias, Western agencies, however, continued to supply intelligence to Mossad long after press reporting had made clear exactly who was behind the killings. As Guttmann says, the assassination campaign would likely not have been possible without their continued cooperation.
Guttmann’s own research records that Golda Meir’s instruction remained that no innocent bystanders were to be hurt – the explosive charge for each hit calibrated carefully enough that a target could be killed while the blast stayed contained to his room. Compare that caution to Palestine today, where a single strike on Salah Shehade’s Gaza City home in 2002 killed at least 11 civilians alongside him, including eight children – a ratio of collateral death that would have been unthinkable in the 1970s, when the target was living on a street in Rome or Paris.
Hellbound and Down 