The question on everyone’s mind is if Iran will agree to give up its 440 kilograms of enriched uranium. President Trump recently proclaimed on his Truth Social account that this material lies underneath the rubble of last June Operation Midnight Hammer attack, though no one else seems to believe this assertion.
Benjamin Netanyahu claimed in February that the Iranian’s not only still had their hands on the material, but would soon enrich it to weapons grade and use it to attack the US and Israel.
Several of my friends—including a couple of Israeli friends—have written to assure me that the US and Israel must obtain this material at all costs, as they believe the Iranians will certainly fashion it into a nuclear weapon and go on the offensive with it.
A few months ago, one of my favorite pen pals assured me that the Iranian regime is an irrational actor and will not recognize or be constrained by the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
It’s a fascinating twist of history that the current negotiations are taking place in Islamabad, Pakistan, because the same proclamations were made about Pakistan when it was working to acquire an atomic bomb. A Grok query about this episode yielded the following.
Pakistani rhetoric supporting Palestinian causes and its self-image as a defender of the Islamic world led Israeli officials to view a nuclear Pakistan as a potential supplier to Arab states or terrorists hostile to the Jewish state. As early as 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin warned allies of the “threat posed by Pakistan’s nuclear program.” Israeli intelligence, Mossad, responded with covert operations. Between 1979 and 1981, suspected Mossad-orchestrated sabotage targeted European suppliers of centrifuge technology and dual-use equipment to Pakistan, including parcel bombs and assassinations of key intermediaries. Israeli planners even considered direct military action: in the mid-1980s, the Israeli Air Force reportedly rehearsed strikes on Pakistan’s Kahuta enrichment facility using F-15s and F-16s, possibly with Indian assistance or basing. U.S. intelligence reportedly tipped off Pakistan about these plans, averting escalation, as Washington balanced its alliances. Assassination plots against A.Q. Khan himself were allegedly prepared but never executed.
Despite these multifaceted efforts—diplomatic pressure, sanctions, intelligence sharing, and covert sabotage—Pakistan achieved nuclear capability by the mid-1980s and conducted overt tests in May 1998. The program succeeded through clandestine procurement, Chinese assistance, and domestic resilience. U.S. and Israeli actions delayed progress but were undermined by competing strategic interests: America’s Afghan priorities and Israel’s logistical limits against a distant target. Today, Pakistan maintains an estimated 170 warheads.
Hellbound and Down 