Striking a nuclear deal with North Korea is the most courageous foreign policy project left unfinished from President Donald Trump’s first term. The arc from war scare and “fire and fury” to détente and “love letters” stretched over three years until its engagement phase was derailed by the failed Hanoi summit and the onset of Covid-19. Six years on, statements by the White House and the Kim regime indicate a willingness to return to talks. That is welcome, because progress toward establishing a stable U.S.–DPRK relationship remains in the interests of both sides, even accounting for the dramatic improvement in the North’s international position since 2021.
The South Korean president Lee Jae Myung’s visit to Washington last week would have been a good opportunity for the White House to begin to adopt a new approach. Frontloading heavy demands on denuclearization foreclosed progress on other worthy issues in 2018–2019. To make headway in 2025, the U.S. must shift from “denuclearization first” to “regular engagement first,” and accept that complete denuclearization is a long-run aspiration. Trump should pitch the North on an interim deal that couples three public unilateral U.S. concessions with a private offer of sanctions relief calibrated to verifiable limits on the North’s fissile material production.
Kim Jong Un’s reciprocation is never guaranteed, but it is in America’s interests to broaden his horizons beyond fighting Russia’s war against Ukraine, international cybercrime, and untrammeled development of nuclear missiles that can strike the United States.
The 2019 Hanoi summit, the last substantive high-level U.S.–DPRK meeting, was meant to implement the four aspirations of the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement: establishing a new U.S.–DPRK relationship, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, working toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and repatriating the remains of American soldiers who died in the Korean War. Pending a leader-level accord on denuclearization, both sides were reportedly ready to make unprecedented progress on the other three goals by signing agreements declaring a symbolic end to the Korean War, establishing liaison offices in each other’s capitals, facilitating economic investment, and repatriating remains of more U.S. soldiers.
But talks on denuclearization quickly collapsed. Trump walked away from a DPRK offer to dismantle at least part of its Yongbyon plutonium and enriched uranium facility and formally halt nuclear and missile testing in exchange for the lifting of all post-2016 UN sanctions on its civilian economy. The U.S. position began with a demand for the North to freeze and dismantle all its nuclear production facilities—not only Yongbyon—in a definite period in exchange for relief from the UN sanctions. At some point the U.S. side reportedly increased its demand to include total relinquishment of North Korea’s nuclear program, including all facilities and all weapons. This “Libya model” offer bore the imprint of John Bolton, Trump’s then-National Security Advisor, and was probably designed to sabotage the talks, since Kim certainly knew of Muammar Gaddafi’s grisly death less than a decade after he relinquished his nuclear program.
Trump and Kim both gambled that the magic of a leader-level summit would allow them to achieve sweeping goals. Each devalued pre-summit talks that could have produced a more incremental, more achievable deal. Kim refused to even authorize his working level diplomats to discuss denuclearization. And the White House went ahead with the summit knowing a viable deal was not on the table.
What is unclear from the public record is the extent to which either side, facing maximalist requests, toned down their own position to try bridge the gap. That incremental approach, which tends to de-emphasize the goal of complete denuclearization, is the best path forward.
North Korea’s willingness and capacity to harm U.S. interests is now greater than ever. Its arsenal of warheads has reportedly grown from 15 to 50 since 2016 and it is estimated to have sufficient fissile material for 40 more. It continues to test and refine ICBM designs that can strike the continental U.S., including solid-fueled models that can be dispersed and launched at short notice. North Korea’s geopolitical ambit has also spread to Europe. It has sold Russia billions of dollars’ worth of ammunition to support its war effort in Ukraine. In June 2024 Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty, and 15,000 North Korean soldiers were sent to fight in Russia’s Kursk region. In return, Russia has granted the country access to advanced missile and reconnaissance technologies. At the same time, Russia and China have relaxed their enforcement of the post-2016 UN sanctions, reducing pressure on the North’s civilian economy.
Hellbound and Down 