August 6th marks the 80th anniversary of mankind’s most cataclysmic and ignominious achievement: The first weaponized use of an atomic bomb. At approximately 8:15 in the morning, the bomb “Little Boy” detonated over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. While estimates have varied between 70,000 and 140,000 dead, the sheer magnitude of devastation caused to a largely civilian population cannot be understated. To this day, much debate rages on regarding the necessity of such weapons in the closing chapter of the Second World War.
The current orthodoxy of American military history, however, stands firmly entrenched that the usage of this bomb (and a subsequent one in Nagasaki three days later) was critical to ending the war quickly and saving the lives of countless Americans and even Japanese civilians who would have assuredly died in the ensuing operation to seize the entirety of mainland Japan. But how vital was the atomic bombing truly to ending the war? A deeper dive into contemporary sources reveals that the bombing was needless, cruel, and firmly established an abhorrent precedent for a newly established global hegemon.
Operation Downfall
Modern military historians desperately cling to the notion set forth by former War Secretary Henry Stimson, as articulated in the February 1947 issue of Harper’s Magazine, that, if forced to carry a ground invasion of Japan to conclusion, it would “cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone.” This invasion, dubbed “Operation Downfall,” was estimated by Stimson’s calculations to last well into 1946 and would have entailed that “additional losses might be expected among our allies” and that “enemy casualties would be much larger than our own.”
And while a large preponderance of scholarship on the matter seeks to reaffirm these claims, it was a dubious metric even at the time. As Barton J. Bernstein wrote in a 1999 issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies, no pre-Hiroshima literature can be found that would back up these claims. It appears to be a postwar invention by Stimson, Truman, et al., to justify the decision. This is an important distinction, as the bulk of pro-atomic weapon usage advocates rely heavily on this claim. However, perhaps surprisingly to some, the decision was questioned by many senior military leaders within the United States military even at the time.
Hellbound and Down 