Multiple political, strategic, and military factors are converging in a way that could make 2026 a uniquely dangerous year for Taiwan. Chinese leaders increasingly believe that asserting control over Taiwan is inevitable and may be achievable sooner than previously assumed.
Xi Jinping’s personal ambitions and political timeline add urgency to this assessment. He has pushed the Taiwan issue more aggressively than any predecessor and may view reunification as a defining legacy achievement. Xi has set 2027 as the target for the People’s Liberation Army to complete its modernization goals, ordering the military to be capable of a successful invasion by the PLA’s 100th anniversary.
While 2027 itself is unlikely to see major military action due to the Communist Party Congress and the regime’s emphasis on internal stability, the year immediately preceding it, 2026, is far more flexible.
Former INDOPACOM commander Admiral Philip Davidson warned in 2021 that the threat to Taiwan would become “manifest” within six years, a warning that came to be known as the Davidson Window. The term refers to a period of heightened risk, roughly between 2021 and 2027, during which China could acquire the military capability to attempt a takeover of Taiwan.
Davidson’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee underscored the pace of China’s military modernization and its narrowing gap with U.S. and allied forces in the region.
According to 2025 and 2026 U.S. Department of Defense reports, the People’s Liberation Army has expanded its missile inventory from about 1,200 in 2020 to roughly 3,500, while missile launchers grew from 800 to 1,500, supported by additional brigades and 300 new ICBM silos. Systems such as the DF-26 enable saturation strikes on U.S. bases in Guam.
Hellbound and Down 