On May 3, Japanese Air Self-Defense Force fighter jets scrambled from Okinawa in response to a helicopter that took off from a Chinese Coast Guard vessel in an apparent territorial defense posture. The helicopter wasn’t near a port or any of Japan’s 430 inhabited islands. It was flying near the Senkaku Islands.
Long administered by Japan, and recognized by the U.S. as Japanese territory, the Senkakus have emerged as a flash point in the increasingly confrontational Japan-China relationship and the broader U.S.-China competition.
Far from a quarrel over empty rocks, the Senkaku Islands dispute resides at the volatile intersection of China’s rising nationalism, Japan’s strategic vulnerability, and, critically, America’s alliance credibility.
What’s Really at Stake for China
While control of the islands could marginally strengthen China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) posture and expand its Exclusive Economic Zone, the real driver of China’s policy is rooted in its broader goal of undermining the U.S.-led alliance system in Asia. This effort is a critical step in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pursuit of a grand strategy bent on achieving regional hegemony and ultimately displacing the United States as the world’s leading superpower.
Despite a long and bitter history between Japan and China, the Senkaku Islands, named the Diaoyu Islands in China, were a peripheral issue until 2012. That year, Japan nationalized three of the Senkaku islands by purchasing them from a private owner in an attempt to prevent their development by a hardline Japanese governor. Instead of diffusing tensions, the move led to anti-Japanese protests across China and elevated the islands to a matter of national pride.
But the protests were not a spontaneous outpouring of long simmering anti-Japanese sentiment triggered by the nationalization of three barren rocks; they were state enabled. In a country where public demonstrations are suppressed, the CCP allowed and encouraged widespread displays of outrage. By letting nationalism flare, Beijing cloaked its ensuing policy shift towards the islands it defines as “inalienable“ parts of its territory as a reaction to public sentiment rather than a calculated assertion of power and a component of their strategic ambitions.
That China’s policy shift towards the islands occurred in 2012 was no coincidence. An increasingly self-assured China perceived the U.S. as weakened, viewing the post-2008 Global Financial Crisis shock to U.S. economic power as a strategic opening. And with rising confidence in their military and economic power, the CCP, under the new leadership of Xi Jinping, began shedding its decades long “hide and bide“ strategy in favor of a more aggressive foreign policy with a mandate to “actively accomplish something.”
For China, the Senkaku dispute is less about the intrinsic value of eight uninhabited rocks than about the future of the regional order. China knows that if it can erode Japan’s ability to control the islands without triggering a U.S. response, America’s security guarantees would appear flimsy and negotiable. Beijing’s ultimate Senkaku Islands objective, then, is to expose the vulnerabilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance and thus weaken a cornerstone of American power in Asia. For China to achieve national rejuvenation, it must erode the system of U.S. alliances that stands in its way.
How China Applies Pressure: A Campaign of Attrition
Since 2012, China has transformed the Senkaku Islands dispute from a dormant issue into a calibrated campaign of coercion. China’s incremental pressure strategy aims at weakening Japan’s control and eroding confidence in the U.S.-Japan alliance.
At sea, China relies on constant presence operations. In 2023, Chinese government vessels entered the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on 352 out of 365 days—the highest number since record-keeping began in 2008, according to data from the Japan Coast Guard. Additionally, Chinese Maritime Militia boats often harass Japanese fishermen and shadow Japan Coast Guard patrols.
The PLA Navy (PLAN) has also ramped up its footprint. China’s destroyers, cruisers, and surveillance ships conduct regular patrols near the islands, mapping the battlespace and normalizing their presence. Now the world’s largest navy, PLAN operations are becoming more frequent and more complex.
In the air, Beijing declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea in 2013, encompassing the Senkakus. While ignored by the U.S. and Japan, the ADIZ signaled China’s intent to claim the airspace as its own. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) now regularly flies J-11 fighters, H-6K bombers, and UAVs near the islands, prompting Japan to scramble jets hundreds of times per year.
Hellbound and Down 