A multipolar world is, by its nature, a nuclear one. Its conflicts are increasingly shaped by the presence of nuclear weapons. Some of these wars, such as the conflict in Ukraine, are fought indirectly. Others, as in South Asia, unfold in more direct forms. In the Middle East, one nuclear power has attempted to preempt another state’s potential development of nuclear weapons, backed by an even more powerful nuclear-armed ally. Meanwhile, rising tensions in East Asia and the Western Pacific bring the risk of a direct clash between nuclear states ever closer.
Having avoided a nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War, some European countries have since lost the sense of caution once associated with possessing such weapons. There are several reasons for this. During the ‘mature’ Cold War years, especially after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, nuclear weapons played their intended role: they deterred and intimidated. Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact operated on the assumption that any large-scale confrontation would escalate into a nuclear conflict. Recognizing this danger, the political leaderships in Washington and Moscow worked to avoid the unthinkable.
Notably, while the Americans entertained the idea of a limited nuclear war confined to Europe, Soviet strategists remained deeply skeptical. During decades of Soviet-American confrontation, all military conflicts occurred far from Europe and outside the core security interests of the two powers.
Hellbound and Down 