For far too long, the American legal and political landscape has been distorted by a fundamental misunderstanding of the 14th Amendment: that merely being born on U.S. soil makes one a citizen. This misconception contradicts the original intent of the amendment’s framers. Furthermore, it undermines the foundational principle that citizenship arises from allegiance, not geographic happenstance.
On May 15, the Supreme Court will take up three cases, consolidated under the name Trump v. CASA. It will address Donald Trump’s bold and necessary attempt to end the unconstitutional practice of granting citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil, regardless of parental allegiance. The fact that the Court has chosen to hear these cases in May — a rare occurrence typically reserved for matters of utmost urgency — underscores just how pivotal this issue is. The stakes couldn’t be higher. At risk is the foundational principle that citizenship is rooted in allegiance, not mere geography. This is a principle that the Constitution clearly supports and that decades of judicial misinterpretation have dangerously eroded.
President Donald Trump’s executive order is at the crux of this case, and marks a critical moment in the battle to restore constitutional integrity. This action, however, has rekindled debate over whether birthright citizenship is truly required by the 14th Amendment. A closer examination of the Constitution, its framers’ intent, and relevant historical precedents reveals that birthright citizenship is neither constitutionally mandated nor consistent with the principles of American law and government.
The Crux of the Issue: Jurisdiction and Allegiance
The primary argument for birthright citizenship hinges on the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
Advocates of birthright citizenship often isolate the phrase “born or naturalized in the United States,” disregarding the critical qualification that follows: “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” This latter phrase is not mere surplusage — it carries substantive legal meaning rooted in allegiance, not mere presence.
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, who introduced the Citizenship Clause in 1866, explicitly stated its intent:
This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, [or] who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers accredited to the Government of the United States, but will include every other class of persons.
Senator Howard’s remarks make clear that the mere accident of birth within U.S. borders does not automatically confer citizenship if the individual’s allegiance lies with a foreign power. How can a person be both a citizen and an alien simultaneously if mere birth location were the sole determinant of citizenship?
Hellbound and Down 