It was only a few weeks ago that Russian President Vladimir V. Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met to ink the historic Russo-Iranian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The pact itself was a milestone, so much so that commentators around the world are still widely discussing its implications. Perhaps one of the most striking elements of the treaty is the major focus on Eurasia. Although Western analysts tend to focus on Russo-Iranian cooperation in the Middle East, the treaty indicates that Eurasia is of even more immediate geopolitical significance to both Moscow and Tehran. To historians and long-time observers of Iran and Russia, this is hardly a surprise. The Eurasian region – that is, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Caspian Sea – forms an integral part of the common Russo-Iranian neighborhood.
For the security of both countries, the Caucasus region in particular is especially critical. Defined by its protective mountainous geography and central location between the Black and Caspian seas, the area has long played a major role in the security architecture of both Russia and Iran. This major geostrategic significance has certainly not been lost on the current Russian leadership, and President Putin in particular. From the defeat of Islamist terrorists in Chechnya to the success of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, the Caucasus has always held an especially important place in Moscow’s geopolitical outlook. Sochi in particular has served as a standard for Russian revival following the freefall of the Yeltsin years. The region is no less significant to Iran and has always served as a critical security and commercial link for successive Iranian leaders, dating back to the age of Cyrus the Great and his Achaemenid Empire. In this regard, President Pezeshkian’s native Iranian Azerbaijan played a particularly vital role in facilitating Iran’s historic connections with the Caucasus, linking the area to the great trade routes of the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Silk Road.
Thus, it is hardly a surprise that the Caucasus continues to be a major strategic priority for both Moscow and Tehran. For the Kremlin, its importance is second only to Ukraine and has been amplified at a time when Western political leaders have called for a “strategic defeat” of Russia. Especially important for both Tehran and Moscow are the three independent former Soviet republics of the South Caucasus, or Transcaucasia – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. These countries have been of particular interest to war hawks, neoconservative intellectuals, and big energy interests in Washington and London for decades. All of these groups hold an especially strong desire to realize a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The aim is to use the Caucasus as a bridgehead to access the energy riches of post-Soviet Central Asia, as a means of “containing” Russia, Iran, and ultimately, China. Israel – and especially the hard-right of the Israeli political elite – has likewise long held interests in the region, with an eye toward using post-Soviet Azerbaijan as an instrument against Iran’s territorial integrity. Baku regularly receives generous military aid from Tel Aviv in exchange for sending oil to Israel, all while keeping conspicuously mum on the atrocities against Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Azerbaijan’s closest ally, Turkey, is another major player interested in weakening Russian and Iranian influence in Caucasia. In fact, NATO has delegated to Ankara the task of projecting Western influence into the region, given that Turkey is the one alliance member in closest proximity to the Caucasus. Ankara pursues this task alongside its own interests, which nevertheless correspond with those of NATO.
Hellbound and Down 