A year has passed since Hamas’ incursion into Israel on October 7th. Dubbed Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Hamas conducted an improbable attack that resulted in 1200 dead Israelis and over 250 hostages taken into Gaza. Israel also initiated the Hannibal Directive that day, killing some of their civilians to prevent them from being taken into Gaza. In the aftermath of the attack, political pundits and analysts ruminated on why Hamas attacked. From Hamas’ perspective, October 7th was a justified response to 75 years of Israeli oppression against the Palestinian people. Beyond that rationale, experts could not fully explain October 7th. However, in retrospect, other elements may have driven Hamas’ strategic calculus for the October 7th attacks.
One of the motivating factors behind Hamas’ October 7th attack was the group’s unpopularity amongst Palestinians in Gaza. According to James Zogby of the Arab-American Institute, roughly 20% of Palestinians in Gaza supported Hamas before Oct 7th. One of the most notable instances of public disobedience came in July 2023 when thousands of Palestinians took to the streets against the Islamist group over the economic and living conditions in Gaza caused by Israel’s brutal blockade. The demonstrations were violently broken up in what was considered a rare but powerful display of frustration against Hamas’ rule.
Taking these elements into consideration, Hamas sought to use October 7th as an attempt to reconfigure its image as an authoritarian militant group into a fighting force protecting Palestinians against Israeli aggression. Hamas believed that by framing October 7th as a revolutionary act of resistance against Israel, Palestinians would see them as protectors of their struggle and see Hamas in a favorable light.
Geopolitical considerations in the Middle East also contributed to the October 7th attack. Hamas ultimately felt the need to debunk the narrative that the Middle East could ignore the Palestinian struggle entirely. For example, Jordan and Egypt relinquished their political leverage when both nations made peace with Israel without conditioning the creation of a Palestinian state.
In the months before the Hamas attack, Saudi Arabia was on the brink of repeating this same pattern by normalizing relations with Israel. Washington and Riyadh were engaged in high-level discussions in which the Saudis sought a U.S. defense pact. The White House pushed the Kingdom to drop its demands that normalization with Tel Aviv be conditioned on a Palestinian state.
Hellbound and Down 