Since 1994, federal law has prohibited gun possession by people who are subject to domestic violence restraining orders. Although that provision may seem like a commonsensical safeguard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit ruled last February that it was not “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation”—the constitutional test prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 ruling in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen. On Tuesday, in United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court will consider whether the 5th Circuit was right about that.
Rahimi is primarily about the contours of the right to keep and bear arms as it was traditionally understood. But a Cato Institute brief notes that the case also raises the question of what due process requires when the government seeks to deprive someone of that right.
Under 18 USC 922(g)(8), which Congress approved as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, it is a felony, currently punishable by up to 15 years in prison, for someone to possess or receive a firearm when he is subject to a court order that restrains him from “harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner” or the partner’s child or from “engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury” to the partner or the partner’s child. The order must be preceded by a hearing of which the respondent “received actual notice,” and it must include either a finding that the respondent poses “a credible threat” or language that “prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” that “would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.”
To issue an order, in other words, a judge need not conclude that the respondent actually poses a threat. To trigger the loss of gun rights, the order need only include boilerplate regarding the use of force. And as 5th Circuit Judge James C. Ho noted in his concurring opinion last February, orders that include such language are “often used as a tactical device in divorce proceedings,” “are granted to virtually all who apply,” are “a tempting target for abuse,” and in some cases have been used to disarm the victims of domestic violence, leaving them “in greater danger than before.”
Are the procedural protections specified by Section 922(g)(8) enough to guarantee the “due process” that the Fifth Amendment demands before someone can be “deprived of life, liberty, or property”? The Cato Institute, joined by the Goldwater Institute, thinks not.