I’ve been saying this for months: despite “experts” just sounding the alarm moments ago: the private credit unwind that started months ago and has now spiraled into a very real liability for the economy wasn’t some unknowable tail risk lurking in the shadows.
It couldn’t have been clearer if it was a fucking neon sign blinking THIS ENDS BADLY hanging outside of the 4 train station on Wall Street so industry workers were forced to see it on their way into work every morning.
Not only did I call the private credit collapse, I also argued that it would experience a sharp downturn before the Fed stepped in to bail it out or provide a backstop, despite, once again, the widespread misconduct of mismarking positions and carrying opaque, low-quality assets on the books of the companies managing these funds.
And here we are, right on schedule, watching that script unfold with all the subtlety of Eric Swalwell on a date after 9 whiskey cocktails.
In the last two days alone, Bloomberg reports that the Federal Reserve has gone from politely observing to actively interrogating. Not in a press-release, “we’re monitoring conditions” sort of way, but boots-on-the-ground examiners asking major banks to cough up details about their exposure to private credit.
Translation: they’re not trying to understand the industry, they’re trying to figure out how bad the damage could get and who’s going to be holding the bag when it does.
And what are they likely finding? Exactly what anyone paying attention already knew. Private credit funds didn’t just lend money, they borrowed it, too. Because in good times, leverage makes returns look smooth and irresistible. It turns middling loans into “high-yield opportunities.” It creates the illusion of stability. But in bad times? That same leverage becomes a transmission mechanism, turning localized stress into systemic risk. It’s not a bug, it’s the design.
Meanwhile, the Treasury is now poking around insurers, because of course this nuclear dogshit being peddled as a financial opportunity didn’t stay neatly contained in some alternative-assets sandbox. It likely spread. Into insurance portfolios, retirement products, retail funds…basically anywhere someone was desperate enough for yield to believe the pitch. The industry ballooned to roughly $1.8 trillion (and depending on how you count it, more), all built on the comforting fiction that because it wasn’t traditional banking, it somehow wasn’t subject to traditional banking problems.
Just like we’re seeing with “magically” successful subprime lenders like Carvana, of course they’re still subject to reality. The better question is how they can avoid the assumption they have to face reality at some point. I think we know how Carvana has been doing it: f*cking with the numbers. And private credit is doing the same. Just with worse transparency.
And now suddenly regulators are “assessing spillover risk,” which is the bureaucratic equivalent of checking where the fire exits are while the building is already filling with smoke.
Let’s not pretend we don’t know where this goes. When the Fed starts mapping exposures like this, it’s not because they’re writing a research paper. It’s because they’re quietly preparing the intervention. Maybe it’s a backstop. Maybe it’s liquidity support. Maybe it’s some creatively named facility that sounds temporary but lingers for years (something like the “Assessment of Systemic Stress by Head Office Liquidity & Economic Support” plan, or A.S.S.H.O.L.E.S. for short).
Hellbound and Down 