Both Donald Trump and his legions of critics in Europe are celebrating the outcome of the latest NATO summit. The centerpiece of NATO’s renewed image of solidarity was an agreement among all Alliance members (except Spain) to boost their annual defense outlays to at least 5 percent of their yearly gross domestic product (GDP). Although NATO officials portrayed this commitment as a purely voluntary step, it appeased Trump’s long-standing demands for greater financial “burden-sharing” within the Alliance.
Hawks on both sides of the Atlantic may cheer this development, but advocates of a genuine “America first” foreign policy for Washington have little reason to celebrate. Indeed, more burden-sharing has a disturbing potential to entangle the United States in a growing array of dangerous quarrels between Europe (especially NATO’s East European members) and Russia. Thus, there could be more Ukraine-style proxy wars in our future.
European leaders apparently were willing to make major concessions to secure America’s continued entanglement in the continent’s security affairs. They even let Trump take his propaganda victory lap following the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite continued misgivings in some European capitals about the wisdom of his action. They gave the U.S. leader an even more impressive, albeit implicit, diplomatic victory lap regarding Alliance defense spending. This theme had dominated Washington’s transatlantic agenda during Trump’s first term, when he pressured the allies to fulfill repeated pledges they had made over the years to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. During the 2024 U.S. presidential campaign, his demand escalated to 5 percent – the same figure that NATO summit leaders have now adopted.
Despite any superficial appearances, the outcome of the June 2025 NATO summit was not good for the American people. A meaningful debate in the United States on the future of Washington’s transatlantic policy should not focus on the issue of burden-sharing. America’s principal need is not for more burden-sharing within NATO; our republic needs a strategic divorce from NATO.
Despite hoary propaganda about NATO being an alliance of equals, there was always a yawning gap between that image and the reality of U.S. hegemony. The United States invariably called the shots on Alliance policy regarding security issues that U.S. leaders deemed truly important anywhere in the world.
An especially graphic demonstration of how the transatlantic power relationship worked in practice came during the Cuban Missile crisis during the autumn of 1963. John F. Kennedy’s administration dispatched former ambassador W. Averell Harriman to meet with French President Charles De Gaulle about the alarming situation. Near the end of the session, De Gaulle asked Harriman if he was consulting with him about U.S. policy or “informing” him. Harriman conceded that Washington was merely informing its ally. The United States would make the final decision unilaterally, based on America’s best interests.
One consequence of that confirmation of Washington’s dominance within NATO was that France promptly developed and deployed an independent strategic nuclear deterrent and withdrew from NATO’s military structure, thus asserting an independent role for France.