April 30, 2025, marks the 50th anniversary of the final, definitive defeat of the U.S. military crusade in Vietnam. The images of U.S. helicopters desperately flying American diplomats and Washington’s high-level South Vietnamese collaborators from the roof of the U.S. embassy in Saigon effectively captured not only the chaotic environment, but also the extent of Washington’s overall policy debacle. The outcome of the war was a humiliating defeat for the United States in every respect. Vietnam’s reunification under a communist government was now an indisputable reality. Indeed, the United States finally succumbed to the pressure to establish diplomatic relations with that government in 1995.
Washington’s failed effort over more than two decades to prevent that outcome was extremely expensive financially to the United States, with more than $141 billion expended. Measured in terms of 2025 dollars, that amount would be approximately $838 billion. Even worse was the terrible cost in blood. The war took the lives of more than 58,000 American soldiers and caused an estimated 3.8 million casualties, both civilian and military, in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Widespread disillusionment about Washington’s armed crusade in Southeast Asia was evident in the United States, and for a few years, the disastrous experience seemed to inoculate the American public against supporting any similar adventures. When Ronald Reagan’s administration flirted with providing military backing for corrupt client regimes in Central America, there was noticeable pushback, especially from Democrats in Congress. “No more Vietnams” became a popular mantra throughout the country.
However, a closer look at public attitudes, especially the views of political elites in both parties, would have suggested that the change in Washington’s overall foreign policy orientation was less substantial than it seemed at first glance. There was little resistance to pro-war adventurism elsewhere in the world, as long as U.S. military personnel were not directly at risk. For example, Washington’s policy of using Islamist rebels in Afghanistan to harass Soviet occupation forces received extensive bipartisan support.
Even direct U.S. military involvement received little push back, as long as a U.S. victory was quick and decisive. That point was confirmed when U.S. forces invaded Grenada in 1983 and promptly ousted a pro-communist regime that had recently seized power. The Reagan administration’s meddling in Lebanon’s civil war, though, showed that there remained an extensive public and elite aversion to American casualties. The loss of 241 Marines in the bombing of the U.S. barracks outside Beirut immediately caused the administration to move the remaining troops to ships off shore, and that step was just a prelude to the departure of all U.S. forces from Lebanon.
Hellbound and Down 